Bohmian mechanics is the leading non-local realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Its development and defense against objections (by V. Allori, B. Hiley, and others) constitute a distinct field at the intersection of physics and the philosophy of science. The aim of this work is to examine, in the context of current debates on quantum realism, the scientific and philosophical ideas of D. Bohm in their interconnection. The novelty of the article includes: a characterization of D. Bohm’s epistemology, his system of metaphors, as well as a comparative analysis of his metaphysics with the philosophical concepts of N. Bohr and W. Heisenberg. In his epistemology, Bohm combines realism with the view that our knowledge is limited. In the case of a single particle, its trajectory can be visualized; for a hundred particles, this is practically impossible. Similarly, in metaphysics, the world is real, but at the deep level of the implicate order it is only partially knowable for us. It is emphasized that Bohm possesses a genuine system of mutually complementary metaphors that elucidate his metaphysics: besides the holographic one, these are “the fish in the aquarium”, “the drop of ink”, and “the radio signal to the ship”. The metaphor of the radio signal to the ship in mechanics demonstrates an informational, rather than a force-based, influence on the particle. In metaphysics, it acquires a broader meaning: information guides the development of macro-objects. In the philosophy of physics, D. Bohm’s dynamic holism is contrasted with N. Bohr’s epistemological line and Heisenberg’s Pythagorean line (A. Plotnitsky). Bohr also recognizes holism, but it is the holism of particle, apparatus, and observer. In Bohm, holism has an ontological, universal character, rather than being fragmented according to the observer’s standpoint. For Heisenberg, symmetries expressed in equations lie at the foundation of reality; for Bohm, however, the meaning and significance of equations are merely an isolated aspect of a unified whole, a manifestation of active information from it. These three lines represent three answers to the question of the foundation of physical reality.
Bohmian mechanics is the leading non-local realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Its development and defense against objections (by V. Allori, B. Hiley, and others) constitute a distinct field at the intersection of physics and the philosophy of science. The aim of this work is to examine, in the context of current debates on quantum realism, the scientific and philosophical ideas of D. Bohm in their interconnection. The novelty of the article includes: a characterization of D. Bohm’s epistemology, his system of metaphors, as well as a comparative analysis of his metaphysics with the philosophical concepts of N. Bohr and W. Heisenberg. In his epistemology, Bohm combines realism with the view that our knowledge is limited. In the case of a single particle, its trajectory can be visualized; for a hundred particles, this is practically impossible. Similarly, in metaphysics, the world is real, but at the deep level of the implicate order it is only partially knowable for us. It is emphasized that Bohm possesses a genuine system of mutually complementary metaphors that elucidate his metaphysics: besides the holographic one, these are “the fish in the aquarium”, “the drop of ink”, and “the radio signal to the ship”. The metaphor of the radio signal to the ship in mechanics demonstrates an informational, rather than a force-based, influence on the particle. In metaphysics, it acquires a broader meaning: information guides the development of macro-objects. In the philosophy of physics, D. Bohm’s dynamic holism is contrasted with N. Bohr’s epistemological line and Heisenberg’s Pythagorean line (A. Plotnitsky). Bohr also recognizes holism, but it is the holism of particle, apparatus, and observer. In Bohm, holism has an ontological, universal character, rather than being fragmented according to the observer’s standpoint. For Heisenberg, symmetries expressed in equations lie at the foundation of reality; for Bohm, however, the meaning and significance of equations are merely an isolated aspect of a unified whole, a manifestation of active information from it. These three lines represent three answers to the question of the foundation of physical reality.
Abstract The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Bohm 1952a, 1952b, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1975, 1984, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution—drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies—is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.
