Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)

Post-Quantum Private Set Intersection for Small Sets

Junxin Liu, Mike Rosulek, Ni Trieu

Published Nov 12, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Are private set intersection (PSI) protocols ready for the post-quantum future? We focus on the PSI protocol of Rosulek & Trieu (''RT21'', ACM CCS 2021), which is the current state-of-the-art for PSI on small sets (less than a thousand items). The RT21 protocol presents some fundamental barriers to post-quantum security. First, although it is written in terms of an arbitrary KEM, it requires certain properties of Diffie-Hellman KEM that simply are not satisfied by any post-quantum candidates. Second, even if adapted to post-quantum KEMs, it would require an ideal permutation with blocklength larger than any known viable candidate. We show how to modify the RT21 to make it compatible with post-quantum KEM candidates like ML-KEM. We also describe a direct domain-extension construction for ideal permutations, showing how to construct a huge-block ideal permutation directly from one with smaller blocklength, such as the Keccak permutation family. Along the way, we also introduce new abstractions for oblivious key-value stores (Garimella et al., Crypto 2021) that make the analysis of these kinds of PSI protocols more modular. We implemented our protocol and evaluated its performance across different network settings and instantiations. We achieve PSI from standardized post-quantum primitives with latency as low as 0.25 ms/item and communication as low as 1.67 KiB/item. We find that the performance penalty for post-quantum security ranges from 1.25× to 5.92× in latency and is 16.7× in communication, depending on the instantiation.

DOI
10.1145/3830454.3846535

Related papers

Post-Quantum Private Set Intersection with Ultra-Efficient Online Performance

Yue Qin, Bei Liang, Hongyuan Cai +1 more

While tremendous progress has been made towards achieving highly efficient and practical Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols during the last decade, the development of post-quantum PSI is still far from satisfactory. Existing post-quantum PSI protocols encounter a dilemma: while those based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) achieve low online communication, they suffer from significant online computation; conversely, protocols based on post-quantum Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) exhibit excellent online computational performance but incur substantially high online communication. To overcome this dilemma, we present a lattice-based PSI protocol that achieves optimal online performance in both communication and computation. Our solution introduces two core innovations: a robust signal comparison algorithm based on RLWE key exchange, which determines the intersection through signal consistency rather than direct shared key comparison, and an optimized Oblivious Key–Value Stores (OKVS) implementation featuring a composite key–value mapping for efficient handling of high-dimensional RLWE polynomials. We implement the protocol and conduct extensive benchmarks in both symmetric and asymmetric set-size settings. The results show that our construction achieves the lowest online overhead in both computation and communication among all tests. For example, with asymmetric set sizes (212,11041), the online phase requires only 0.132 s, yielding 19× and 282× improvements over FHE-based (CCS’21) and OPRF-based (EUROCRYPT’25) protocols, respectively. Even at (224,11041), our online communication time is only 0.201 s, which is 226× and 184× that of FHE-based and OPRF-based PSI, respectively. Additionally, our online communication overhead is the lowest in all tests; however, this comes at the cost of heavy offline communication overhead for very large set sizes, revealing a clear trade-off between pre-computation and online efficiency. This work addresses a critical gap in post-quantum PSI by delivering a protocol that achieves balanced online communication and computational overhead, thereby enabling broader practical deployment.

Electronics•Dec 19, 2025•0 citations

Efficient post-quantum private set-intersection protocol

Nibedita Kundu, Tanmay Choudhury, Sumit Kumar Debnath

Private set intersection (PSI) is a cryptographic protocol that enables two parties to securely determine the intersection of their private datasets without revealing anything except the intersection. Most of the existing PSI protocols are based on traditional number theoretic problems, such as discrete logarithm problem and factorisation problem. Unfortunately, these protocols would be broken if efficient quantum computer emerges. The post-quantum PSI is an important alternative to traditional PSI protocols for its potential to resist future attacks of quantum computers. In this work, we present first post-quantum PSI protocol that achieves size-hiding property. Space-efficient probabilistic data structure Bloom filter along with lattice-based public key encryption are used as building blocks of our construction. It attains linear complexity and security in standard model under the decisional learning with errors (DLWE) assumption. Moreover, we extend our post-quantum PSI to its authorised variant APSI retaining all the properties.

