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IACR Communications in Cryptology

A Survey on Security Reductions in Post-Quantum Cryptography

Thomas Attema, Ronald Cramer, Serge Fehr, Yu‐Hsuan Huang, Bor de Kock, Jana Sotáková

Published Oct 26, 2026• 0 citations
PDF (CC BY)Publisher

Abstract

It is obviously necessary that the security of post-quantum cryptographic schemes is based on computational problems that are hard to solve even with a quantum computer (unlike, e.g., factoring). Examples of such computational problems appear in the theory of lattices or in coding theory. However, this is not sufficient: also the security proof, which comes in the form of an algorithmic reduction that turns any hypothetical attacker into an algorithm that solves the considered hard computational problem, needs to be valid when considering quantum computing as the model of computation. In this work, we provide an overview of the hurdles one typically encounters when proving the security of post-quantum cryptographic schemes, and we elaborate on some of the mathematical techniques that have been developed in order to overcome these hurdles (to some extent). We also analyze the caveat that even when a security proof can be established (by reducing the security to a quantum-hard computational problem), the reduction often suffers from a larger reduction loss, compared to when proving classical security, which negatively affects the concrete security. In the second part of this work, we offer a survey of the respective reduction losses in (1) generic transformations that are often used in the design of cryptographic schemes (like the Fiat-Shamir and Fujisaki-Okamoto transformations), and (2) some concrete cryptographic schemes (with a focus on those standardized by NIST), when considering classical and when considering post-quantum security. Finally, we investigate how these reduction losses translate into bit security, the standard measure of the concrete security of a cryptographic scheme (or of the hardness of an underlying computational problem). A natural question is how the bit security is affected by the different reduction losses we encountered. Surprisingly, we observe that a better or worse reduction (in terms of the reduction loss) is not always reflected as such in the bit security. We explain this phenomenon by the fact that the bit security is oblivious to the actual advantage–time function, and instead considers a worst-case behavior of that function. Thus, by exploiting the actual advantage–time function there is potential to get more accurate (i.e., less conservative) estimates for the concrete security.

