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Electronics

Master-Trapdoor-Free Post-Quantum Multi-Authority Authentication via User-Local Lattice Capability Aggregation

Jinhong Chen, Xueguang Zhou, Wei Fu

Published Oct 21, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Cross-organizational authentication often requires credentials from several authorities. We construct a lattice-based protocol with independently issued capabilities bound to a periodic pseudonym authenticated by a trusted user registry and aggregated locally into one proof. Setup requires no system-wide lattice master trapdoor or cross-authority joint lattice secret. Repartitioning a fixed witness among authorities preserves the aggregate relation and proof dimensions. We prove fixed-witness selective unforgeability of the ideal protocol under honest issuance, authentication-signature security, normal-form module learning with errors (Module-LWE), and homogeneous module short-integer solution (Module-SIS). The proof uses classical random oracles, a programmable extendable-output function (XOF), an integer norm certificate, and a reference sampler with quantified error. A C++17 research prototype was evaluated in 23 configurations. Its 78,522-byte token becomes smaller than the per-attribute Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)-44 reference at 33 attributes and is 49.51% smaller at 64 attributes. With 64 attributes and 64 authorities, online signing and prepared verification took 56.038 and 8.729 ms, respectively. Complete local cold signing took 370.050 ms, and public matrices for 64 capabilities occupied 29.75 mebibytes (MiB). Aggregation reduces repeated token communication for larger witnesses, at the cost of preparation, public-state storage, and higher measured computation than the ML-DSA references.