International Journal of Information and Computer Security•Jan 1, 2022•2 citations

Compact and Malicious Private Set Intersection for Small Sets

Mike Rosulek, Ni Trieu

We describe a protocol for two-party private set intersection (PSI) based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The protocol is proven secure against malicious parties, in the ideal permutation + random oracle model.

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)•Nov 12, 2021•82 citations

Card-Based Protocols for Private Set Intersection and Union

Anastasiia Doi, Tomoki Ono, Yoshiki Abe +5 more

Abstract Card-based cryptography aims to realize secure multiparty computation with physical cards. This paper is the first to address Private Set Intersection (PSI) and Private Set Union (PSU) in card-based cryptography. PSI and PSU are well-studied secure computation protocols to compute the set intersection and the set union, respectively. We show two-party PSI and PSU protocols in each of the two operation models: one is the shuffle-based model in which parties perform all operations publicly, and the other is the private-permutation-based model that allows parties to perform some operations privately. In the shuffle-based model, we show PSI and PSU protocols can be realized with existing secure AND and OR protocols, respectively. However, these protocols have an issue of increasing the number of shuffles depending on the size of the universal set. To resolve the issue, we further propose PSI and PSU protocols with only one shuffle at the cost of increasing the number of cards. In the private-permutation-based model, we show PSI and PSU protocols can be achieved with existing secure AND and OR protocols, respectively, as in the shuffle-based protocols. These protocols have an advantage of requiring only one private permutation and one communication. We further show that the number of cards of these protocols can be reduced at the cost of increasing the number of private permutations and communications.

New Generation Computing•Jun 22, 2024•6 citations

Private set intersection: New generic constructions and feasibility results

Paolo D’Arco, María Isabel González Vasco, Ángel Luis Pérez del Pozo +2 more

In this paper we focus on protocols for private set intersection (PSI), through which two parties, each holding a set of inputs drawn from a ground set, jointly compute the intersection of their sets. Ideally, no further information than which elements are actually shared is compromised to the other party, yet the input set sizes are often considered as admissible leakage.In the unconditional setting we evidence that PSI is impossible to realize and that unconditionally secure size-hiding PSI is possible assuming a set-up authority is present in an set up phase. In the computational setting we give a generic construction using smooth projective hash functions for languages derived from perfectly-binding commitments. Further, we give two size-hiding constructions: the first one is theoretical and evidences the equivalence between PSI, oblivious transfer and the secure computation of the AND function. The second one is a twist on the oblivious polynomial evaluation construction of Freedman et al. from EUROCRYPT 2004. We further sketch a generalization of the latter using algebraic-geometric techniques. Finally, assuming again there is a set-up authority (yet not necessarily trusted) we present very simple and efficient constructions that only hide the size of the client's set.

Advances in Mathematics of Communications•Jan 1, 2017•3 citations

A Signal‐Matching Approach to RLWE‐Based PSI: Achieving Optimal Online Efficiency in 3 Rounds

