Shor's algorithm factors an n-bit integer in time polynomial in n, which would break RSA. Its asymptotic gate complexity, however, says little about what a real machine must provide, because the dominant cost is the overhead of quantum error correction. This report evaluates the computational complexity of Shor's algorithm in three layers: the logical algorithm (gate count, depth and qubits of order finding and modular exponentiation), the surface-code layer (code distance, logical error suppression, lattice surgery and magic-state production) and the physical resource layer (qubits and wall-clock time). We present a compact analytic resource model, calibrated to the published Gidney-Ekerå estimate for RSA-2048, and use it to study scaling with key size, physical error rate and reaction time. For RSA-2048 the model gives about 2.6 billion Toffoli gates, roughly 6,200 logical qubits, a code distance near 29 and about 20 million physical qubits for a runtime of about seven hours at a 0.1% physical error rate. Resource requirements grow as n3 in gates and runtime, while physical-qubit overhead is dominated by the code distance, which rises steeply as the physical error rate approaches the threshold. We also summarize how algorithmic and code improvements through 2026 have reduced published estimates by orders of magnitude.
Shor's algorithm factors an n-bit integer in time polynomial in n, which would break RSA. Its asymptotic gate complexity, however, says little about what a real machine must provide, because the dominant cost is the overhead of quantum error correction. This report evaluates the computational complexity of Shor's algorithm in three layers: the logical algorithm (gate count, depth and qubits of order finding and modular exponentiation), the surface-code layer (code distance, logical error suppression, lattice surgery and magic-state production) and the physical resource layer (qubits and wall-clock time). We present a compact analytic resource model, calibrated to the published Gidney-Ekerå estimate for RSA-2048, and use it to study scaling with key size, physical error rate and reaction time. For RSA-2048 the model gives about 2.6 billion Toffoli gates, roughly 6,200 logical qubits, a code distance near 29 and about 20 million physical qubits for a runtime of about seven hours at a 0.1% physical error rate. Resource requirements grow as n3 in gates and runtime, while physical-qubit overhead is dominated by the code distance, which rises steeply as the physical error rate approaches the threshold. We also summarize how algorithmic and code improvements through 2026 have reduced published estimates by orders of magnitude.
We significantly reduce the cost of factoring integers and computing discrete logarithms in finite fields on a quantum computer by combining techniques from Shor 1994, Griffiths-Niu 1996, Zalka 2006, Fowler 2012, Ekerå-Håstad 2017, Ekerå 2017, Ekerå 2018, Gidney-Fowler 2019, Gidney 2019. We estimate the approximate cost of our construction using plausible physical assumptions for large-scale superconducting qubit platforms: a planar grid of qubits with nearest-neighbor connectivity, a characteristic physical gate error rate of 10 − 3 , a surface code cycle time of 1 microsecond, and a reaction time of 10 microseconds. We account for factors that are normally ignored such as noise, the need to make repeated attempts, and the spacetime layout of the computation. When factoring 2048 bit RSA integers, our construction's spacetime volume is a hundredfold less than comparable estimates from earlier works (Van Meter et al. 2009, Jones et al. 2010, Fowler et al. 2012, Gheorghiu et al. 2019). In the abstract circuit model (which ignores overheads from distillation, routing, and error correction) our construction uses 3 n + 0.002 n lg n logical qubits, 0.3 n 3 + 0.0005 n 3 lg n Toffolis, and 500 n 2 + n 2 lg n measurement depth to factor n -bit RSA integers. We quantify the cryptographic implications of our work, both for RSA and for schemes based on the DLP in finite fields.
Planning the transition to quantum-safe cryptosystems requires understanding the cost of quantum attacks on vulnerable cryptosystems. In Gidney+Ekerå 2019, I co-published an estimate stating that 2048 bit RSA integers could be factored in eight hours by a quantum computer with 20 million noisy qubits. In this paper, I substantially reduce the number of qubits required. I estimate that a 2048 bit RSA integer could be factored in less than a week by a quantum computer with less than a million noisy qubits. I make the same assumptions as in 2019: a square grid of qubits with nearest neighbor connections, a uniform gate error rate of 0.1%, a surface code cycle time of 1 microsecond, and a control system reaction time of 10 microseconds. The qubit count reduction comes mainly from using approximate residue arithmetic (Chevignard+Fouque+Schrottenloher 2024), from storing idle logical qubits with yoked surface codes (Gidney+Newman+Brooks+Jones 2023), and from allocating less space to magic state distillation by using magic state cultivation (Gidney+Shutty+Jones 2024). The longer runtime is mainly due to performing more Toffoli gates and using fewer magic state factories compared to Gidney+Ekerå 2019. That said, I reduce the Toffoli count by over 100x compared to Chevignard+Fouque+Schrottenloher 2024.
