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Observational Equivalence of Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions and the Role of Different Observations

Werndl, Charlotte

Published Jan 1, 2011• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Recently some results have been presented which show that certain kinds of deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent (Werndl 2009a, 2010). This paper focuses on some philosophical questions prompted by these results. More specifically, first, I will discuss the philosophical comments made by mathematicians about observational equivalence, in particular Ornstein and Weiss (1991). Their comments are vague, and I will argue that, according to a reasonable interpretation, they are misguided. Second, the results on observational equivalence raise the question of whether the deterministic or indeterministic description is preferable relative to all evidence. If none of them is preferable, there is underdetermination. I will criticize Winnie's (1998) argument that, by appealing to different observations, one finds that the deterministic description is preferable. In particular, I will clarify a confusion in this argument. Furthermore, I will argue that if the concern is a strong kind of underdetermination, the argument delivers the desired conclusion but this conclusion is trivial; and for other kinds of underdetermination of interest the argument fails.

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Observational Equivalence of Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions and the Role of Different Observations

Werndl, Charlotte

Recently some results have been presented which show that certain kinds of deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent (Werndl 2009a, 2010). This paper focuses on some philosophical questions prompted by these results. More specifically, first, I will discuss the philosophical comments made by mathematicians about observational equivalence, in particular Ornstein and Weiss (1991). Their comments are vague, and I will argue that, according to a reasonable interpretation, they are misguided. Second, the results on observational equivalence raise the question of whether the deterministic or indeterministic description is preferable relative to all evidence. If none of them is preferable, there is underdetermination. I will criticize Winnie's (1998) argument that, by appealing to different observations, one finds that the deterministic description is preferable. In particular, I will clarify a confusion in this argument. Furthermore, I will argue that if the concern is a strong kind of underdetermination, the argument delivers the desired conclusion but this conclusion is trivial; and for other kinds of underdetermination of interest the argument fails.

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Although logical empiricism is now mostly decried, their naturalist claim that the content of a theory can be read off from its structure, without any philosophical considerations needed, still supports traditional strategies to escape cases of underdetermination. The appeal to theoretical equivalence or to theoretical virtues, for instance, both assume that there is a neutral standpoint from which the structure of the theories can be analyzed, the physically relevant from the superfluous separated, and a comparison made between their theoretical content and virtues. In my dissertation, I examine the presuppositions upon which such strategies depend. I argue that the methodological principle underlying them, according to which theories with no superfluous structure should be preferred, is unpractical, for what constitutes relevant structure is determined by epistemic considerations about the aim of scientific theories.\nIn chapter 1, I analyze the claim that theories with ordinary bosons and fermions are theoretically equivalent to theories with exotic `paraparticles'. I argue that this claim does not do justice to the latter, as the proof is formulated in a vocabulary parochial to the former and thus favors one of the theory while giving an impoverished version of the second.\nIn chapter 2, I examine recent arguments to the effects that any interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that can offer a no-go theorem against paraparticles possesses an explanatory advantage over other interpretations and should, as such, be favored over others. Given that most physicists consider paraparticles as surplus structure whose non-observation does not require an explanation, I evaluate arguments of both sides and suggest a third way to approach the question.\nFinally, in chapter 3, I turn my attention to methods for excluding another kind of unphysical structure, mathematical artifacts, from rival dark matter models. Simulations are our only window into what rival models predict about the universe’s structure. But for them to play a useful role in generating knowledge, we need to distinguish reliably between real predictions and artifacts. I argue that robustness analysis fails to fulfill this task. I propose in its place another methodology, that of crucial simulations.