Yue Qin, Bei Liang, Hongyuan Cai +2 more

In this study, we propose a novel post‐quantum private set intersection (PSI) protocol based on the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. Different from existing PSI protocols based on post‐quantum oblivious pseudorandom functions (EUROCRYPT’25) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) (CCS’21), our construction follows the Diffie–Hellman (DH)‐based PSI paradigm and uses post‐quantum key exchange to achieve PSI functionality. Our key technique is a signal matching (SigMa) mechanism, which determines whether two items match by checking the consistency of the reconciliation signals derived from their corresponding shared keys. The resulting PSI protocol completes in three rounds. In the first two rounds, the parties exchange RLWE‐based public keys associated with their items; in the third round, the sender transmits the corresponding signals. The receiver then applies SigMa to compare the received signals with its locally computed signals and thereby identify the intersection. We implement our protocol and compare it with Cong et al. (CCS’21) and Heimberger et al. (EUROCRYPT’25). Our protocol achieves the lowest online communication across all evaluated symmetric and asymmetric set‐size configurations, at the cost of additional offline communication. It also achieves the lowest online and total times among the evaluated protocols for all symmetric settings with | X | = | Y | ∈ {2 12 , 2 16 , 2 20 } and all asymmetric settings with | X | ∈ {2 12 , 2 16 , 2 20 } and | Y | ∈ {5535, 11041}. We believe that our work not only supplements existing post‐quantum PSI frameworks but also opens the opportunity for broader applications of post‐quantum PSI.

