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Channel code design for the wiretap channel

Anuradha Wickramasooriya

Published Jan 1, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This thesis addresses the analysis and design of channel codes for physical layer security. Wyner's wiretap channel is considered as the basic transmission model with a focus on the binary-input symmetric discrete memoryless channels. Firstly, a new technique to quantify the equivocation rate is proposed, providing an e_cient tool to measure the achievable secrecy levels for di_erent wiretap channel models based on the binary erasure channel model. The probability of secrecy outage and the average secrecy rate are then investigated for general binary-input symmetric discrete memoryless channels from a channel-coding perspective.

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Multi-user and wiretap channels including feedback

S. Leung-Yan-Cheong

The concept of the wiretap channel was first proposed by Wyner. He considered the case in which data is to be transmitted reliably over a discrete memoryless main channel to a legitimate receiver. The wiretapper views the output of the main channel through another discrete memoryless channel. It is assumed that the wiretapper knows the code being used and his only handicap is the additional noise in his signal. The problem is to maximize the transmission rate R to the legitimate receiver and the equivocation d of the wiretapper. In this dissertation, the additive white Gaussian noise wiretap channel is introduced and the set of all achievable (R,d) pairs is determined explicitly through the use of certain special properties of the Gaussian channel. Some useful characterizations of a special class of wiretap channels are also explored. A model of the wiretap channel with feedback is proposed. It turns out that with the introduction of feedback, even when the main channel is inferior to the wiretapper's channel, it is still possible to reliably communicate with the legitimate receiver in complete secrecy. The binary erasure wiretap channel with feedback is examined and inner and outer bounds on the achievable (R,d) region are given. Finally, a scheme for enlarging the capacity region of multiple-access channels using feedback is analyzed. It is shown that conditions under which an enlargement is possible are fairly weak, indicating that feedback can almost increase the capacity region. (Author)

•Jan 1, 1976•19 citations

Equivocation Analysis Across Continuous and Discrete Memoryless Channels

Munibun Billah

Physical-layer security uses the noise already present in the channel to keep a message secret without making any assumption about the eavesdropper's computing power. In Wyner's wiretap channel model, coset coding uses randomness to map the message to many codewords and protects against information leakage from an active eavesdropper. The secrecy provided by such codes is measured by their equivocation, which is the eavesdropper's remaining uncertainty about the message after she observes her channel. So computing equivocation is an important aspect of analyzing the wiretap channel model. Many channels of practical interest have no closed-form expression for equivocation, and exact calculation has been limited to a few specific channels. This dissertation studies the equivocation analysis of coset codes along two complementary directions. When a channel offers no closed-form solution, we estimate the information leakage with a neural network called the mutual information neural estimator (MINE). And for a discrete memoryless channel, we derive a general framework for the exact equivocation. The first study builds coset codes from short Reed-Muller codes and tests them over the air in a real indoor environment with software-defined radios. In this study, the secrecy is estimated using MINE, and short coset codes are shown to provide a secrecy advantage. The second study proposes a low-density parity-check (LDPC) code that injects artificial noise by flipping a chosen set of coded bits over a Gaussian wiretap channel. The third study moves from estimation to exact analysis. It examines coset coding over the Ghost Modulation wiretap channel, which is modeled as an asymmetric binary crossover erasure channel (ABCEC). Then it derives exact expressions for both the equivocation and the secrecy capacity. The final study generalizes the exact analysis to any discrete memoryless channel and verifies the framework against well-studied channels. Finally, it applies the developed framework to the asymmetric Z-channel with an efficient formulation that greatly reduces the computational cost.

•Jul 22, 2026•0 citations

Reliability and Secrecy Functions of the Wiretap Channel Under Cost Constraint

Te Sun Han, Hiroyuki Endo, Masahide Sasaki

The wiretap channel has been devised and studied first by Wyner, and subsequently extended to the case with nondegraded general wiretap channels by Csiszár and Körner. Focusing mainly on the stationary memoryless channel with cost constraint, we newly introduce the notion of reliability and secrecy functions as a fundamental tool to analyze and/or design the performance of an efficient wiretap channel system, including binary symmetric wiretap channels, Poisson wiretap channels, and Gaussian wiretap channels. Compact formulas for those functions are explicitly given for stationary memoryless wiretap channels. It is also demonstrated that, based on such a pair of reliability and secrecy functions, we can control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy (usually conflicting), both with exponentially decreasing rates as block length \(n\) becomes large. Four ways to do so are given on the basis of rate shifting, rate exchange, concatenation, and change of cost constraint. In addition, the notion of the \(\delta \) secrecy capacity is defined and shown to attain the strongest secrecy standard among others. The maximized versus averaged secrecy measures is also discussed.

arXiv:1307.0608•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Sep 10, 2014•59 citations