DOI
10.3390/electronics15204860

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IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing•Feb 19, 2025•11 citations
Cross-organizational authentication often requires credentials from several authorities. We construct a lattice-based protocol with independently issued capabilities bound to a periodic pseudonym authenticated by a trusted user registry and aggregated locally into one proof. Setup requires no system-wide lattice master trapdoor or cross-authority joint lattice secret. Repartitioning a fixed witness among authorities preserves the aggregate relation and proof dimensions. We prove fixed-witness selective unforgeability of the ideal protocol under honest issuance, authentication-signature security, normal-form module learning with errors (Module-LWE), and homogeneous module short-integer solution (Module-SIS). The proof uses classical random oracles, a programmable extendable-output function (XOF), an integer norm certificate, and a reference sampler with quantified error. A C++17 research prototype was evaluated in 23 configurations. Its 78,522-byte token becomes smaller than the per-attribute Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)-44 reference at 33 attributes and is 49.51% smaller at 64 attributes. With 64 attributes and 64 authorities, online signing and prepared verification took 56.038 and 8.729 ms, respectively. Complete local cold signing took 370.050 ms, and public matrices for 64 capabilities occupied 29.75 mebibytes (MiB). Aggregation reduces repeated token communication for larger witnesses, at the cost of preparation, public-state storage, and higher measured computation than the ML-DSA references.
Anonymous authentication schemes such as group signatures and anonymous credentials are important privacy-protecting tools in electronic communications. The only currently known scheme based on assumptions that resist quantum attacks is the group signature scheme by Gordon et al. (ASIACRYPT 2010). We present a generalization of group signatures called anonymous attribute tokens where users are issued attribute-containing credentials that they can use to anonymously sign messages and generate tokens revealing only a subset of their attributes. We present two lattice-based constructions of this new primitive, one with and one without opening capabilities for the group manager. The latter construction directly yields as a special case the first lattice-based group signature scheme offering full anonymity (in the random-oracle model), as opposed to the practically less relevant notion of chosen-plaintext anonymity offered by the scheme of Gordon et al. We also extend our scheme to protect users from framing attacks by the group manager, where the latter creates tokens or signatures in the name of honest users. Our constructions involve new lattice-based tools for aggregating signatures and verifiable CCA2-secure encryption.
With the standardization of post-quantum signature schemes such as Dilithium and Falcon, lattice-based ring signatures have become a promising tool for anonymous authentication and privacy-preserving encryption in big data environments. Specifically, the DualRing-LB scheme (CRYPTO’ 21), despite its short signatures and elegant structure, suffers from the large public key size, which dominates its communication cost and hinders scalability. There are two methods to reduce the public key size: the first is a compression technique, and the second is the bimodal distribution. The former discards the lower bits of the public key while the latter utilizes a smaller modulus. However, the unforgeability proof of DualRing-LB is incompatible with these methods because they lead to a rapid increase in the norm bound of the module short integer solution (or MSIS) problem, thereby significantly reducing security. In this paper, we follow the original security method of DualRing-LB and apply the trapdoor sampling technique to derive a tighter upper bound of MSIS problem, yielding a fixed security level independent of the ring size. The new proof result enables the use of both the compression technique and the bimodal distribution to enhance the communication efficiency of lattice-based DualRing schemes. Based on this result, we propose three practical lattice-based instantiations that reduce the public key size by 56%, 67%, 50%, compared to DualRing-LB, respectively, and achieve overall size reductions of at least 52%, 56%, 38%, respectively, across different ring sizes. Our results can contribute to lightweight, privacy-preserving cryptographic mechanisms for secure data sharing and authentication in large-scale distributed systems.
Threshold signature schemes allow a group of users to jointly generate a digital signature, providing resilience against faults and enhancing decentralization. With the advent of post-quantum cryptography, lattice-based threshold signatures have gained attention as viable PQ-threshold solutions. Nevertheless, existing constructions are limited in terms of their scalability, robustness. Worse, none is compatible with standardized schemes, particularly with the NIST-selected and standardized Module-Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) algorithm.In this work, we present the first threshold signature scheme that is fully compatible with ML-DSA, supporting secure and efficient signing for a small number of parties, with an average communication per party upper bounded by 1 MB up to 6 parties. Our construction leverages advanced short secret sharing techniques and integrates optimized rejection sampling to achieve a favorable balance between communication efficiency and correctness in distributed environments. We implement our construction in Go and evaluate its performance across local, LAN, and WAN network settings. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our threshold ML-DSA scheme is not only practically deployable but also well-suited for real-world applications, including multi-device cryptocurrency wallets, threshold-based TLS authentication, and for Tor's directory authorities.