•Jan 1, 2019•2 citations
Recently some results have been presented which show that certain kinds of deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent (Werndl 2009a, 2010). This paper focuses on some philosophical questions prompted by these results. More specifically, first, I will discuss the philosophical comments made by mathematicians about observational equivalence, in particular Ornstein and Weiss (1991). Their comments are vague, and I will argue that, according to a reasonable interpretation, they are misguided. Second, the results on observational equivalence raise the question of whether the deterministic or indeterministic description is preferable relative to all evidence. If none of them is preferable, there is underdetermination. I will criticize Winnie's (1998) argument that, by appealing to different observations, one finds that the deterministic description is preferable. In particular, I will clarify a confusion in this argument. Furthermore, I will argue that if the concern is a strong kind of underdetermination, the argument delivers the desired conclusion but this conclusion is trivial; and for other kinds of underdetermination of interest the argument fails.
Recently some results have been presented which show that certain kinds of deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent (Werndl 2009a, 2010). This paper focuses on some philosophical questions prompted by these results. More specifically, first, I will discuss the philosophical comments made by mathematicians about observational equivalence, in particular Ornstein and Weiss (1991). Their comments are vague, and I will argue that, according to a reasonable interpretation, they are misguided. Second, the results on observational equivalence raise the question of whether the deterministic or indeterministic description is preferable relative to all evidence. If none of them is preferable, there is underdetermination. I will criticize Winnie's (1998) argument that, by appealing to different observations, one finds that the deterministic description is preferable. In particular, I will clarify a confusion in this argument. Furthermore, I will argue that if the concern is a strong kind of underdetermination, the argument delivers the desired conclusion but this conclusion is trivial; and for other kinds of underdetermination of interest the argument fails.
This article focuses on three themes concerning determinism and indeterminism. The first is observational equivalence between deterministic and indeterministic models. The article discusses several results about observational equivalence and presents an argument on how to choose between deterministic and indeterministic models involving indirect evidence. The second is whether Newtonian physics is indeterministic. The article argues that the answer depends on what one takes Newtonian mechanics to be and highlights how contemporary debates on this issue differ from those in the nineteenth century. The third theme is how the method of arbitrary functions can be used to make sense of deterministic probabilities. The article discusses various ways of interpreting the initial probability distributions and argues that they are best understood as physical, biological, and other quantities characterizing the particular situation. The fact that the method of arbitrary functions deserves more attention than it has received so far is also emphasized.
This paper argues that, where deterministic and indeterministic formulations agree on empirically corroborated structure while differing in their completion of structure that remains empirically underdetermined, features invariant across these formulations warrant ontological commitment, whereas any warrant attaching to features that vary across them is categorically more provisional. Because deterministic and indeterministic completions are always formally available, while additional grounds for preferring particular completions are contingent and defeasible, empirically corroborated structure alone cannot determine whether reality is fundamentally deterministic or indeterministic, or whether that very distinction belongs only to specific representations of it. On this basis, I advance a model-invariance criterion according to which structural features are candidates for realist commitment insofar as they are empirically corroborated within a regime and preserved across the admissible formulations of that structure. I show how such invariant content can be characterised in mathematically intelligible ways, yielding a fallibilist form of structural realism grounded in model-invariance rather than in the specific form of any given mathematical representation. Features such as conservation relations, invariant measures, symmetries, and probability or correlation structures over observable histories may satisfy this criterion. By contrast, the localisation of modal selection---whether in fine-grained initial conditions, stochastic outcomes, or state-update and collapse mechanisms---may vary across empirically admissible formulations and therefore constitute a gauge-like representational freedom. This framework offers a realist ontology for modern physics that combines empirical openness with resistance to metaphysical overreach.
Abstract Is the world deterministic and can we ever know whether it is or is not so? This chapter critically evaluates recent results that bear on these issues, and points out the relation to probabilities. While results from classical physics are neither fully relevant nor conclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism beyond doubt. However, whether the quantum world is indeterministic crucially depends on how the measurement problem is solved. There are both deterministic and indeterministic contenders in this field, some of them empirically equivalent to another one. This is shown using the deterministic Bohm theory and Nelsonsion mechanics, which is indeterministic. Two arguments that purport to establish indeterminism and that rely on Gleason's theorem and on Conway and Kochen's recent Free Will Theorem are shown to be wanting.
Although logical empiricism is now mostly decried, their naturalist claim that the content of a theory can be read off from its structure, without any philosophical considerations needed, still supports traditional strategies to escape cases of underdetermination. The appeal to theoretical equivalence or to theoretical virtues, for instance, both assume that there is a neutral standpoint from which the structure of the theories can be analyzed, the physically relevant from the superfluous separated, and a comparison made between their theoretical content and virtues. In my dissertation, I examine the presuppositions upon which such strategies depend. I argue that the methodological principle underlying them, according to which theories with no superfluous structure should be preferred, is unpractical, for what constitutes relevant structure is determined by epistemic considerations about the aim of scientific theories.\nIn chapter 1, I analyze the claim that theories with ordinary bosons and fermions are theoretically equivalent to theories with exotic `paraparticles'. I argue that this claim does not do justice to the latter, as the proof is formulated in a vocabulary parochial to the former and thus favors one of the theory while giving an impoverished version of the second.\nIn chapter 2, I examine recent arguments to the effects that any interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that can offer a no-go theorem against paraparticles possesses an explanatory advantage over other interpretations and should, as such, be favored over others. Given that most physicists consider paraparticles as surplus structure whose non-observation does not require an explanation, I evaluate arguments of both sides and suggest a third way to approach the question.\nFinally, in chapter 3, I turn my attention to methods for excluding another kind of unphysical structure, mathematical artifacts, from rival dark matter models. Simulations are our only window into what rival models predict about the universe’s structure. But for them to play a useful role in generating knowledge, we need to distinguish reliably between real predictions and artifacts. I argue that robustness analysis fails to fulfill this task. I propose in its place another methodology, that of crucial simulations.