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Measuring Post-Quantum TLS Adoption in Brazil

Jhonatan Jauja Ccana, Eder J. Scheid

Published Oct 21, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The emergence of large-scale quantum computing threatens widely deployed public-key cryptographic algorithms used to secure Internet communications, including those employed by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Consequently, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is being progressively incorporated into TLS, particularly through hybrid key exchange mechanisms that combine classical and post-quantum algorithms. However, the actual adoption of these mechanisms across Internet services remains insufficiently characterized, especially in emerging and regional contexts. This paper addresses this gap through a measurement study of post-quantum TLS key exchange adoption among Brazilian Internet services. We analyze the top-10,000 ranked .br domains from the Tranco list, actively probing each service to identify the negotiated TLS version and key exchange group. Our results show that TLS 1.3 is already predominant, accounting for 87.3% of the measured HTTPS services with a valid TLS version, and that 4,697 of the 8,697 services with a valid key exchange group (54.0%) negotiated a post-quantum or hybrid mechanism. This adoption is highly concentrated in a single group, X25519MLKEM768, which accounts for 98.5% of the observed PQC negotiations. These findings indicate that post-quantum or hybrid key exchange mechanisms have already reached a significant deployment scale among Brazilian Internet services.

DOI
10.5753/errc.2026.35999

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The emergence of large-scale quantum computing threatens widely deployed public-key cryptographic algorithms used to secure Internet communications, including those employed by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Consequently, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is being progressively incorporated into TLS, particularly through hybrid key exchange mechanisms that combine classical and post-quantum algorithms. However, the actual adoption of these mechanisms across Internet services remains insufficiently characterized, especially in emerging and regional contexts. This paper addresses this gap through a measurement study of post-quantum TLS key exchange adoption among Brazilian Internet services. We analyze the top-10,000 ranked .br domains from the Tranco list, actively probing each service to identify the negotiated TLS version and key exchange group. Our results show that TLS 1.3 is already predominant, accounting for 87.3% of the measured HTTPS services with a valid TLS version, and that 4,697 of the 8,697 services with a valid key exchange group (54.0%) negotiated a post-quantum or hybrid mechanism. This adoption is highly concentrated in a single group, X25519MLKEM768, which accounts for 98.5% of the observed PQC negotiations. These findings indicate that post-quantum or hybrid key exchange mechanisms have already reached a significant deployment scale among Brazilian Internet services.
The emergence of quantum computing presents a fundamental challenge to the security of current Internet communication systems. Transport Layer Security (TLS), which forms the backbone of secure web communication, predominantly relies on classical public-key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), both of which are susceptible to quantum attacks. This paper conducts a large scale empirical evaluation of post-quantum readiness across 32,011 domains, with a primary focus on real-world TLS deployments across diverse sectors by analysing negotiated TLS parameters, including protocol versions, cipher suites, key exchange mechanisms, and certificates. The results indicate that while modern protocols like TLS 1.3 and QUIC are gaining adoption, 15.70% of domains especially in critical sectors such as banking and government still rely on TLS 1.2. Furthermore, 49.3% of domains support hybrid post-quantum key exchange mechanisms (e.g., MLKEM768 with X25519), whereas 50.7% continue to use classical key exchange, reflecting partial transition. Notably, 0% adoption of hybrid post-quantum certificates was observed, leaving the authentication layer vulnerable to quantum-enabled attacks such as certificate forgery. The findings reveal uneven adoption of post-quantum mechanisms across sectors, where technology driven platforms are advancing more rapidly than legacy-dependent infrastructures. Overall, the study highlights that achieving complete quantum resilience requires a coordinated transition not only in key exchange mechanisms but also in certificate infrastructures. Without such comprehensive migration, Internet communication systems remain vulnerable to long-term threats, including Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is becoming an important component of long-term trust in Internet-facing infrastructure. Publicly observable PQC support provides evidence of externally visible deployment, but does not necessarily reflect the overall progress of an organisation's post-quantum migration. This distinction matters when observable deployment is used as an indicator of organisational readiness or progress towards migration deadlines. We present a measurement study of observable PQC deployment across 4,665 UK organisations spanning ten sectors. We measure post-quantum key-exchange support across HTTPS and SMTP STARTTLS endpoints, attribute reachable endpoints to their underlying infrastructure providers where possible, and statistically examine protocol-, sector-, and provider-level deployment patterns. Among reachable endpoints, 44.0\% of HTTPS services supported at least one evaluated PQC key-exchange group, compared with 6.4\% of SMTP services. Among organisations reachable over both protocols, HTTPS support was significantly more common than SMTP support (matched odds ratio 16.89). Although deployment varied across sectors, infrastructure provider identity was substantially more predictive than organisational sector, and observable deployment was highly concentrated among a small number of providers. Only 144 organisations supported PQC across both web and email infrastructure, highlighting an uneven and fragmented migration landscape. No post-quantum certificate signatures were observed across the measured endpoints. These findings show that observable PQC deployment is currently shaped predominantly by infrastructure-provider deployment decisions and should not be interpreted as a complete measure of organisational migration readiness.
