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The Philosophical Magazine A Journal of Theoretical Experimental and Applied Physics

Can active information solve key problems in the Bohm theory?

Paavo Pylkkänen

Published Sep 27, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In two 1952 papers David Bohm proposed a hidden-variables interpretation of quantum theory, completing an approach de Broglie had suggested in 1927. An electron is a particle accompanied by a field, described by the wave function, which gives rise to a quantum potential influencing the particle alongside the classical potential. Bohm later became critical of his own theory: the mathematical form of the quantum potential is arbitrary; for a many-body system it assumes a physical field in 3N-dimensional configuration space; and in measurement it leaves empty wave packets floating around. He responded by radically reinterpreting the quantum field as a field of information rather than a physical field, claiming thereby to solve all three problems. This proposal has been largely ignored in recent philosophy of physics. I situate it in relation to the nomological interpretation of the wave function and its dispositionalist and Humean variants, arguing that active information agrees with the nomological view about what the wave function is not while differing about what it is, and that it belongs among property rather than law interpretations. I conclude that it is a serious live option, which moreover suggests a new approach to the mind–matter relation.

DOI
10.1080/14786435.2026.2737148

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In two 1952 papers David Bohm proposed a hidden-variables interpretation of quantum theory, completing an approach de Broglie had suggested in 1927. An electron is a particle accompanied by a field, described by the wave function, which gives rise to a quantum potential influencing the particle alongside the classical potential. Bohm later became critical of his own theory: the mathematical form of the quantum potential is arbitrary; for a many-body system it assumes a physical field in 3N-dimensional configuration space; and in measurement it leaves empty wave packets floating around. He responded by radically reinterpreting the quantum field as a field of information rather than a physical field, claiming thereby to solve all three problems. This proposal has been largely ignored in recent philosophy of physics. I situate it in relation to the nomological interpretation of the wave function and its dispositionalist and Humean variants, arguing that active information agrees with the nomological view about what the wave function is not while differing about what it is, and that it belongs among property rather than law interpretations. I conclude that it is a serious live option, which moreover suggests a new approach to the mind–matter relation.
Abstract The paper proposes that quantum theory implies a radically new notion of matter which has not been properly understood before David Bohm’s groundbreaking work. Bohm proposed that the fundamental particles of physics (such as electrons) are not merely pushed around mechanically by classical forces but are also able to respond to information. Information is thus assumed to be an objective commodity which can exist independently of the human mind and which actively guides or instructs physical processes. This notion of active information also applies in computational, biological and psychological phenomena, thus helping us to understand how the mental and the physical sides of reality are related. It may even help us to understand the nature of conscious experience. The latter part of the paper considers the deeper mathematical and physical background of quantum theory and suggests that we need to revise our basic assumptions about quantum objects, such as the role of the wave function.
In this paper I give a new information-theoretic analysis of the formalisms and interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) in general, and of two mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanics in particular: The Copenhagen interpretation and David Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. Adopting Juan G. Roederer’s reading of the notion of pragmatic information, I argue that pragmatic information is not applicable to the Copenhagen interpretation since the interpretation is primarily concerned with epistemology rather than ontology. However it perfectly fits Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics in the realms of biotic and artificial systems. Viewing Bohm’s interpretation of QM in the context of pragmatic information imposes serious limitations to the qualitative aspect of such an interpretation, making his extension of the notion active information to every level of reality illegitimate. Such limitations lead to the idea that, contrary to Bohm’s claim, mind is not a more subtle aspect of reality via the quantum potential as active information, but the quantum potential as it affects particles in the double-slit experiment represents the non-algorithmic aspect of the mind as a genuine information processing system. This will provide an information-based ground, firstly, for refreshing our views on quantum interpretations and secondly, for a novel qualitative theory of the relationship of mind and matter in which mind-like properties are exclusive attributes of living systems. To this end, I will also take an information-theoretic approach to the notion of intentionality as interpreted by John Searle.
Abstract The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Bohm 1952a, 1952b, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1975, 1984, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution—drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies—is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.
