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On robust key agreement based on public key authentication

F Hao

Published Jan 1, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper discusses public-key authenticated key agreement protocols. First, we critically analyze several authenticatedkey agreement protocols and uncover various theoretical and practical flaws. In particular, we present two new attacks onthe HMQV protocol, which is currently being standardized by IEEE P1363. These attacks suggest the caution one shouldtake when interpreting theoretical results from a formal model. We further point out that many of the protocol failures inthe past are caused by sidestepping an important engineering principle, namely “Do not assume that a message you receivehas a particular form (such as g^r for known r) unless you can check this”. Constructions in the past generally resistedthis principle on the grounds of efficiency: checking the knowledge of the exponent is commonly seen as too expensive.In a concrete example, we demonstrate how to effectively integrate the zero-knowledge proof primitive into the protocoldesign and meanwhile achieve good efficiency. Our new key agreement protocol, YAK, has comparable computationalefficiency to the MQV and HMQV protocols with clear advantages on security. Among all the related techniques, ourprotocol appears to be the simplest so far. We believe simplicity is also an important engineering principle.

DOI
10.25405/ncl.34178064

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This paper discusses public-key authenticated key agreement protocols. First, we critically analyze several authenticatedkey agreement protocols and uncover various theoretical and practical flaws. In particular, we present two new attacks onthe HMQV protocol, which is currently being standardized by IEEE P1363. These attacks suggest the caution one shouldtake when interpreting theoretical results from a formal model. We further point out that many of the protocol failures inthe past are caused by sidestepping an important engineering principle, namely “Do not assume that a message you receivehas a particular form (such as g^r for known r) unless you can check this”. Constructions in the past generally resistedthis principle on the grounds of efficiency: checking the knowledge of the exponent is commonly seen as too expensive.In a concrete example, we demonstrate how to effectively integrate the zero-knowledge proof primitive into the protocoldesign and meanwhile achieve good efficiency. Our new key agreement protocol, YAK, has comparable computationalefficiency to the MQV and HMQV protocols with clear advantages on security. Among all the related techniques, ourprotocol appears to be the simplest so far. We believe simplicity is also an important engineering principle.
Abstract. We describe two new attacks on the HMQV protocol. The first attack raises a serious question on the basic definition of “authentica-tion ” in HMQV, while the second attack is generally applicable to many other protocols. In addition, we present a new authenticated key agree-ment protocol called YAK. Our approach is to depend on well-established techniques such as Schnorr’s signature. Among all the related protocols, YAK appears to be the simplest so far. We believe simplicity is an im-portant engineering principle. 1
Abstract This paper considers security analysis of the YAK, a public key‐based authenticated key agreement protocol. The YAK protocol is a variant of the two‐pass HMQV protocol but uses zero‐knowledge proofs for proving knowledge of ephemeral values. In this paper, we show that the YAK protocol lacks joint key control and perfect forward secrecy attributes and is vulnerable to some attacks including unknown key‐share and key‐replication attacks. This invalidates the semantic security of the protocol in several security models. There are also other considerations regarding the impersonation and small subgroup attacks. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Summary Hao proposed the YAK as a robust key agreement based on public‐key authentication, and the author claimed that the YAK protocol withstands all known attacks and therefore is secure against an extremely strong adversary. However, Toorani showed the security flaws in the YAK protocol. This paper shows that the YAK protocol cannot withstand the known key security attack, and its consequences lead us to introduce a new key compromise impersonation attack, where an adversary is allowed to reveal both the shared static secret key between two‐party participation and the ephemeral private key of the initiator party in order to mount this attack. In addition, we present a new security model that covers these attacks against an extremely strong adversary. Moreover, we propose an improved YAK protocol to remedy these attacks and the previous attacks mentioned by Toorani on the YAK protocol, and the proposed protocol uses a verification mechanism in its block design that provides entity authentication and key confirmation. Meanwhile, we show that the proposed protocol is secure in the proposed formal security model under the gap Diffie‐Hellman assumption and the random oracle assumption. Moreover, we verify the security of the proposed protocol and YAK protocol by using an automatic verification method such as the Scyther tool, and the verification result shows that the security claims of the proposed protocol are proven, in contrast to those of the YAK protocol, which are not proven. The security and performance comparisons show that the improved YAK protocol outperforms previous related protocols.
The MQV key agreement protocol, a technique included in recent standards, is shown in its basic form to be vulnerable to an unknown key-share attack. Although the attack's practical impact on security is minimal---a key confirmation step easily prevents it---the attack is noteworthy in the principles it illustrates about protocol design. First, minor “efficiency improvements” can significantly alter the security properties of a protocol. Second, protocol analysis must consider potential interactions with all parties, not just those that are normally online. Finally, attacks must be assessed in terms of system requirements, not just in isolation.
As the fundamental building block for secure communication in the open network, authenticated key agreement protocols are usually constructed in the public key setting. Certificateless public key cryptography combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In this paper, we present a secure and efficient two-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on the efficient certificateless public key encryption scheme due to Cheng and Comley. Security analysis shows that it achieves perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes for authenticated key agreement protocol, such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control. Compared to other comparable schemes, it is more secure and has nice efficiency.