IET Information Security•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations
Are private set intersection (PSI) protocols ready for the post-quantum future? We focus on the PSI protocol of Rosulek & Trieu (''RT21'', ACM CCS 2021), which is the current state-of-the-art for PSI on small sets (less than a thousand items). The RT21 protocol presents some fundamental barriers to post-quantum security. First, although it is written in terms of an arbitrary KEM, it requires certain properties of Diffie-Hellman KEM that simply are not satisfied by any post-quantum candidates. Second, even if adapted to post-quantum KEMs, it would require an ideal permutation with blocklength larger than any known viable candidate. We show how to modify the RT21 to make it compatible with post-quantum KEM candidates like ML-KEM. We also describe a direct domain-extension construction for ideal permutations, showing how to construct a huge-block ideal permutation directly from one with smaller blocklength, such as the Keccak permutation family. Along the way, we also introduce new abstractions for oblivious key-value stores (Garimella et al., Crypto 2021) that make the analysis of these kinds of PSI protocols more modular. We implemented our protocol and evaluated its performance across different network settings and instantiations. We achieve PSI from standardized post-quantum primitives with latency as low as 0.25 ms/item and communication as low as 1.67 KiB/item. We find that the performance penalty for post-quantum security ranges from 1.25× to 5.92× in latency and is 16.7× in communication, depending on the instantiation.
While tremendous progress has been made towards achieving highly efficient and practical Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols during the last decade, the development of post-quantum PSI is still far from satisfactory. Existing post-quantum PSI protocols encounter a dilemma: while those based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) achieve low online communication, they suffer from significant online computation; conversely, protocols based on post-quantum Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) exhibit excellent online computational performance but incur substantially high online communication. To overcome this dilemma, we present a lattice-based PSI protocol that achieves optimal online performance in both communication and computation. Our solution introduces two core innovations: a robust signal comparison algorithm based on RLWE key exchange, which determines the intersection through signal consistency rather than direct shared key comparison, and an optimized Oblivious Key–Value Stores (OKVS) implementation featuring a composite key–value mapping for efficient handling of high-dimensional RLWE polynomials. We implement the protocol and conduct extensive benchmarks in both symmetric and asymmetric set-size settings. The results show that our construction achieves the lowest online overhead in both computation and communication among all tests. For example, with asymmetric set sizes (212,11041), the online phase requires only 0.132 s, yielding 19× and 282× improvements over FHE-based (CCS’21) and OPRF-based (EUROCRYPT’25) protocols, respectively. Even at (224,11041), our online communication time is only 0.201 s, which is 226× and 184× that of FHE-based and OPRF-based PSI, respectively. Additionally, our online communication overhead is the lowest in all tests; however, this comes at the cost of heavy offline communication overhead for very large set sizes, revealing a clear trade-off between pre-computation and online efficiency. This work addresses a critical gap in post-quantum PSI by delivering a protocol that achieves balanced online communication and computational overhead, thereby enabling broader practical deployment.
Private set intersection (PSI) is a cryptographic protocol that enables two parties to securely determine the intersection of their private datasets without revealing anything except the intersection. Most of the existing PSI protocols are based on traditional number theoretic problems, such as discrete logarithm problem and factorisation problem. Unfortunately, these protocols would be broken if efficient quantum computer emerges. The post-quantum PSI is an important alternative to traditional PSI protocols for its potential to resist future attacks of quantum computers. In this work, we present first post-quantum PSI protocol that achieves size-hiding property. Space-efficient probabilistic data structure Bloom filter along with lattice-based public key encryption are used as building blocks of our construction. It attains linear complexity and security in standard model under the decisional learning with errors (DLWE) assumption. Moreover, we extend our post-quantum PSI to its authorised variant APSI retaining all the properties.
Abstract Card-based cryptography aims to realize secure multiparty computation with physical cards. This paper is the first to address Private Set Intersection (PSI) and Private Set Union (PSU) in card-based cryptography. PSI and PSU are well-studied secure computation protocols to compute the set intersection and the set union, respectively. We show two-party PSI and PSU protocols in each of the two operation models: one is the shuffle-based model in which parties perform all operations publicly, and the other is the private-permutation-based model that allows parties to perform some operations privately. In the shuffle-based model, we show PSI and PSU protocols can be realized with existing secure AND and OR protocols, respectively. However, these protocols have an issue of increasing the number of shuffles depending on the size of the universal set. To resolve the issue, we further propose PSI and PSU protocols with only one shuffle at the cost of increasing the number of cards. In the private-permutation-based model, we show PSI and PSU protocols can be achieved with existing secure AND and OR protocols, respectively, as in the shuffle-based protocols. These protocols have an advantage of requiring only one private permutation and one communication. We further show that the number of cards of these protocols can be reduced at the cost of increasing the number of private permutations and communications.
In this paper we focus on protocols for private set intersection (PSI), through which two parties, each holding a set of inputs drawn from a ground set, jointly compute the intersection of their sets. Ideally, no further information than which elements are actually shared is compromised to the other party, yet the input set sizes are often considered as admissible leakage.In the unconditional setting we evidence that PSI is impossible to realize and that unconditionally secure size-hiding PSI is possible assuming a set-up authority is present in an set up phase. In the computational setting we give a generic construction using smooth projective hash functions for languages derived from perfectly-binding commitments. Further, we give two size-hiding constructions: the first one is theoretical and evidences the equivalence between PSI, oblivious transfer and the secure computation of the AND function. The second one is a twist on the oblivious polynomial evaluation construction of Freedman et al. from EUROCRYPT 2004. We further sketch a generalization of the latter using algebraic-geometric techniques. Finally, assuming again there is a set-up authority (yet not necessarily trusted) we present very simple and efficient constructions that only hide the size of the client's set.
In this study, we propose a novel post‐quantum private set intersection (PSI) protocol based on the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. Different from existing PSI protocols based on post‐quantum oblivious pseudorandom functions (EUROCRYPT’25) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) (CCS’21), our construction follows the Diffie–Hellman (DH)‐based PSI paradigm and uses post‐quantum key exchange to achieve PSI functionality. Our key technique is a signal matching (SigMa) mechanism, which determines whether two items match by checking the consistency of the reconciliation signals derived from their corresponding shared keys. The resulting PSI protocol completes in three rounds. In the first two rounds, the parties exchange RLWE‐based public keys associated with their items; in the third round, the sender transmits the corresponding signals. The receiver then applies SigMa to compare the received signals with its locally computed signals and thereby identify the intersection. We implement our protocol and compare it with Cong et al. (CCS’21) and Heimberger et al. (EUROCRYPT’25). Our protocol achieves the lowest online communication across all evaluated symmetric and asymmetric set‐size configurations, at the cost of additional offline communication. It also achieves the lowest online and total times among the evaluated protocols for all symmetric settings with | X | = | Y | ∈ {2 12 , 2 16 , 2 20 } and all asymmetric settings with | X | ∈ {2 12 , 2 16 , 2 20 } and | Y | ∈ {5535, 11041}. We believe that our work not only supplements existing post‐quantum PSI frameworks but also opens the opportunity for broader applications of post‐quantum PSI.