As health information crosses from one healthcare domain or infrastructure to another, robust confidentiality, authentication, and integrity of the electronic medical records are crucial.This study aims to present a hybrid post-quantum encryption and authentication scheme for secure medical data exchange across the border using lattice-based encryption.The framework integrates a session-key establishment mechanism based on ML-KEM, AES-256-GCM for medical-data encryption, a digital signature scheme based on ML-DSA, integrity check based on hash function and identity-bound transaction metadata.It takes into account the mathematical security model involving key encapsulation, signature verification, adversarial advantage, communication overhead and processing cost.This shows that the proposed framework takes around 0.47ms for key encapsulation, 0.55ms for decapsulation and 0.94ms for digital signing, using simulation-based evaluation.The assumed end-to-end processing time is 83.91ms for a medical record of 50 MB, and the security related communication overhead falls off to about 0.011% when the size of the medical record increases.The results of the analysis show that quantum-resistant protection can be implemented with a moderate computational and communication overhead in crossborder healthcare settings.
As health information crosses from one healthcare domain or infrastructure to another, robust confidentiality, authentication, and integrity of the electronic medical records are crucial.This study aims to present a hybrid post-quantum encryption and authentication scheme for secure medical data exchange across the border using lattice-based encryption.The framework integrates a session-key establishment mechanism based on ML-KEM, AES-256-GCM for medical-data encryption, a digital signature scheme based on ML-DSA, integrity check based on hash function and identity-bound transaction metadata.It takes into account the mathematical security model involving key encapsulation, signature verification, adversarial advantage, communication overhead and processing cost.This shows that the proposed framework takes around 0.47ms for key encapsulation, 0.55ms for decapsulation and 0.94ms for digital signing, using simulation-based evaluation.The assumed end-to-end processing time is 83.91ms for a medical record of 50 MB, and the security related communication overhead falls off to about 0.011% when the size of the medical record increases.The results of the analysis show that quantum-resistant protection can be implemented with a moderate computational and communication overhead in crossborder healthcare settings.
Enterprise databases store sensitive financial, healthcare, genomic, and governmental records requiring long-term confidentiality. However, quantum computing threatens conventional RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography through Shor’s algorithm, while harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks expose encrypted archives to future decryption. This paper proposes a lattice-based post-quantum envelope-encryption architecture that replaces conventional key-wrapping mechanisms in transparent data encryption (TDE) systems while preserving AES-256 bulk encryption. The framework integrates a hybrid Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and classical cryptographic combiner, Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) or Falcon Digital Signature Algorithm (FN-DSA) authentication, hash-chained audit logging, and policy-driven cryptographic agility. Seven algorithms support hybrid encapsulation, decapsulation, enterprise rekeying, audit verification, mode negotiation, and exposure-aware migration scheduling. An analytical performance model estimates a 9% latency increase per hybrid key-rewrapping operation, reaching 12% at the highest security level. Parallel processing reduces the projected rekeying time for ten million keys from over ten hours to under ninety seconds using 512 workers. A ten-year ML-DSA-authenticated audit trail across 1,000 tenants requires approximately 400 MB, compared with approximately 100 MB using FN-DSA. Four case studies covering financial, healthcare, genomic, and multinational systems demonstrate computationally feasible migration within one hour. Without migration, long-retention records face estimated residual exposure periods of 41–57 years under Mosca’s inequality. The findings indicate that cryptographic key management, rather than computational migration costs, represents the primary challenge in protecting enterprise databases against quantum threats. Future work includes hardware security module integration, constant-time implementations, and empirical validation under operational enterprise workloads.
The advent of quantum computing machine raises substantial threats to the existing cryptographic techniques. The extensively used RSA and ECC will be compromised by the quantum algorithms such as Shor’s. This poses a considerable risk of the unauthorized access and leakage of sensitive information, including electronic healthcare records. Conversely, symmetric encryption techniques such as AES-256, will remain safe in the post-quantum era. However, they lack capabilities to perform secure key exchange and authentication without complementary cryptographic algorithms. This issue is mitigated by the proposed hybrid, post-quantum-secure framework developed for secure storage and sharing of healthcare files. In the proposed model, the healthcare files are encrypted using AES-256, the encryption keys are securely encapsulated using CRYSTALS-Kyber, and the file authenticity and integrity are guaranteed using CRYSTALS-Dilithium driven digital signatures. The system is fully implemented in Java by adopting liboqs-java library, and is incorporated with a lightweight web interface to facilitate secure healthcare file storage and sharing. The comprehensive testing of the implementation was performed with timed key generation, key encapsulation, AES encryption/decryption and Dilithium signing/verification. Overall, the proposed technology demonstrates strong performance in its execution speed, computational efficiency, and its ability to handle large medical datasets. The experimental analysis proves that the increase in ciphertext size, introduced by the post-quantum cryptographic operations is negligible and remains constant for files of varying sizes. The demonstration confirms the feasibility of integrating post-quantum cryptography into the healthcare infrastructure in a cost-effective manner thereby ensuring post-quantum medical data security
The privacy threat, cross-border regulatory differences, and emerging quantum threat are critical challenges to secure cross-border medical data exchange.The present paper suggests a post-quantum cryptography scheme based on lattice-based schemes (LWE, Ring-LWE, Module-LWE) and code-based schemes (McEliece) in order to provide long-term security.The aim is to come up with a robust architecture that ensures confidentiality, integrity and interoperability among global healthcare systems.The implementation combines hybrid-encryption, keyencapsulation schemes, and quantum-resistant, quantum-digital signatures along with secure data transmission protocols.Experimental results demonstrate an improvement in the attack resistance of 53.04 percent and a decrease in the probability of data breach by 85.19 percent over classical cryptographic systems with a reasonable computational overhead (17.94 percent increase).The framework is resistant to algorithmic threats by Shor and Grover.The research finds that future-proof medical data exchange is imperative and can be achieved with postquantum solutions that proposed scalable and secure interoperability of healthcare across the globe.
