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On the Peierls Development of Heisenberg’s interpretation of the wave-function – a pragmatic approach to Quantum Measurement

Mike G. Burt

Published Jul 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In 1929 Heisenberg introduced the idea that the wavefunction encapsulates the knowledge of the observer of a quantum system. Over many years his erstwhile student, Rudolf Peierls, successfully developed this idea in a few brief works. Here these works are examined, interpreted, and expanded to widen appreciation of Peierls’s development of Heisenberg’s elegant idea. The approach followed here is very much in the spirit adopted by Peierls who eschewed a ‘rigorous axiomatic’ and aimed at using ‘logic at the level of the working physicist’. The fundamental tenet of his work is that the wavefunction or density matrix represents the knowledge of an observer and that two observers of the same system may well have different knowledge and will use different density matrices to describe it. Essential to the understanding of Peierls’s approach is the demonstration, given here, that the density matrix generally can be expressed entirely in terms of probabilities of observable outcomes and that such probabilities are subjective in the first instance. The process by which the knowledge of two observers may be combined is discussed in detail for some simple cases and, by using the Bayes theorem, the progress to a common understanding of the correct density matrix for a given situation demonstrated. Peierls gave a criterion to ensure that the amalgamation of data from two observers can never lead to violation of the uncertainty principle : that the density matrices of two observers must commute. It is pointed out that it is essential that the density matrices of two observers commute under all circumstances no matter how inaccurate the data or fanciful the beliefs used to construct them. Once this is appreciated it can be shown that Peierls’s density matrix commutation criterion is the generalisation of the standard result in quantum mechanics that two observables must commute if they are to be known precisely and simultaneously, but now extended to imperfectly known mixed states rather than a single pure state. Peierls’s second criterion for two observers to have compatible density matrices, that their product is non zero, is discussed and clarified.

