Beyond Channel Eavesdropping: Collapse of QKD Security Assumptions from the Perspective of Forced‑Lock‑Breaking and Implications for a New Information Paradigm
With the increasing security demands of nextgeneration communication standards and the looming threat posed by quantum computers to traditional encryption methods, quantum key distribution (QKD) has emerged as a promising solution in domains such as military, government, and finance, with significant potential for further commercialization. Although QKD is theoretically unconditional secure, practical implementations often face vulnerabilities arising from imperfections in channels and devices, as well as inherent characteristics of QKD protocols. This paper investigates the probability of eavesdropping from the perspective of error rates using probabilistic analysis. Such an approach not only facilitates the detection of potential eavesdropping but also helps estimate the amount of leaked information, providing a basis for subsequent countermeasures like privacy amplification. Additionally, the probabilistic analysis sheds light on the robustness of communication channels with varying quality against eavesdropping attempts.