Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables mutually distrusting parties to jointly evaluate a function over their private inputs without revealing those inputs to any participant.Classical MPC constructions based on Boolean or arithmetic circuits incur significant computational overhead when deployed over large participant groups, and their security guarantees rest upon hardness assumptions that are vulnerable to quantum adversaries.This paper introduces an elliptic curve cryptography-based secure MPC framework that exploits the algebraic structure of elliptic curve groups over finite fields to construct efficient oblivious transfer extensions, Beaver triple generation, and verifiable secret sharing protocols.The framework models the computation as a directed acyclic graph over the elliptic curve group law, enabling algebraic optimizations that reduce the number of point multiplications required per gate evaluation.Pedersen commitments over the curve group provide unconditionally hiding and computationally binding commitment guarantees, while zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms authenticate each party's contribution without information leakage.Security is formalized in the universal composability (UC) framework under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in the standard model.Evaluation on benchmark circuits including AES key expansion, SHA-3 compression, and private set intersection demonstrates that the proposed EC-MPC protocol achieves 42.3 ms per gate for a four-party evaluation, outperforming BGW by 52.8% and GMW by 42.9% in identical configurations.The framework scales to 32-party computations with sub-quadratic communication overhead, confirming its practicality for cloud-based secure computation, privacy-preserving machine learning inference, and federated healthcare analytics.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables mutually distrusting parties to jointly evaluate a function over their private inputs without revealing those inputs to any participant.Classical MPC constructions based on Boolean or arithmetic circuits incur significant computational overhead when deployed over large participant groups, and their security guarantees rest upon hardness assumptions that are vulnerable to quantum adversaries.This paper introduces an elliptic curve cryptography-based secure MPC framework that exploits the algebraic structure of elliptic curve groups over finite fields to construct efficient oblivious transfer extensions, Beaver triple generation, and verifiable secret sharing protocols.The framework models the computation as a directed acyclic graph over the elliptic curve group law, enabling algebraic optimizations that reduce the number of point multiplications required per gate evaluation.Pedersen commitments over the curve group provide unconditionally hiding and computationally binding commitment guarantees, while zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms authenticate each party's contribution without information leakage.Security is formalized in the universal composability (UC) framework under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in the standard model.Evaluation on benchmark circuits including AES key expansion, SHA-3 compression, and private set intersection demonstrates that the proposed EC-MPC protocol achieves 42.3 ms per gate for a four-party evaluation, outperforming BGW by 52.8% and GMW by 42.9% in identical configurations.The framework scales to 32-party computations with sub-quadratic communication overhead, confirming its practicality for cloud-based secure computation, privacy-preserving machine learning inference, and federated healthcare analytics.
Multiparty Computation (hereafter MPC) is a technique for allowing a set ofparticipants to run a secure computation with the assurance that the output is (1) correct, and (2) that a malicious party did not learn anything about the inputs of the honest parties besides what it can glean from the output. Impor- tantly much of cryptography is based on the assumption that an honest party has a private and secret input, and if the adversary learns this input the security of the scheme is broken. Then naturally the techniques of MPC can be applied to create threshold protocols for these cryptographic schemes to ensure that the secret inputs are not leaked and moreover that no group of parties smaller than the threshold know the input at all. While we have known how to generically evaluate MPC for any function since the 80s the question of efficiency still drives progress to this day. This thesis looks at two approaches for making secure com- putation more practical to deploy: developing specialized protocols for appli- cations such as distributed key generation and signing with RSA and ECDSA; and improving the state of the art of maliciously secure generic boolean-circuit MPC. We first look at work that produced a distributed key generation protocol for RSA that utilizes a novel candidate sampling mechanism to reduce waste in primality testing. The second work builds a threshold scheme for symmetric cryptographic primitives such as AES and SHA where there is limited algebraic structure to exploit by efficiently converting a generic n-of-n MPC protocol into a threshold t-of-n MPC protocol. Future directions in this thesis are in combin- ing techniques from the prior works to create a blind signature scheme for the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) that requires both alge- braic operations over elliptic curves and additionally symmetric evaluations of the SHA2 hash function.--Author's abstract
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic framework that enables multiple parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping those inputs private. MPC has found applications in privacy-preserving data analytics, secure voting, private machine learning, and secure financial transactions. This article provides a comprehensive survey of recent advances in MPC protocols, including fully homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, and oblivious transfer. It also explores the challenges in efficiency, scalability, and real-world deployment of MPC and discusses future research directions to enhance its practicality and security.
parties to securely compute an agreed function f over some finite field in the presence of a computationally unbounded adversary, who can maliciously corrupt any t out of the n parties. Most of the known efficient MPC protocols are designed in the offline- online framework introduced in a seminal work by Beaver in CRYPTO 1991. In this framework, the parties generate shared random and private multiplication-triples during the offline phase, which are used later in the online phase for securely evaluating the multiplication gates in the circuit representing f . The efficiency of the MPC protocols in this framework then relies on efficient ways of implementing the offline phase. In this paper, we propose a new and simple framework for generating shared and private random multiplication triples with unconditional security. The existing protocols approach this problem by first producing shared pairs of private and random values, followed by securely computing the shared product of each pair of values. The latter task involves a multiplication protocol for shared values that are typically communication intensive. Our framework takes a completely different approach and shuns the use of multiplication protocol. Namely, we ask the parties to verifiably share random multiplication triples and then securely extract shared random multiplication triples unknown to the adversary, from the shared triples. Realizing our framework in the asynchronous and hybrid network setting,1 we present the first ever MPC protocols with a linear (in the number of parties) communication overhead per multiplication gate in the circuit representing f . These are significant improvements over the best known existing MPC protocols in the asynchronous and hybrid network setting with communication complexity O(n2) and O(n3), respectively. Our framework when applied to the synchronous setting results in round-efficient MPC protocols.
Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) allows a set of mutually distrusting parties to jointly evaluate a function on their private inputs while maintaining input privacy. In this work, we improve semi-honest secure two-party computation (2PC) over rings, with a focus on the efficiency of the online phase. We propose an efficient mixed-protocol framework, outperforming the state-of-the-art 2PC framework of ABY. Moreover, we extend our techniques to multi-input multiplication gates without inflating the online communication, i.e., it remains independent of the fan-in. Along the way, we construct efficient protocols for several primitives such as scalar product, matrix multiplication, comparison, maxpool, and equality testing. The online communication of our scalar product is two ring elements irrespective of the vector dimension, which is a feature achieved for the first time in the 2PC literature. The practicality of our new set of protocols is showcased with four applications: i) AES S-box, ii) Circuit-based Private Set Intersection, iii) Biometric Matching, and iv) Privacy-preserving Machine Learning (PPML). Most notably, for PPML, we implement and benchmark training and inference of Logistic Regression and Neural Networks over LAN and WAN networks. For training, we improve online runtime (both for LAN and WAN) over SecureML (Mohassel et al., IEEE S&P '17) in the range 1.5x–6.1x, while for inference, the improvements are in the range of 2.5x–754.3x.
The wireless network suffers from many security problems, and computation in a wireless network environment may fail to preserve privacy as well as correctness when the adversaries conduct attacks through backdoors, steganography, kleptography, etc. Secure computation ensures the execution security in such an environment, and compared with computation on the plaintext, the performance of secure computation is bounded by the underlying cryptographic algorithms and the network environment between the involved parties. Besides, the Chinese cryptography laws require the cryptographic algorithms that appeared in the commercial market to be authorized. In this work, we show how to implement oblivious transfer (OT), an important primitive in secure multiparty computation (MPC), using the Chinese government-approved SM2 and SM3 algorithms. The SM2 algorithm is based on the elliptic curve cryptography and is much faster than the discrete logarithm-based solutions. Moreover, by adopting the standard OT extension technique, we can extend the number of OTs efficiently with one more round of communication and invocations to the SM3 and SM4 algorithms. The OT primitive can be used in the Beaver multiplication triple generation and other MPC protocols, e.g., private set intersection. Therefore, we can utilize the SM series cryptography, specifically, the SM2, SM3, and SM4 algorithms, to build highly efficient secure computation frameworks which are suitable for the wireless network environment and for commercial applications in China. The experimental evaluation results show that our protocols have comparable performance to existing protocols; specifically, our protocols are quite suitable for bad network environments.
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) is an expression encompassing cryptographic techniques that allow mutually distrustful parties to jointly perform computations over private data, ensuring correctness and preserving privacy despite malicious behavior. Guaranteed output is the strongest security goal for MPC: protocols with this property always deliver results. This is in contrast with weaker notions that allow malicious aborts. The seminal works of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson (STOC’88) and Rabin and Ben-Or (STOC’89) showed interactive protocols to compute any function with guaranteed output and perfect security if fewer than one third of parties are corrupted, or with statistical security (with a small error probability) if fewer than half are corrupted. These results hold when the set of participants is fixed throughout the execution. Ostrovsky and Yung’s proactive model (PODC’91) relaxes this assumption by allowing the set of corrupted parties to evolve over time, better capturing the dynamics of long-lived computations, where machines may be periodically compromised and recovered. The recent YOSO (You Only Speak Once) and fluid MPC models (CRYPTO’21) push this ambitious modelling even further by allowing for fully dynamic participation, with parties joining and leaving the computation at will. In this setting, known protocols with guaranteed output fall short of optimal resilience or rely on non-standard communication and adversarial assumptions. Matching the classical BGW and Rabin–Ben-Or bounds in these settings remained an open problem. We resolve these questions within the Layered MPC abstraction of David et al. (CRYPTO’23), in which the interaction pattern of a protocol is restricted to be a layered graph, meaning parties are partitioned into a sequence of disjoint sets (layers) and can send private and broadcast messages to parties in immediately subsequent layers. We match the BGW and Rabin and Ben-Or bounds in this model, fully characterizing the feasibility landscape of Layered MPC with guaranteed output. As a stepping stone towards our statistically secure protocol, we construct a more efficient and conceptually simpler computationally secure protocol relying on linear non-interactive commitments. Our results yield optimally-resilient and maximally-proactive MPC protocols with guaranteed output for both perfect and statistical security.