We have touched many times upon the problem of WP-Dualism. Now we shall analyse the problem, by starting with what is chronologically the first discussion about it. An organic answer to the problem came from de Broglie, but, for many reasons yet to be analysed in greater depth, it was not accepted by the majority of physicists. This theory was later included in the theoretical program of the Hidden-Variable theory by David Bohm, so that one normally speaks of the ‘de Broglie-Bohm Pilot wave’. However, de Broglie's proposal was directed more toward the problem of WP-Dualism as such, while Bohm's proposal was directed more toward the construction of a deterministic theory by contesting the completeness of QM — and here the point of departure is more Einstein's Ignorance interpretation [see proposition 6.3: p. 106] and the historical article of Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen [EINSTEIN et al . 1935]. As a consequence of the Hidden Variable theory the problem of non-locality was posed. The problem of the WP-Dualism and that of Hidden Variable theories (and non-locality) are theoretically different and hence they require different examinations. Therefore we divide all matter into three different parts: in this part we shall discuss de Broglie's theory and the problem of WP-Dualism; in part VIII, the problem of completeness and determinism (Bohm's Hidden Variable theory); in part IX the problem of separability and non locality. While part VIII, and especially chapter 33, is devoted to an interpretation of QM particles, we discuss in particular here what quantum waves are; if they are classical entities, if and how they can be ontologically interpreted, and what a quantum state is. We shall confirm our main distinction between states and observables. • We begin [in chapter 28 ] with the classical discussion stimulated by de Broglie with his proposal of the double solution theory — a proposal following which both particles and waves always exist together. Then more recent proposals concerning the nature of quantum waves and of quantum states are discussed (non-analytical solutions, empty waves, ontological interpretation of waves based on protective measurements). • Three-valued logic [ chapter 29 ] represents to a certain extent the opposite point of view relative to de Broglie's: the microentities are not determined in themselves (neither corpuscular nor wave-like), and, only under very specific circumstances (measurements), can the truth or falsehood of propositions about the values of observables be decided. Even if three-valued logic is chronological precedent to the matter of the precedent chapter, for systematical reasons it seemed better to discuss it after the latter. • Then in chapter 30 the relationship between which-path information and superposition is discussed, and very recent (proposed and performed) experiments are reported; finally we begin to discuss an ontological interpretation.
I combine the idea of a primitive ontology with the metaphysics of laws of nature. In so doing, I examine the theoretical entities that are postulated in Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and the de Broglie–Bohm quantum theory. I argue that the existence of mass, forces, fields, and the wave-function depends on the status of laws. The three major theories on laws of nature I treat are Humeanism, dispositionalism, and primitivism about laws. I point out that properties are notoriously ignored in debates on primitive ontologies. In fact, I show that properties, both intrinsic and relational, aren’t needed in physics; therefore, I replace the primitive ontology with a primitive stuff ontology, whose elements have no properties. Recently, a debate has started on the ontological status of forces in classical mechanics; I criticize the major positions and present my own idea that focuses on the status of laws of nature. Another hot topic is the status of the wave-function. Here, I develop a new interpretation in the framework of Humeanism that crucially differs from that advocated by David Albert and Barry Loewer, in that our world is not an illusion of a reality in configuration space. In addition, I propose a hitherto unconsidered way in which the wave–function can be construed as a holistic disposition.
Perhaps more so than any other twentieth-century physicist, David Bohm was trying to develop an ontological interpretation for quantum theory, i.e. an interpretation which tells us what quantum theory says about the nature of reality. He is best known for presenting in 1952 an improved version of de Broglie’s ‘pilot-wave’ theory, which says that an electron is a particle always accompanied by a new type of quantum field or pilot wave which guides it. In later research Bohm realized that the pilot wave is not pushing and pulling the particle mechanically but rather contains information which guides the particle, analogously to the way radar waves guide a ship on autopilot. The postulation of such objective and active information to the quantum level is a radical metaphysical move which also opens a new way to understand how the material and mental sides of reality are related to each other. It might even make it easier to understand what phenomenal properties are and how they could play a causal role in the physical world. This paper provides an overview of not only the pilot-wave theory, but also Bohm’s other related frameworks, namely the implicate order and soma-significance. It is suggested that these views point to a new theory of the relation of consciousness and matter which we can call interactionist dual-aspect monism. This theory suggests, against illusionism, that phenomenal properties exist and, against idealism, that the world has a material aspect which exists independently of the human mind ‐ thus ‘real consciousness in a real world’.