Analysis of short blocklength codes for secrecy

Willie K. Harrison, Dinis Sarmento, João P. Vilela +1 more

In this paper, we provide secrecy metrics applicable to physical-layer coding techniques with finite blocklengths over Gaussian and fading wiretap channel models and analyze their secrecy performance over several cases of concatenated code designs. Our metrics go beyond some of the known practical secrecy measures, such as bit error rate and security gap, so as to make lower bound probabilistic guarantees on error rates over short blocklengths both preceding and following a secrecy decoder. Our techniques are especially useful in cases where application of traditional information-theoretic security measures is either impractical or simply not yet understood. The metrics can aid both practical system analysis, including cryptanalysis, and practical system design when concatenated codes are used for physical-layer security. Furthermore, these new measures fill a void in the current landscape of practical security measures for physical-layer security coding and may assist in the wide-scale adoption of physical-layer techniques for security in real-world systems. We also show how the new metrics provide techniques for reducing realistic channel models to simpler discrete memoryless wiretap channel equivalents over which existing secrecy code designs may achieve information-theoretic security.

arXiv:1509.07092•EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking•Oct 29, 2018•29 citations

Finite Blocklength Secrecy Coding

Jack Pfister

Coding for physical layer security is typically evaluated as blocklengths approach infinity using information theoretic measures. This thesis presents techniques to quantify secrecy guarantees of finite blocklength wiretap codes across two common channel models. This is an important step for the field of physical layer security as secrecy guarantees are generally not quantified at finite blocklengths. From this analysis, we are able to determine the best performing linear secrecy codes for their respective blocklengths and information rates. Due to the error correcting shortcomings of wiretap codes, we also investigate the error correcting capabilities of a secrecy coding technique that uses polar codes.

•May 9, 2018•3 citations

A New Wiretap Channel Model and Its Strong Secrecy Capacity

Mohamed Nafea, Aylin Yener

In this paper, a new wiretap channel model is proposed, where the legitimate transmitter and receiver communicate over a discrete memoryless channel. The wiretapper has perfect access to a fixed-length subset of the transmitted code word symbols of her choosing. Additionally, she observes the remainder of the transmitted symbols through a discrete memoryless channel. This new model subsumes the classical wiretap channel and wiretap channel II with noisy main channel as its special cases, and is termed as the generalized wiretap channel for that reason. The strong secrecy capacity of the proposed channel model is identified. Achievability is established by solving a dual secret key agreement problem in the source model, and converting the solution to the original channel model using probability distribution approximation arguments. In the dual problem, a source encoder and decoder, who observe random sequences independent and identically distributed according to the input and output distributions of the legitimate channel in the original problem, communicate a confidential key over a public error-free channel using a single forward transmission, in the presence of a compound wiretapping source who has perfect access to the public discussion. The security of the key is guaranteed for the exponentially many possibilities of the subset chosen at the wiretapper by deriving a lemma which provides a doubly-exponential convergence rate for the probability that, for a fixed choice of the subset, the key is uniform and independent from the public discussion and the wiretapping source's observation. The converse is derived by using Sanov's theorem to upper bound the secrecy capacity of the generalized wiretap channel by the secrecy capacity when the tapped subset is randomly chosen by nature.