Digital signatures are pivotal for ensuring the authenticity and integrity of digital communications, serving as the backbone of numerous cryptographic protocols and systems.However, the physical constraints of network communication pose challenges in the transmission of large number of signatures, including digital certificates in Public Key Infrastructures, routing protocols, and decentralized systems.The advent of quantum computing has heightened these challenges, given that post-quantum cryptographic schemes, like those proposed under NIST's standardization project, generally result in larger signature sizes.Aggregate signatures represent a powerful cryptographic tool to reduce communication costs in protocols that require the verification of multiple signatures.In fact, this method can reduce the total amount of transmitted data by allowing multiple signers to combine their individual signatures on separate messages into a single aggregate signature.Since general forms of aggregations are difficult to achieve in practice, weaker variants can be considered.For instance, in a Sequential Aggregate Signature (SAS) scheme, signatures are combined in a specific sequence, allowing each subsequent signer to append their signature to an already aggregated one.Although sequential aggregation is more restrictive, it often suits contexts where order or hierarchy are inherent, thus continuing to be beneficial in practical applications.This thesis contributes primarily by exploring aggregate signatures under post-quantum assumptions, particularly focusing on signature schemes that are not based on structured lattices.Our research delves into two main classes of digital signatures in the postquantum setting.Firstly, we explore the generalization of SAS schemes to Hashand-Sign signatures based on generic trapdoor functions.The simple structure of signatures within this paradigm appears to make them ideal candidates for sequential aggregation.However, early SAS proposals required the use of trapdoor permutation (e.g., RSA), while post-quantum trapdoor functions known so-far are not injective.Direct attempts at generalizing permutation-based schemes have been proposed, but they either lack formal security or require additional properties on the trapdoor function, which are typically not available for multivariate or code-based functions.We provide a comprehensive analysis of existing models, discuss their limitations, and prove how direct extensions of original SAS iii From the beginning, I perceived my PhD as a solitary journey, a constant juggling act between industry and academia.For that, I've had my fair share of moments wondering if I was in the right place at the right time.But looking back, I realize it's the people who've been there -sometimes pushing, sometimes supporting, always believing -that have made this journey not just possible, but worthwhile.First and foremost, I wish to express my deepest thanks to Guglielmo Morgari.It all started with an unexpected (and perhaps annoying) call, and you took a chance on me.Your unwavering dedication and endless support have been invaluable throughout this process.Thank you for constantly pushing me to reach higher, for making me a better communicator, and somehow convincing me that I'm now friends with the lab's oscilloscope.Perhaps most importantly, I want to thank you for imparting me a small piece of the immeasurable faith you've always placed in me.These acknowledgments naturally extend to Telsy, the company to which I owe this unique opportunity.I'm still amazed and grateful to be part of a team that's not afraid to bet on the value of research.A special thank you goes to Fabrizio Vacca and the colleagues who believed in this project and made it possible.I am grateful to my academic supervisor, Danilo Bazzanella, and the entire CrypTo group at Politecnico.You have provided me with the precious opportunity to work closely in an environment that is both stimulating and welcoming.Although my primary workspace has never been the department, and my "office" there remains more of a theoretical concept than a physical location I can reliably find, each visit has contributed to making me feel part of a broader research community.Among the group, my sincere thanks to Antonio Di Scala and Carlo Sanna for guiding me through my first academic works with patience and wisdom.I extend my gratitude to Simone Dutto and Nadir Murru for their meticulous review of my work and the numerous insightful suggestions they provided.I am deeply indebted to my closest co-authors and colleagues.To Alessio Meneghetti, thank you for being the first who helped me find a thread in a tangle of
Permissioned blockchains authenticate transactions, votes and quorum certificates with computationally secure signatures, and post-quantum replacements inflate consensus traffic by orders of magnitude. Information-theoretic alternatives have required a trusted authority, quantum channels, per-signature interaction, or single-use keys with bounded transfer. We present SILMARILS-MV, a multi-verifier unconditionally secure signature in which a signature is the vector α=A e(m)α= A\,e(m)α=Ae(m) and each verifier holds a secret functional ci=ΓTλ(xi)c_i = Γ^T λ(x_i)ci​=ΓTλ(xi​) derived from virtual anchors ΓΓΓ that nobody learns. Against unbounded adversaries corrupting up to ωωω verifiers and any signers, and observing every decision, an honest verifier accepts a forged or invalid signature with probability at most Q/q+1/(q−1)Q/q + 1/(q-1)Q/q+1/(q−1), a bound that is tight in its leading term. The scheme is strongly unforgeable, non-repudiable, transferable across unboundedly many hops, and linearly aggregatable. Keys are issued by the validators through perfectly secure MPC for t<n/3t < n/3t<n/3, without broadcast. To scale, we let the committee itself sign: in threshold notarization, finality certificates have constant size 32(ω+1)32(ω+1)32(ω+1) bytes and per-validator issuance cost no longer depends on nnn. Arbiter-verified keys give clients 32-byte signatures, robust redistribution supports membership changes and share refresh, and verifiers can be enrolled retroactively. A certificate verifies in 2.4 microseconds. In an analytic normal-case model at 1000 validators, threshold notarization needs 71 KiB of authentication traffic per validator per block, 22x less than ML-DSA-44 for admitted verifiers. In a Rust HotStuff prototype with 100 validators, SILMARILS-MV commits 2.8x more transactions per second than ML-DSA-44 with 67x less cryptographic CPU, and Monte-Carlo attacks match the bounds.
Due to limited computational and storage capabilities, wireless medical sensor networks (WMSN) encounter considerable overhead in processing the storage and verification of numerous signatures. Multi-signatures allow a group of signers to produce a single, compact signature on the same message, significantly reducing storage requirements and communication bandwidth in WMSN. However, conventional multi-signature schemes are not quantum resistant, as their security assumptions will be compromised with the quick advancement in quantum computing. Alternatively, lattice-based cryptography is widely considered capable of withstanding quantum computing attacks. In this article, we introduce a quantum-resistant and non-interactive identity-based multi-signature scheme from lattices with public key aggregation (IBMS-pka). By leveraging the small integer solution (SIS) assumption, our scheme is proven secure within the random oracle model. Besides, our scheme enables users to choose their system identities (e.g., physical IP address or email address) as public keys compared to PKI-based schemes, and avoids the extra communication costs in contrast to interactive schemes. Meanwhile, our scheme outperforms other related works according to our experiments. Specifically, the multi-signature generation has a slightly higher efficiency compared to other related schemes, while the multi-signature verification has a larger enhancement. Moreover, the performance improvement becomes more evident as the number of signers grows.