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IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC)

Hybrid Key Exchange for Carrier-Grade MACsec: A System-Level Performance Study

Ciarán Mullan

Published Jun 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) must extend beyond application-layer protocols to link-layer systems such as IEEE 802.1AE MACsec. However, MACsec control planes impose strict provisioning latency constraints and must scale to large numbers of Secure Associations (SAs), making post-quantum integration a systems challenge.We propose a hybrid MACsec key exchange combining elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) with post-quantum KEMs, designed to integrate with existing SA provisioning workflows without data-plane modifications. We introduce a time-to-provision-N SAs metric and evaluate ML-KEM alongside other post-quantum KEMs and ECDH on a representative ARM-based platform, with additional validation on carrier-grade MACsec hardware.Results indicate that ML-KEM is the only evaluated post-quantum KEM that supports practical hybrid integration under MACsec control-plane constraints, while others incur prohibitive overhead on the tested platform.

DOI
10.1109/iscc70364.2026.11740067

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IEEE Access•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) must extend beyond application-layer protocols to link-layer systems such as IEEE 802.1AE MACsec. However, MACsec control planes impose strict provisioning latency constraints and must scale to large numbers of Secure Associations (SAs), making post-quantum integration a systems challenge.We propose a hybrid MACsec key exchange combining elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) with post-quantum KEMs, designed to integrate with existing SA provisioning workflows without data-plane modifications. We introduce a time-to-provision-N SAs metric and evaluate ML-KEM alongside other post-quantum KEMs and ECDH on a representative ARM-based platform, with additional validation on carrier-grade MACsec hardware.Results indicate that ML-KEM is the only evaluated post-quantum KEM that supports practical hybrid integration under MACsec control-plane constraints, while others incur prohibitive overhead on the tested platform.
The Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) underpins Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) by establishing secure associations and negotiating cryptographic keys. Its reliance on classical public-key primitives such as Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) renders it vulnerable to quantum attacks, as Shor’s algorithm can break these schemes once large-scale quantum computers become available. To address this challenge, we integrate post-quantum cryptography into IKEv2 using a hybrid key exchange combining ECDH over P-384 with the ML-KEM-768 parameter set of the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), following Request for Comments (RFC) 9370 and RFC 9242. We present a Fragmentation Boundary Model that identifies when post-quantum payloads approach or exceed the non-fragmenting IKE_SA_INIT payload budget across ML-KEM parameter sets, Internet Protocol (IP) versions, and effective path maximum transmission units (PMTUs). We implemented the hybrid design on a Texas Instruments TM4C1294 microcontroller running FreeRTOS and CycloneTCP, and measured its execution time, memory footprint, and network overhead. Across 150 successful handshakes per configuration, mean Security Association establishment time increased from 3390.4 to 3488.6 ms, an overhead of 98.2 ms (2.9%). Flash use increased by 8%, random-access memory (RAM) use by 5%, and total IKEv2 traffic size by 42%, while no IP fragmentation was observed under the evaluated Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) conditions. These findings establish the feasibility of the evaluated hybrid configuration on the TM4C1294 platform and provide a platform-specific baseline for further evaluation of quantum-resilient IPsec on embedded automotive architectures.
The security of state-of-the-art Bluetooth pairing relies on Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH), which is vulnerable to quantum attacks. However, the feasibility of integrating standardized Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) primitives into the controller-level Bluetooth Classic (BC) protocol stack remains an open question. This paper presents the first comprehensive evaluation of integrating a post-quantum secure key exchange for BC pairing. We analyze the impact of replacing the existing ECDH-based key establishment with NIST-standardized PQC Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs), focusing on protocol-level packetization, over-the-air transmission overhead, and execution performance in constrained hardware. Using BC’s Link Manager Protocol (LMP) and DM1 packet structure, we quantify Public Parameter Transmission (PPT) latency for classical and post-quantum schemes. We further benchmark ECDH and ML-KEM implementations on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller with characteristics comparable to those of constrained Bluetooth controllers. Our results show that ML-KEM is computationally feasible on such hardware, often matching or outperforming classical ECDH in execution time. However, PQC significantly increases over-the-air overhead. Under ML-KEM, PPT accounts for 60–75% of total key exchange latency, compared to less than 10% for ECDH. Code-based schemes such as HQC are shown to be impractical due to excessive memory and transmission requirements under provided hardware constraints. These findings indicate that the primary obstacle to post-quantum Bluetooth pairing is not computation but wireless packetization, reliability, and energy consumption; facilitating a safe and efficient quantum-secure migration of resource-constrained wireless communication settings.