The advent of quantum computing poses significant threats to classical public-key cryptographic primitives such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. As many critical network and security protocols depend on these primitives for key exchange and authentication, there is an urgent need to understand their quantum vulnerability and assess the progress made towards integrating post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This survey provides a detailed examination of nine widely deployed protocols - TLS, IPsec, BGP, DNSSEC, SSH, QUIC, OpenID Connect, OpenVPN, and Signal Protocol - analysing their cryptographic foundations, quantum risks, and the current state of PQC migration. We find that TLS and Signal lead the transition with hybrid post-quantum key exchange already deployed at scale, while IPsec and SSH have standardised mechanisms but lack widespread production adoption. DNSSEC and BGP face the most significant structural barriers, as post-quantum signature sizes conflict with fundamental protocol constraints. Across all protocols, key exchange proves consistently easier to migrate than authentication, and protocol-level limitations such as message size and fragmentation often dominate over raw algorithm performance. We also discuss experimental deployments and emerging standards that are shaping the path towards a quantum-resistant communication infrastructure.
This thesis investigates the current state of Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in the industry, with a particular focus on its practical deployment, integration challenges, and performance implications.The study combines a structured analysis of academic literature, standardization efforts, and industry guidance with an experimental evaluation of PQC integration in widely used security protocols. The analysis shows that, while significant progress has been made in the standardization of quantum-resistant algorithms such as ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA, real-world adoption remains in an early and transitional phase. Organizations primarily focus on evaluation and pilot implementations, as deployment is constrained by interoperability issues, implementation maturity, and the complexity of migrating existing cryptographic infrastructures.To complement the conceptual analysis, experimental measurements were conducted for TLS, SSH, and IPsec to evaluate the performance impact of hybrid post-quantum cryptographic mechanisms. The results indicate that performance overhead is not uniform across components. In particular, post-quantum signature schemes introduce significant computational and network overhead, mainly due to increased key and certificate sizes. In contrast, hybrid key exchange mechanisms show only moderate performance impact across all evaluated protocols.The findings highlight that the primary challenge of PQC adoption lies not in algorithm design but in practical integration and large-scale migration. Hybrid cryptographic approaches emerge as the most viable strategy for enabling a gradual transition, balancing improved security against quantum threats with operational feasibility.Overall, this thesis demonstrates that PQC is transitioning from a theoretical research field to a practical engineering challenge, with significant implications for the future design of secure communication systems.
The emergence of quantum computing presents a significant threat to classical cryptographic primitives, particularly those employed in securing internet communications via widely used protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). As conventional key exchange mechanisms will become increasingly vulnerable in the post-quantum era, the integration of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms into existing security protocols is of utmost importance. This study investigates the impact of incorporating PQC key encapsulation mechanisms—specifically, the recent standards CRYSTALS-Kyber and HQC, in conjunction with the candidate standard BIKE—into the TLS 1.3 handshake. A comprehensive experimental evaluation was conducted to measure handshake latency under emulated network conditions with varying packet loss probabilities. The findings offer useful insights into the performance trade-offs introduced by PQC integration and further highlight the necessity of a timely transition to post-quantum cryptographic standards.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protects most Internet traffic, yet migration to post-quantum TLS (PQ-TLS) depends on more than publishing a new algorithm standard. Despite rapid standardization of the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and hybrid TLS groups, practitioners lack a structured way to assess whether deployment ecosystems are ready to adopt PQ-TLS. This letter proposes a six-dimensional readiness and adoption framework and a reproducible maturity rubric (levels 0--4). A case study of Windows, Linux, macOS, and Android applies the rubric to cited vendor documentation. The main finding is that cryptographic and protocol readiness are uniformly high across the case study, while platform and application readiness show the widest gap and act as the primary adoption bottlenecks for software that inherits OS TLS APIs. The study reports documented transition signals, not live PQ-TLS negotiation rates.