Using keys generated by a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system requires their integration with application-level systems. In long-distance QKD networks, Trusted Nodes (TN) are commonly used to relay keys between distant endpoints; however, these nodes have access to key material, increasing the attack surface and introducing security risks. In this work, we propose a secure architecture that leverages a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to protect key handling operations at intermediary nodes. The Secure Application Entity (SAE) of the trusted node is executed within a TEE enclave, ensuring that key material is processed and stored in an isolated environment protected by hardware-enforced mechanisms. This design prevents the host system and other untrusted components from accessing sensitive keys, even if the intermediary node is compromised. Additionally, the proposed architecture enables the establishment of virtual QKD links between distant nodes through secure key forwarding, without exposing key material outside the enclave. Remote attestation mechanisms verify the integrity and authenticity of the enclave before key provisioning. By isolating key management operations and reducing the reliance on software-based protection, the proposed approach aims to reduce the attack surface and strengthen the security of QKD networks.
Using keys generated by a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system requires their integration with application-level systems. In long-distance QKD networks, Trusted Nodes (TN) are commonly used to relay keys between distant endpoints; however, these nodes have access to key material, increasing the attack surface and introducing security risks. In this work, we propose a secure architecture that leverages a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to protect key handling operations at intermediary nodes. The Secure Application Entity (SAE) of the trusted node is executed within a TEE enclave, ensuring that key material is processed and stored in an isolated environment protected by hardware-enforced mechanisms. This design prevents the host system and other untrusted components from accessing sensitive keys, even if the intermediary node is compromised. Additionally, the proposed architecture enables the establishment of virtual QKD links between distant nodes through secure key forwarding, without exposing key material outside the enclave. Remote attestation mechanisms verify the integrity and authenticity of the enclave before key provisioning. By isolating key management operations and reducing the reliance on software-based protection, the proposed approach aims to reduce the attack surface and strengthen the security of QKD networks.
With the advent of quantum computing, the increasing threats to security poses a great challenge to communication networks. Recent innovations in this field resulted in promising technologies such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which enables the generation of unconditionally secure keys, establishing secure communications between remote nodes. Additionally, QKD networks enable the interconnection of multi-node architectures, extending the point-to-point nature of QKD. However, due to the limitations of the current state of technology, the scalability of QKD networks remains a challenge toward feasible implementations. When it comes to long-distance implementations, trusted relay nodes partially solve the distance issue through the forwarding of the distributed keys, allowing applications that do not have a direct QKD link to securely share key material. Even though the relay procedure itself has been extensively studied, the establishment of the relaying node path still lacks a solution. This paper proposes an innovative network architecture that solves the challenges of Key Management System (KMS) identification, relay path discovery, and scalability of QKD networks by integrating Software-Defined Networking (SDN) principles, and establishing high-level virtual KMSs (vKMS) in each node and creating a new entity called the Quantum Security Controller (QuSeC). The vKMS serves the end-user key requests, managing the multiple KMSs within the node and abstracting the user from discovering the correct KMS. Additionally, based on the high-level view of the network topology and status, the QuSeC serves the path discovery requests from vKMSs, computing the end-to-end (E2E) relay path and applying security policies. The paper also provides a security analysis of the proposal, identifying the security levels of the architecture and analyzing the core networking security properties, and a performance evaluation that confirms the feasibility and scalability of the proposal.
Quantum security over long distances with untrusted relays is largely unfounded and is still an open question for active research. Standard Quantum Key Distribution Network (QKDN) architecture demands full trust in QKD relays, which is too restrictive and limits QKDN applications. We investigate secure secret relaying in QKDNs by relaxing the trust assumptions (if not completely) on the relay. We classify QKD relays into Full Access Trust (FAT), Partial Access Trust (PAT), and No Access Trust (NAT) levels, each reflecting the required trust on the key management system for end-to-end communication. We review and propose QKD key management systems based on these trust levels. We propose a new decentralized key management system and review key management within a centralized topology. These different approaches offer various advantages based on QKDN requirements, granting operational flexibility. We believe this work offers a fresh perspective on the challenge of ensuring secure long-range communications in the future.