DOI
10.1142/9789819827572_0011

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•Aug 29, 2026•0 citations
In 1929 Heisenberg introduced the idea that the wavefunction encapsulates the knowledge of the observer of a quantum system. Over many years his erstwhile student, Rudolf Peierls, successfully developed this idea in a few brief works. Here these works are examined, interpreted, and expanded to widen appreciation of Peierls’s development of Heisenberg’s elegant idea. The approach followed here is very much in the spirit adopted by Peierls who eschewed a ‘rigorous axiomatic’ and aimed at using ‘logic at the level of the working physicist’. The fundamental tenet of his work is that the wavefunction or density matrix represents the knowledge of an observer and that two observers of the same system may well have different knowledge and will use different density matrices to describe it. Essential to the understanding of Peierls’s approach is the demonstration, given here, that the density matrix generally can be expressed entirely in terms of probabilities of observable outcomes and that such probabilities are subjective in the first instance. The process by which the knowledge of two observers may be combined is discussed in detail for some simple cases and, by using the Bayes theorem, the progress to a common understanding of the correct density matrix for a given situation demonstrated. Peierls gave a criterion to ensure that the amalgamation of data from two observers can never lead to violation of the uncertainty principle : that the density matrices of two observers must commute. It is pointed out that it is essential that the density matrices of two observers commute under all circumstances no matter how inaccurate the data or fanciful the beliefs used to construct them. Once this is appreciated it can be shown that Peierls’s density matrix commutation criterion is the generalisation of the standard result in quantum mechanics that two observables must commute if they are to be known precisely and simultaneously, but now extended to imperfectly known mixed states rather than a single pure state. Peierls’s second criterion for two observers to have compatible density matrices, that their product is non zero, is discussed and clarified.
The brief works of Peierls on the role of the observer in quantum mechanics are examined, interpreted and expanded to widen accessibility and understanding of these works. The approach followed here is very much in the spirit adopted by Peierls who eschewed a `rigorous axiomatic' and aimed at using `logic at the level of the working physicist'. The fundamental tenet of his work is that the wavefunction or density matrix represents the knowledge of an observer and that two observers of the same system may well have different knowledge and will use different density matrices to describe it. Essential to the understanding of Peierls's approach is the demonstration given here that the density matrix generally can be expressed entirely in terms of probabilities of observable outcomes and that such probabilities are subjective in the first instance.The process by which the knowledge of two observers may be combined is discussed in detail for some simple cases and, by using Bayes's theorem, the progress to a common understanding of the correct density matrix for a given situation demonstrated. Peierls gave a criterion to ensure that the amalgamation of data from two observers can never lead to violation of the uncertainty principle : that the density matrices of two observers must commute. It is pointed out that it is essential that the density matrices of two observers commute under all circumstances no matter how inaccurate or even fanciful the data or beliefs used to construct them. Once this is appreciated it can be shown that Peierls's density matrix commutation criterion is fully equivalent to the standard result in quantum mechanics that two observables must commute if they are to be known precisely and simultaneously,but now extended to imperfectly known mixed states rather than a single eigenstate.
Sir Rudolph Peierls, in a reply to John Bell's last critique of the state of our understanding of quantum mechanics, maintained that it is easy to give an acceptable account of the physical significance of the quantum theory. The key is to recognize that all the density matrix characterizing a physical system ever represents is knowledge about that system. In answer to Bell's implicit rejoinder "Whose knowledge?" Peierls offered two simple consistency conditions that must be satisfied by density matrices that convey the knowledge different people might have about one and the same physical system: their density matrices must commute and must have a non-zero product. I describe a simple counterexample to his first condition, but show that his second condition, which holds trivially if the first does, continues to be valid in its absence. It is an open question whether any other conditions must be imposed.
Sir Rudolph Peierls, in a reply to John Bell's last critique of the state of our understanding of quantum mechanics, maintained that it is easy to give an acceptable account of the physical significance of the quantum theory. The key is to recognize that all the density matrix characterizing a physical system ever represents is knowledge about that system. In answer to Bell's implicit rejoinder Whose knowledge? Peierls offered two simple consistency conditions that must be satisfied by density matrices that convey the knowledge different people might have about one and the same physical system: their density matrices must commute and must have a non-zero product. I describe a simple counterexample to his first condition, but show that his second condition, which holds trivially if the first does, continues to be valid in its absence. It is an open question whether any other conditions must be imposed.
Abstract The fundamentals of the theory of density matrices are reviewed. The density matrix is introduced first in terms of state vectors for pure states over which a probability distribution is given. It is then shown that the applications of the density matrix do not require knowledge of the particular probability distribution over pure states that may have been used for its original determination. It is stressed that density matrices, like state vectors, describe ensembles rather than single systems, as determinism in quantum theory (except for some conservation laws) is of a statistical character only. The entropy of a quantum‐mechanical system is defined as the average per system of the entropy of an ensemble of systems described by the quantum‐mechanical (pure or mixed) state. For pure states this entropy is zero, in agreement with the fact that state vectors constitute the maximal information that can be given about a quantum‐mechanical system. As the entropy should be independent of the particular probability distribution over pure states that may have been used to form the mixed state, it is calculated from statistical considerations about an imaginary ensemble in which the eigenvalues of the density matrix are probabilities over pure states given by the eigenfunctions of the density matrix. The entropy is calculated for a mixture of two nonorthogonal states. The time evolution of the density matrix, in general, is not a unitary transformation, as observable systems are not closed and therefore in the Hamiltonian contain unknown external parameters that are not the same for the entire mixture. Therefore transitions between pure states and mixed states take place. Those from pure to mixed states take place spontaneously and irreversibly under increase of entropy. Transitions from mixed states to pure states can be fabricated; an example is given. As Wigner's thought experiment of mixing coherently the two beams from a Stern‐Gerlach apparatus according to estimates of Bohm should be impossible by loss of coherence in the gradient magnetic field, it is indicated how Wigner's ideas may be realized by using, instead, polarized light beams from birefringent crystals. After a brief review of the quantum theory of measurements and the various arguments usually given for the reducibility of state after the measurement, Wigner's argument against blind use of these arguments is interpreted as a limit of validity of the familiar probability rule of quantum theory, which should not be applied after an unsuccessful measurement. By splitting light beams coherently by glass plates, one can by the same apparatus have measurements both of the relative intensities of two coherent beams, and of interference effects between the two beams. This shows that complementarity applies to the individual systems in the beam, as they reach the glass plate where a choice must be made between two complementary possibilities of future measurement. Finally, by describing Schrödinger's cat by a density matrix and asking about its time dependence, it is shown that, if it were possible to measure the interference effects between living and dead cats used by some people as a justification for writing down a state vector for the cat, then this measurement could be used to revive some dead cats.
A quantum state, via the Born Rule, assigns probabilities to the different possible values of observables of a quantum system. It is only in virtue of these probabilities — or, alternatively, expectation values — that quantum mechanics is empirically testable. Since assigning a state to a system means assigning probabilities to the values of observables, it may seem natural to read Peierls’ claim that the state ‘represents our knowledge of the system’ (Peierls [1991], p. 19) as a shorthand for saying that the state represents our knowledge of these probabilities. The latter view is sometimes even straightforwardly identified with the epistemic conception of states, for example by Marchildon, who claims that ‘[i]n the epistemic view [of quantum states], the state vector (or wave function or density matrix) does not represent the objective state of a microscopic system […], but rather our knowledge of the probabilities of outcomes of future measurements’ (Marchildon [2004], p. 1454). However, according to an argument due to Fuchs and endorsed by Timpson, 31 the idea that quantum states represent our knowledge about quantum probabilities should not be regarded as the core claim of the epistemic conception of quantum states, simply because, as they argue, this idea is in fact incompatible with the latter. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Quantum mechanics' formal core is a handful of objects---the wavefunction that encodes a state, the operators that act on it, the commutators that measure their incompatibility, and the uncertainty principle that the commutators imply---and the theory's history is the story of how those objects were given. This article presents a narrative review of the primary literature that gave them, from Heisenberg's 1925 umdeutung---the reinterpretation that replaced orbits with arrays of transition amplitudes---and Schrödinger's 1926 quantization as an eigenvalue problem, which wrote the wave equation and proved the equivalence with matrix mechanics, through Born's 1926 probability interpretation of the wavefunction, Heisenberg's 1927 uncertainty paper, Robertson's 1929 general commutator inequality, Pauli's 1926 solution of the hydrogen spectrum by the new mechanics, Bohr's 1928 quantum postulate and complementarity, Weyl's 1928 group theory and quantum mechanics, Dirac's 1930 Principles, which organized the formalism's transformations, and von Neumann's 1932 mathematical foundations, which gave the theory its Hilbert space, to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen 1935 argument that tested what the formalism claims about reality. The synthesis is organized around three themes: the state's representations, in which matrix and wave mechanics were shown to be one theory; the uncertainty structure, in which commutators became the measure of incompatibility and the uncertainty principle its theorem; and the formalism's completion, in which Hilbert space, transformations, and the measurement problem gave the objects their rigorous home. It is concluded that the formal core's construction is physics' most consequential algebra---the theory's content located not in its pictures but in its operators' relations.