Traditional public-key cryptography algorithms, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. More critically, security protocols based on these algorithms are exposed to the “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” threat, an ongoing risk that emphasizes the urgency of transitioning to post-quantum cryptography. This transition presents a significant challenge for lightweight security protocols, such as Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC), which are designed for IoT environments. To address this, a PQ/T hybrid key exchange construction for EDHOC is proposed, combining post-quantum mechanisms alongside traditional algorithms to mitigate future quantum threats while remaining secure against current threats using well-established classical cryptography. The scheme is evaluated on a CortexM4 processor, demonstrating the best performance with ML-KEM-512, with a slight increase in processing time, limited RAM overhead, and a roughly sevenfold increase in message size. Despite these trade-offs, the hybrid construction remains practical and represents a viable option for enhancing EDHOC security in anticipation of the post-quantum era in constrained environments.
The migration of remote-access and industrial communication systems from classical public-key cryptography to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) requires careful evaluation at both the protocol and system levels. This paper presents PQC-E2E-CA, a system-level evaluation framework for reviewing post-quantum and hybrid cryptographic configurations in Secure Shell (SSH). The framework integrates OQS-enabled OpenSSH and OpenSSL with Linux netem network emulation, automated experiment execution, SCP integrity verification, and statistical post-processing. The evaluation separates key exchange behavior from host key authentication. Specifically, it measures ML-KEM and hybrid ML-KEM as SSH key exchange mechanisms, and ML-DSA as a host-key signature mechanism. Experiments are conducted under controlled RTT and packet-loss conditions using a gateway virtualised client-server testbed. The results show that ML-KEM and hybrid ML-KEM can be integrated into SSH without prohibitive application-level session setup overhead in the evaluated environment. Among the evaluated configurations, ML-KEM-768 demonstrates comparatively lower SSH session establishment latency at 50 ms RTT with 0% packet loss. ML-DSA-44 achieves the lowest host-key authentication latency under the same conditions and maintains relatively stable performance at 150 ms RTT with 5% packet loss. SCP throughput results for 100 MB and 200 MB transfers indicate that sustained transfer performance is mainly influenced by RTT and transport-layer dynamics using a single dominant key exchange configuration. These findings support migration toward standardized post-quantum mechanisms in SSH-based gateway and remote-access environments, provided that algorithm choice and system configuration are validated under representative workloads and network conditions.
Quantum computing threatens classical key exchange protocols such as Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH). Post-quantum schemes like Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman (SIDH) offer quantum resistance but at notable computational and communication costs. We propose DualSecure Key Exchange (DSKE), a hybrid protocol that integrates the classical security of ECDH with the quantum resistance of SIDH. Methodology: DSKE jointly derives two shared secrets -KECDH via elliptic-curve scalar multiplication over a 256-bit prime field and KSIDHvia supersingular isogeny mappings—then fuses them using a secure KDF (e.g., SHA-3): K=KDF(KECDH || KSIDH). We formalize core operations and asymptotics (ECDH O(n3); SIDH O(mlog m)), specify key materials, and fix parameter choices aligned with established baselines (e.g., Curve25519 for ECDH and standard SIKE/SIDH parameter sets) to ensure reproducibility. Experimental settings: Evaluations were conducted on an Intel Core i7 with 16 GB RAM using Python-based cryptographic libraries, with repeated trials for timing stability. Results: DSKE achieves runtime = 6.6 ms versus ECDH = 1.2 ms and SIDH = 5.4 ms; communication = 512 bytes versus ECDH = 128 bytes and SIDH = 384 bytes; and key size 1024 bits (hybrid) versus 256 bits (ECDH) and 768 bits (SIDH). Comparative analysis against SIKE further contextualizes DSKE’s efficiency–security trade-off. Security strength follows the minimum of the constituent levels; with a 256-bit prime for ECDH (=128-bit classical) and standard SIDH/SIKE parameters (targeting =128-bit quantum), the fused key maintains an effective 128-bit level under the stated assumptions and KDF construction. These results indicate that DSKE offers a balanced pathway toward post-quantum readiness, particularly for long-lived, security-critical deployments that can tolerate modest overheads for dual-layer protection.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to conventional public-key cryptographic systems, particularly resource-constrained mobile and cyber-physical environments. To address this challenge, this study proposes an implementation-oriented unified hybrid key derivation framework that integrates the Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE-P256) and post-quantum ML-KEM-768 algorithm for quantum-resilient secure communication. The proposed approach combines independently generated classical and post-quantum shared secrets through a lightweight mixing step followed by HKDF-SHA256 extraction and expansion to derive a unified 256-bit session key. This design preserves forward secrecy while enhancing resilience against quantum adversaries without requiring substantial modifications to the existing communication infrastructures. The framework was implemented on a heterogeneous testbed consisting of an x86_64 client and ARM64-based Android device. Experimental evaluations were conducted across 27 test configurations under three network latency conditions (50, 150, and 500 ms) using payload sizes of 64, 1024, and 10240 KB. Each configuration was executed for 1000 iterations to ensure statistically reliable measurements. The results demonstrate that, compared with standalone ECDHE-P256 and standalone ML-KEM-768, the proposed hybrid framework introduces only minimal computational overhead while maintaining stable resource utilization. Furthermore, network latency contributes more significantly to end-to-end communication delay than cryptographic processing overhead, indicating that the integration of classical and post-quantum cryptographic mechanisms does not constitute a major performance bottleneck. Overall, the proposed implementation-oriented framework provides a practical and lightweight transition strategy to quantum-resilient secure communication in heterogeneous mobile, IoT, and cyber-physical environments.