We present an end-to-end resource estimation of Shor's algorithm on superconducting cat qubits, from its mathematical description to the allocation and scheduling of physical qubits on a chip layout. We review modern versions of Shor's algorithm for RSA, ECDLP and FFDLP, and make their logical circuits and trade-offs explicit. We compile the dominant subroutines down to physical-qubit operations on two architectures: one based on repetition cat codes and one on LDPC cat codes. We design a parity-Cnot gate for cat qubits, extend a multi-target Cnot gate to the LDPC-cat architecture, and adapt an active injection procedure to cat qubits. Building on these primitives, we adapt to cat qubits the adder from Gidney's 2025 resource estimate for factoring RSA-2048. We combine our adder compilation and a coarser estimate for the phaseup with the factory designs and lookup compilation from the FeMoco resource estimation of Kroell et al. Together, these lead to chip layouts and schedules for factoring RSA-2048.
Assuming a 1μs error-correction cycle time, a 10μs reaction time, circuit-level phase-flip noise with probability pZ=5×10−4 and no bit-flips, factoring RSA-2048, the configuration we compile in full, requires about 23 000 cat qubits and 3.14 days. Reusing the compiled operations, solving ECDLP on secp256k1 requires at most 30 000 cat qubits and 1 hour, and FFDLP-512, which we propose as an intermediate benchmark, about 6 700 cat qubits and 21 minutes. Trading space for time, RSA-2048 runs in 1.25 hours on about 611 000 cat qubits. The no-bit-flip requirement (a bit-flip time of about 100 years) can be relaxed to a bit-flip time of about one hour by adding a concatenation layer with a distance-3 bit-flip code, in which case RSA-2048 needs about 45 000 cat qubits.
Shor’s algorithm is a quantum algorithm that can efficiently solve the problems of integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which potentially break currently used public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. However, a significant challenge in solving these problems is the noise inherent in quantum computers. Previous research advanced fault-tolerant techniques such as surface codes to mitigate this noise in quantum computers. Analyzing the security of currently used public-key cryptosystems on fault-tolerant quantum computers is essential. In this paper, we estimate the computational cost required to solve integer factorization using Shor’s algorithm on surface codes. We evaluated computational resources required for surface codes and magic state distillation and derived the computational cost of Shor’s algorithm based on these evaluations. Our computational complexity analysis indicates that there is no significant difference in the order of complexity. However, it underscores the paramount importance of optimizing the coefficient part for future efficiency improvements.
Quantum computing promises revolutionary advances in cryptography, particularly through Shor's algorithm, which can factor large integers in polynomial time and threaten traditional RSA encryption. Through simulation experiments, our research compares Shor's algorithm implementation in ideal versus noisy quantum environments. Under ideal conditions, we factored semiprimes up to N=299 with reasonable resources, but with noise introduction, this ceiling dropped to approximately N=95, beyond which computational costs increased exponentially. The performance gap is striking: ideal simulations factored N=91 in 4 seconds, while noisy simulations required 2,600 seconds—a 650-fold increase. Our hybrid quantum-classical approach showed that noise simulation required modified circuit architectures, reducing gate count growth from 50 to 42.5 gates for comparable test numbers. Qubit requirements followed a step-function pattern in both environments, scaling from 12 qubits for N=15 to 21 qubits for N=91-95, while circuit depth increased from 11 to 17-19 units, with slightly shallower circuits in noisy conditions. In our paper, we propose a hybrid implementation strategy that addresses hardware limitations, present empirical findings on the impact of quantum noise on factoring efficiency, and evaluate the cryptographic security implications under realistic conditions. Our findings underscore the need for fault-tolerant quantum computing and error correction, especially as optimizations suggest factoring 2048-bit RSA keys would require approximately 20 million qubits running for 8 hours. This highlights the urgency in transitioning to post-quantum cryptographic algorithms like CRYSTALS-Dilithium and CRYSTALS-Kyber being standardized by NIST.
Zero-level CCZ Distillation
Magic state distillation is a key component of fault-tolerant quantum computation, as it enables the implementation of non-Clifford gates such as the T gate and the CCZ gate via gate teleportation. However, conventional distillation protocols require a large number of logical qubits and introduce substantial spatial and temporal overhead, posing a significant bottleneck for scalable fault-tolerant quantum computation. In this work, we propose a zero-level distillation protocol that efficiently generates a high-fidelity logical CCZ magic state using only physical qubits on a two-dimensional square lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions. Our method leverages the transversal T/T† operation of the [[8,3,2]] code to fault-tolerantly encode the state CCZ∣+++⟩, which is subsequently teleported to three surface-code logical qubits via lattice surgery. To enable teleportation between codes with different distances, we introduce adaptively initialized teleportation (AIT), a tailored initialization procedure for the surface code. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the logical error rate scales as pL≃300×p2 with respect to the physical error rate p. For example, the proposed method improves the logical error rate by approximately one and two orders of magnitude at p=10−3 and p=10−4, respectively, compared to conventional seven-T-gate approaches. The distillation circuit requires only 22 physical qubits, 3 logical qubits, and a circuit depth of 24, reducing the space-time overhead by a factor of approximately 5-10 compared to previous methods. This result highlights the practicality of CCZ-state distillation in early fault-tolerant quantum computation and offers a new direction toward resource-efficient physical-level magic state distillation beyond conventional T-state generation.