• Zero-trust relay for QKD networks using homomorphic encryption on conventional hardware • External QRNG integration to enhance crypto-agility in embedded random key generation • An extra confidentiality layer through the integration of cryptographic hardware Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables unconditionally secure symmetric key exchange between parties. However, terrestrial fibre-optic links face inherent distance constraints due to quantum signal degradation. Traditional solutions to overcome these limits rely on trusted relay nodes, which perform intermediate re-encryption of keys using one-time pad (OTP) encryption. This approach, however, exposes keys as plaintext at each relay, requiring significant trust and stringent security controls at every intermediate node. These “trusted” relays become a security liability if compromised. To address this issue, we propose a zero-trust relay design that applies fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to perform intermediate OTP re-encryption without exposing plaintext keys, effectively mitigating the risks associated with potentially compromised or malicious relay nodes. Additionally, the architecture enhances crypto-agility by incorporating external quantum random number generators, thus decoupling key generation from specific QKD hardware and reducing vulnerabilities tied to embedded key-generation modules. The solution is designed with the existing European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) QKD standards in mind, enabling straightforward integration into current infrastructures. Its feasibility has been successfully demonstrated through a hybrid network setup combining simulated and commercially available QKD equipment. The proposed zero-trust architecture thus significantly advances the scalability and practical security of large-scale QKD networks, greatly reducing reliance on fully trusted infrastructure.
Cloud-based quantum computingQuantum Computing (QC) introduces significant security and privacy risks to users’ intellectual property, including both program code and input data. In the absence of dedicated protections, quantum circuits submitted to remote services may be accessible to the cloud provider or compromised by malicious insiders. Furthermore, data embedded in these circuits remains susceptible to leakage during execution. This work proposes architectural and hardware enhancements for contemporary superconducting-qubit quantum computers to mitigate such threats. Drawing inspiration from classical Trusted Execution EnvironmentsTrusted Execution Environments (TEE) (TEEs), we define Quantum Trusted Execution EnvironmentsTrusted Execution Environments (TEE) (QTEEs): trusted hardware mechanisms designed to conceal or obfuscate quantum programs in cloud settings. We present two concrete instantiations, SoteriaQ and CASQUE, detailing their hardware support and required system software.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows the distribution of secret keys for quantum-secure communication between two distant parties, vital in the quantum computing era in order to protect against quantum-enabled attackers. However, overcoming rate-distance limits in QKD and the establishment of quantum key distribution networks necessitate key relaying over trusted nodes. This process may be resource-intensive, consuming a substantial share of the scarce QKD key material to establish end-to-end secret keys. Hence, an efficient scheme for key relaying and the establishment of end-to-end key pools is essential for practical and extended quantum-secured networking. In this paper, we propose and compare two protocols for managing, storing, and distributing secret key material in QKD networks, addressing challenges such as the success rate of key requests, key consumption, and overhead resulting from relaying. We present an innovative, fully decentralized key distribution strategy as an alternative to the traditional hop-by-hop relaying via trusted nodes, where three experiments are considered to evaluate performance metrics under varying key demand. Our results show that the decentralized pre-flooding approach achieves higher success rates as application demands increase. This analysis highlights the strengths of each approach in enhancing QKD network performance, offering valuable insights for developing robust key distribution strategies in different scenarios.
There is a need to ensure unconditionally secure communications between different sites of an organization. We use quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol to provide a continuous stream of secret key bits to each communicating pair for message encryption through one-time-pad (OTP) cryptography. Due to long distance between different sites, trusted nodes are used to relay each service key in a hop-by-hop manner from one end node to another end node of a communicating pair. In a QKD network, routes for key relaying can be affected by availability of relay key bits at trusted nodes. Also, relay key allocation among different routes can impact security. We consider the scenario of supporting multiple communicating pairs, where each pair demands delivery of a certain service key rate across the QKD network, and trusted nodes may not have sufficient relay key rates to perform bitwise encryption to protect the service key. Hence, there is a need to allocate the limited relay key bits to meet all service key delivery demands while considering its effects on security. We propose to perform jointly routing and relay key allocation to minimize attack success probability. We have formulated the joint problem as an optimization and further proposed an efficient algorithm to find the optimal solutions. We have evaluated the proposed algorithm to confirm its ability and efficiency in finding optimal routes and relay key allocations. For the specific network topology that we have adopted, results show that the minimum number of required trusted nodes increases linearly when end nodes are added to the system. Furthermore, we can achieve a higher security level by adding more trusted nodes in a QKD network. But increasing the number of trusted nodes beyond the minimum requirement may not continue to reduce significantly the attack success probability.