arXiv:1701.07007•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Dec 22, 2017•26 citations
This thesis addresses the analysis and design of channel codes for physical layer security. Wyner's wiretap channel is considered as the basic transmission model with a focus on the binary-input symmetric discrete memoryless channels. Firstly, a new technique to quantify the equivocation rate is proposed, providing an e_cient tool to measure the achievable secrecy levels for di_erent wiretap channel models based on the binary erasure channel model. The probability of secrecy outage and the average secrecy rate are then investigated for general binary-input symmetric discrete memoryless channels from a channel-coding perspective.
The concept of the wiretap channel was first proposed by Wyner. He considered the case in which data is to be transmitted reliably over a discrete memoryless main channel to a legitimate receiver. The wiretapper views the output of the main channel through another discrete memoryless channel. It is assumed that the wiretapper knows the code being used and his only handicap is the additional noise in his signal. The problem is to maximize the transmission rate R to the legitimate receiver and the equivocation d of the wiretapper. In this dissertation, the additive white Gaussian noise wiretap channel is introduced and the set of all achievable (R,d) pairs is determined explicitly through the use of certain special properties of the Gaussian channel. Some useful characterizations of a special class of wiretap channels are also explored. A model of the wiretap channel with feedback is proposed. It turns out that with the introduction of feedback, even when the main channel is inferior to the wiretapper's channel, it is still possible to reliably communicate with the legitimate receiver in complete secrecy. The binary erasure wiretap channel with feedback is examined and inner and outer bounds on the achievable (R,d) region are given. Finally, a scheme for enlarging the capacity region of multiple-access channels using feedback is analyzed. It is shown that conditions under which an enlargement is possible are fairly weak, indicating that feedback can almost increase the capacity region. (Author)
Physical-layer security uses the noise already present in the channel to keep a message secret without making any assumption about the eavesdropper's computing power. In Wyner's wiretap channel model, coset coding uses randomness to map the message to many codewords and protects against information leakage from an active eavesdropper. The secrecy provided by such codes is measured by their equivocation, which is the eavesdropper's remaining uncertainty about the message after she observes her channel. So computing equivocation is an important aspect of analyzing the wiretap channel model. Many channels of practical interest have no closed-form expression for equivocation, and exact calculation has been limited to a few specific channels. This dissertation studies the equivocation analysis of coset codes along two complementary directions. When a channel offers no closed-form solution, we estimate the information leakage with a neural network called the mutual information neural estimator (MINE). And for a discrete memoryless channel, we derive a general framework for the exact equivocation. The first study builds coset codes from short Reed-Muller codes and tests them over the air in a real indoor environment with software-defined radios. In this study, the secrecy is estimated using MINE, and short coset codes are shown to provide a secrecy advantage. The second study proposes a low-density parity-check (LDPC) code that injects artificial noise by flipping a chosen set of coded bits over a Gaussian wiretap channel. The third study moves from estimation to exact analysis. It examines coset coding over the Ghost Modulation wiretap channel, which is modeled as an asymmetric binary crossover erasure channel (ABCEC). Then it derives exact expressions for both the equivocation and the secrecy capacity. The final study generalizes the exact analysis to any discrete memoryless channel and verifies the framework against well-studied channels. Finally, it applies the developed framework to the asymmetric Z-channel with an efficient formulation that greatly reduces the computational cost.
The wiretap channel has been devised and studied first by Wyner, and subsequently extended to the case with nondegraded general wiretap channels by Csiszár and Körner. Focusing mainly on the stationary memoryless channel with cost constraint, we newly introduce the notion of reliability and secrecy functions as a fundamental tool to analyze and/or design the performance of an efficient wiretap channel system, including binary symmetric wiretap channels, Poisson wiretap channels, and Gaussian wiretap channels. Compact formulas for those functions are explicitly given for stationary memoryless wiretap channels. It is also demonstrated that, based on such a pair of reliability and secrecy functions, we can control the tradeoff between reliability and secrecy (usually conflicting), both with exponentially decreasing rates as block length nnn becomes large. Four ways to do so are given on the basis of rate shifting, rate exchange, concatenation, and change of cost constraint. In addition, the notion of the δ\delta δ secrecy capacity is defined and shown to attain the strongest secrecy standard among others. The maximized versus averaged secrecy measures is also discussed.
In this paper, we provide secrecy metrics applicable to physical-layer coding techniques with finite blocklengths over Gaussian and fading wiretap channel models and analyze their secrecy performance over several cases of concatenated code designs. Our metrics go beyond some of the known practical secrecy measures, such as bit error rate and security gap, so as to make lower bound probabilistic guarantees on error rates over short blocklengths both preceding and following a secrecy decoder. Our techniques are especially useful in cases where application of traditional information-theoretic security measures is either impractical or simply not yet understood. The metrics can aid both practical system analysis, including cryptanalysis, and practical system design when concatenated codes are used for physical-layer security. Furthermore, these new measures fill a void in the current landscape of practical security measures for physical-layer security coding and may assist in the wide-scale adoption of physical-layer techniques for security in real-world systems. We also show how the new metrics provide techniques for reducing realistic channel models to simpler discrete memoryless wiretap channel equivalents over which existing secrecy code designs may achieve information-theoretic security.
Coding for physical layer security is typically evaluated as blocklengths approach infinity using information theoretic measures. This thesis presents techniques to quantify secrecy guarantees of finite blocklength wiretap codes across two common channel models. This is an important step for the field of physical layer security as secrecy guarantees are generally not quantified at finite blocklengths. From this analysis, we are able to determine the best performing linear secrecy codes for their respective blocklengths and information rates. Due to the error correcting shortcomings of wiretap codes, we also investigate the error correcting capabilities of a secrecy coding technique that uses polar codes.
In this paper, a new wiretap channel model is proposed, where the legitimate transmitter and receiver communicate over a discrete memoryless channel. The wiretapper has perfect access to a fixed-length subset of the transmitted code word symbols of her choosing. Additionally, she observes the remainder of the transmitted symbols through a discrete memoryless channel. This new model subsumes the classical wiretap channel and wiretap channel II with noisy main channel as its special cases, and is termed as the generalized wiretap channel for that reason. The strong secrecy capacity of the proposed channel model is identified. Achievability is established by solving a dual secret key agreement problem in the source model, and converting the solution to the original channel model using probability distribution approximation arguments. In the dual problem, a source encoder and decoder, who observe random sequences independent and identically distributed according to the input and output distributions of the legitimate channel in the original problem, communicate a confidential key over a public error-free channel using a single forward transmission, in the presence of a compound wiretapping source who has perfect access to the public discussion. The security of the key is guaranteed for the exponentially many possibilities of the subset chosen at the wiretapper by deriving a lemma which provides a doubly-exponential convergence rate for the probability that, for a fixed choice of the subset, the key is uniform and independent from the public discussion and the wiretapping source's observation. The converse is derived by using Sanov's theorem to upper bound the secrecy capacity of the generalized wiretap channel by the secrecy capacity when the tapped subset is randomly chosen by nature.