Enterprise databases routinely hold records — financial ledgers, electronic health records, genomic biobank entries, government archives — whose confidentiality must survive for decades, yet the asymmetric key-wrapping operations that protect them today (RSA and elliptic-curve key exchange inside transparent data encryption, TDE) are efficiently broken by a sufficiently large quantum computer running Shor's algorithm. Published resource estimates for that attack have fallen roughly three orders of magnitude in thirteen years — from approximately 10^9 physical qubits in 2012 to under 10^6 in 2025 — and the harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) threat means an adversary can exfiltrate encrypted backups today and decrypt them once such a machine exists. A record's effective confidentiality horizon is therefore bounded by whichever comes first: its retention obligation, or the arrival of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC). This paper studies that boundary at the key-management layer specifically, since bulk symmetric encryption (AES-256) already resists Grover's algorithm and is out of scope. We present a lattice-based post-quantum envelope-encryption architecture that replaces the RSA/ECC key-wrapping tier of a conventional TDE key hierarchy with a hybrid ML-KEM/classical key-encapsulation combiner, authenticates key-rotation metadata with ML-DSA or FN-DSA signatures over a hash-chained audit log, and negotiates between classical-only, hybrid, and pure post-quantum modes under policy control. The design is grounded in the Module-LWE and NTRU-lattice hardness assumptions behind NIST's finalized ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and the still-draft FN-DSA (FIPS 206); we give seven explicit algorithms — hybrid encapsulation and decapsulation, enterprise-scale rekeying, signed audit and verification, crypto-agility negotiation, and exposure-ranked migration scheduling — with a composed security argument and an analytical cost model calibrated against published lattice-scheme parameters. That model puts the hybrid combiner's overhead at a modeled 9.0% added latency per key-rewrap relative to an all-classical baseline (12% at the highest NIST security level); shows full-estate rekeying of ten million keys falling from over ten hours at one worker to under ninety seconds at 512 parallel workers; and projects a signed, ML-DSA-authenticated ten-year audit trail for one thousand tenants at roughly 400 MB — about thirteen times an ECDSA baseline — a gap FN-DSA's compact, still-draft signatures narrow to roughly 100 MB. Four illustrative case studies — a 30-year financial ledger, a 50-year health/device archive, a 60-year genomic biobank, and a multinational deployment under CNSA 2.0 and EU deadlines — show migration completing in well under an hour of modeled compute for every estate, yet the two longest-horizon records would carry 41 to 57 years of residual exposure under Mosca's inequality if that migration were skipped: the key-management tier, not the migration's computational cost, is the binding constraint. The paper closes by positioning the framework against current mandates (NIST, NSA CNSA 2.0, the 2026 U.S. federal schedule, and the EU roadmap) and naming the engineering work — constant-time FN-DSA, HSM firmware support, and empirical validation — that separates this analytical architecture from a production deployment.
In healthcare environments, quantum computing poses a direct threat to classic encryption protocols, which include Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), X-rays, and Computed Tomography (CT) scans, which are vulnerable to hacking. As a result of this study, a post-quantum encryption platform is developed, deployable on the cloud, that combines NIST-standardized algorithms for post-quantum encryption, including Kyber1024 (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism, ML-KEM), a key-exchange mechanism, Advanced Encryption Standard-256 Galois/Counter Mode (AES-256-GCM) symmetric protection, and a signature production mechanism called Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm-6 Empirical analysis demonstrates significant improvements in the speed of processing, it does not perform better than Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA-2048) and other general security measurement tools in preventing the exposure of unencrypted data in transit or storage, nor does it comply with standards such as HIPAA and GDPR. Lastly, the platform can ensure the transition to a privacy-centric and innovative healthcare industry through the mass deployment of quantum-resistant defenses.
The rapid adoption of Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) devices enables real-time patient monitoring and remote diagnostics and has revolutionized healthcare delivery. Traditional cryptographic schemes like RSA and ECC, which rely on meaningful mathematical challenges, are under great threat from quantum computing, threatening sensitive medical data confidentiality and integrity. This paper proposes a quantum-resistant healthcare security framework based on lattice-based cryptographic primitives such as Learning With Errors (LWE), Ring-LWE (RLWE), and Short Integer Solution (SIS). To this end, we design a five-phase IoMT-friendly framework—Initialization, Registration, Authentication, Data Exchange, and Treatment—where each phase is backed up by lightweight cryptography primitives that can be easily implemented on the low-resource IoMT devices. Relative to the state-of-the-art lattice- and hash-based constructions, our framework involves 50-75% smaller ciphertext sizes, up to a 50% reduction of the communication overhead, and nearly 60% less in computational cost. Furthermore, the solution relies on zero-knowledge proofs, homomorphic encryption as well and attribute-based access control to guarantee strong security and privacy. Using the AVISPA tool, the framework is formally verified, showing its resistance against classical and quantum adversaries. Focusing on tangible healthcare threats, including data tampering and unlicensed access to patient diagnostics, this research paves the way for scalable, efficient, and quantum-resistant medical data protection. Our results pave the way for future investigations into secure post-quantum healthcare and IoT applications.