DOI
10.62056/a0zo-49p1

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It is obviously necessary that the security of post-quantum cryptographic schemes is based on computational problems that are hard to solve even with a quantum computer (unlike, e.g., factoring). Examples of such computational problems appear in the theory of lattices or in coding theory. However, this is not sufficient: also the security proof, which comes in the form of an algorithmic reduction that turns any hypothetical attacker into an algorithm that solves the considered hard computational problem, needs to be valid when considering quantum computing as the model of computation. In this work, we provide an overview of the hurdles one typically encounters when proving the security of post-quantum cryptographic schemes, and we elaborate on some of the mathematical techniques that have been developed in order to overcome these hurdles (to some extent). We also analyze the caveat that even when a security proof can be established (by reducing the security to a quantum-hard computational problem), the reduction often suffers from a larger reduction loss, compared to when proving classical security, which negatively affects the concrete security. In the second part of this work, we offer a survey of the respective reduction losses in (1) generic transformations that are often used in the design of cryptographic schemes (like the Fiat-Shamir and Fujisaki-Okamoto transformations), and (2) some concrete cryptographic schemes (with a focus on those standardized by NIST), when considering classical and when considering post-quantum security. Finally, we investigate how these reduction losses translate into bit security, the standard measure of the concrete security of a cryptographic scheme (or of the hardness of an underlying computational problem). A natural question is how the bit security is affected by the different reduction losses we encountered. Surprisingly, we observe that a better or worse reduction (in terms of the reduction loss) is not always reflected as such in the bit security. We explain this phenomenon by the fact that the bit security is oblivious to the actual advantage–time function, and instead considers a worst-case behavior of that function. Thus, by exploiting the actual advantage–time function there is potential to get more accurate (i.e., less conservative) estimates for the concrete security.
Abstract It is viewed as revolutionary technology, offering incredible potential in terms of computing power within different scientific and industrial sectors. Quantum computers provide remarkable computing power; however, they also present significant security risks to existing public-key cryptography systems used to secure digital communication, online banking systems, government, medical applications, cloud computing systems, and IoT systems. Security of commonly used encryption schemes like RSA, DH, and ECC depends on mathematical problems that are impossible for classical computers to solve but can be easily resolved with the help of powerful enough quantum computers by using Shor’s algorithm. Furthermore, Grover’s algorithm makes exhaustive search attacks much faster, thus effectively lowering the security level of symmetric encryption schemes since it provides the speed-up for brute-force attacks. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) turned out to be an effective and scalable method to protect digital data from attacks using quantum computing. In contrast to quantum cryptography, which requires a special quantum communication channel, PQC uses classical cryptographic algorithms that cannot be broken down by either classical or quantum computer due to certain mathematical problems. This research paper offers an extensive exploration of post-quantum cryptography through the analysis of the development of quantum computing, weaknesses of current cryptographic techniques, and mathematics behind quantum-resistant algorithms. Moreover, this paper explores the major classes of PQC techniques such as lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography and provides details about their security and application. Moreover, the report gives an overview of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project and analyzes recent standardizations of quantum-proof algorithms to be utilized in future digital infrastructures. Keywords: Post-Quantum Encryption, Quantum Security, Quantum-Proof Public-Key Cryptography, Lattice-Based Security Protocols, ML-KEM Key Encapsulation Mechanism, ML-DSA Digital Signature Algorithm, NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography, Contemporary Cybersecurity, Secure Communications, Cryptographic Algorithms.
This thesis explores key literature on lattice-based post-quantum cryptography and its elements. Chapter 2 introduces key computational concepts, including complexity theory and various models of computation, to establish the theoretical basis for cryptographic security. Chapter 3 provides an overview of classical cryptographic techniques, setting the stage for the transition to quantum-resistant approaches. Chapters 4 and 5 investigate lattice theory and its associated hard problems. Chapter 6 focuses on classical algorithms for lattice reduction that are relevant to both analyzing and solving lattice-based cryptographic problems. Appendices A and B supplement the main content with relevant mathematical back- ground and introductory concepts in quantum computing.
The advent of a full-scale quantum computer will severely impact most currently-used cryptographic systems. The most well-known aspect of this impact lies in the computational-hardness assumptions that underpin the security of most current public-key cryptographic systems: a quantum computer can factor integers and compute discrete logarithms in polynomial time, thereby breaking systems based on these problems. However, simply replacing these problems by other which are (believed to be) impervious even to a quantum computer does not completely solve the issue. Indeed, many security proofs of cryptographic systems are no longer valid in the presence of a quantum-capable attacker; while this does not automatically implies that the affected systems would be broken by a quantum computer, it does raises questions on the exact security guarantees that they can provide. This overview document aims to analyze all aspects of the impact of quantum computers on cryptographic, by providing an overview of current quantum-hard computational problems (and cryptographic systems based on them), and by presenting the security proofs that are affected by quantum-attackers, detailing what is the current status of research on the topic and what the expected effects on security are.
The advent of a full-scale quantum computer will severely impact most currently-used cryptographic systems.The most well-known aspect of this impact lies in the computational-hardness assumptions that underpin the security of most current public-key cryptographic systems: a quantum computer can factor integers and compute discrete logarithms in polynomial time, thereby breaking systems based on these problems.However, simply replacing these problems by other which are (believed to be) impervious even to a quantum computer does not completely solve the issue.Indeed, many security proofs of cryptographic systems are no longer valid in the presence of a quantum-capable attacker; while this does not automatically implies that the affected systems would be broken by a quantum computer, it does raises questions on the exact security guarantees that they can provide.This overview document aims to analyze all aspects of the impact of quantum computers on cryptographic, by providing an overview of current quantum-hard computational problems (and cryptographic systems based on them), and by presenting the security proofs that are affected by quantum-attackers, detailing what is the current status of research on the topic and what the expected effects on security are.
The landscape of modern cryptography is fundamentally challenged by the advent of quantum computing. Current public-key cryptosystems, which form the bedrock of secure digital communication, rely on the computational hardness of problems such as integer factorization (RSA) and the discrete logarithm problem (ECC). However, Shor's algorithm, if implemented on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, can efficiently break these schemes, rendering them insecure. This paper explores the critical transition from these classical number theory problems to lattice-based cryptography, presenting a comprehensive analysis of the motivations, theoretical underpinnings, and practical implications for forging post-quantum cryptographic security. We delve into the mathematical foundations of lattice problems, such as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and Learning With Errors (LWE), which are believed to resist known quantum algorithms. Through a thorough literature review, we trace the evolution of cryptographic thought, detailing the vulnerabilities of pre-quantum schemes and the emergence of lattice-based constructions as leading candidates for post-quantum standardization. The methodology outlines a comparative theoretical analysis of security, efficiency, and robustness against both classical and quantum attacks. Results demonstrate the compelling advantages of lattice-based schemes in terms of provable security reductions and resistance to quantum threats, albeit with considerations for increased key and ciphertext sizes. The discussion highlights the challenges and opportunities in the deployment and standardization of these new cryptographic primitives, emphasizing their critical role in securing future digital infrastructures. This work concludes that lattice-based cryptography offers a robust and theoretically sound pathway to establishing enduring security in a quantum-threatened world.
Shor's quantum factoring algorithm and a few other efficient quantum algorithms break many classical crypto-systems. In response, people proposed post-quantum cryptography based on computational problems that are believed hard even for quantum computers. However, security of these schemes against \emph{quantum} attacks is elusive. This is because existing security analysis (almost) only deals with classical attackers and arguing security in the presence of quantum adversaries is challenging due to unique quantum features such as no-cloning. This work proposes a general framework to study which classical security proofs can be restored in the quantum setting. Basically, we split a security proof into (a sequence of) classical security reductions, and investigate what security reductions are "quantum-friendly". We characterize sufficient conditions such that a classical reduction can be "lifted" to the quantum setting. We then apply our lifting theorems to post-quantum signature schemes. We are able to show that the classical generic construction of hash-tree based signatures from one-way functions and and a more efficient variant proposed in~\cite{BDH11} carry over to the quantum setting. Namely, assuming existence of (classical) one-way functions that are resistant to efficient quantum inversion algorithms, there exists a quantum-secure signature scheme. We note that the scheme in~\cite{BDH11} is a promising (post-quantum) candidate to be implemented in practice and our result further justifies it. Finally we demonstrate the generality of our framework by showing that several existing works (Full-Domain hash in the quantum random-oracle model~\cite{Zha12ibe} and the simple hybrid arguments framework in~\cite{HSS11}) can be reformulated under our unified framework.