Niels Bohr, considered one of the fathers of quantum mechanics, formulated a complex interpretation \nof quantum mechanics that guided his understanding of quantum experiments. The contemporary dispute \nbetween realism and anti-realism, the two main approaches to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, \nis often based on different attitudes towards or even readings of Bohr. We propose that a better \nunderstanding of Bohr’s philosophical thought can contribute to the contemporary reconciliation of \nthese opposing philosophical views and thus to a better understanding of the quantum world. Unfortunately, \nin many contemporary interpretations, Bohr’s philosophical approach to quantum mechanics \nhas been misunderstood, re-interpreted or labelled as ambiguous. This is mostly due to the dispersion \nof Bohr’s complex and unique interpretation through different texts, never united in a single systematically \nconceptualized work. To comprehensively explain Bohr’s philosophical approach and his main \nphilosophical concepts, we consider the many similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical \napproach to science. Husserl developed his philosophical standpoint in a cultural context similar to \nBohr’s and shared Bohr’s objects of philosophical consideration as well as his approach to these objects. \nParallel reading of Bohr’s and Husserl’s texts reveals the closeness between Bohr’s ontological realism— \nepistemological anti-realism standpoint and Husserl’s phenomenological standpoint. This explains \ntheir similar views on the relationship between mathematical language, scientific method and Nature. \nWhile Bohr’s use of the term phenomenon is not equal to Husserl’s, Husserl’s rigorous philosophical \nexplanation of the term helps us to better understand Bohr’s use. Furthermore, the parallel reading \nfacilitates better understanding of one of Bohr’s main philosophical theses, often labelled as ambiguous \nand interpreted in different ways, that it is necessary to use classical concepts to describe quantum phenomena. \nWe claim that the thesis is connected with the advance of epistemological reconsideration of \nscience at the time of Bohr’s writing. Thus, Bohr considers some parts of argumentation as self-evident, \nwhile they are not evident to the contemporary reader. Husserl’s analysis of the relationship between science and the life-world offers a much-needed background for a comprehensive understanding of \nBohr’s thesis. The insight into the similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical approach \nto science and scientific phenomena enables a philosophically rigorous reading of Bohr’s texts; it can \neliminate some of the disagreements between realists and anti-realists and provide a firmer philosophical \nground for a dialog between them.
The innovations to physics introduced by Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr via quantum mechanics presented them with epistemological and metaphysical challenges with which they were perpetually engaged. Among Heisenberg’s innovations are the complex-valued quantum state-transition probability amplitudes, and among Bohr’s the non- trivial role of the measuring environment in the procurement of data. In his article, Arkady Plotnitsky examines the responses of these two natural philosophers to these challenges through the lens of Pythagoreanism in terms of the rational and the irrational. He argues that Bohr’s philosophical stance is of the Reality-without-Realism sort in that Bohr holds quantum reality to be unrepresentable, and that Heisenberg’s is of the Pythagorean-realist sort in that Heisenberg comes to hold reality to be representable, but only by mathematics. Here, I argue that Heisenberg’s later representation of reality can be characterized as neo- Aristotelian because, among other relevant things, he intentionally develops quantum potentiality, which is essential to his late interpretation of the quantum formalism, as a quantification of Aristotle’s potentia.
The Bohr-Einstein debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be viewed as a discussion on the epistemological status of knowledge gained by physics. It is shown that in fact the advent of quantum theory has led, in a new context, to an old philosophical controversy between epistemological realism (held by Einstein) and phenomenalism (held by Bohr). An inquiry into this controversy, taking into account the contemporary understanding of quantum mechanics based on the axiomatic study of its foundations, leads to the conclusion that contrary to widespread opinion, it is perfectly possible to formulate quantum mechanics in an entirely realistic manner according to the postulate of Einstein. We demonstrate that Bohr's episteme-logy, in which the role of experimental arrangements in the physical description is taken as a starting point, does not necessarily imply phenomenlism, but may be justifiably considered as a complementary standpoint to the realistic epistemology of Einstein, which is based on the notion of a mental construction which pictures reality.
The ideas in Heisenberg's paper on quantum mechanics in 1925 mark the beginning not only of a new phase in modern physics, but also of Heisenberg's own philosophical journey. This thesis examines that journey between 1925 and the late 1950s by situating Heisenberg's philosophy of quantum mechanics in the context of his encounters with his contemporaries as well as the context of various strands of thought in the German-speaking world at the time. Heisenberg's early philosophical critique of the 'classical' viewpoint between 1925 and 1927 bears the decisive influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, more specifically, the positivism he saw as underpinning Einstein's emancipation from Newtonian physics. The positivist influence on Heisenberg's early attitude to quantum mechanics is evident in three ways: (a) his invocation of an observability principle in 1925 to justify the renunciation of the concept of the electron orbit, (b) an instrumentalist conception of understanding, which characterised Heisenberg's response to Schrodinger's demand for classical visualisation in space and time in 1926-7, and (c) the introduction of an operational definition of concepts such as position and velocity in 1927, in an attempt to replace the concepts of classical physics. But after discussions with Bohr and Einstein in 1926-7, Heisenberg soon recognised what we might term his `empiricist' viewpoint was problematic. In 1927 Heisenberg's thought undergoes a shift away from the `empiricist' viewpoint that had underpinned his early philosophy of quantum mechanics. The nature and scope of this transformation, which forms the central theme in this thesis, has, up until now, been poorly understood and often completely neglected. Through his discussions with Bohr, Heisenberg came to the realisation that despite their limitations, classical concepts were conditions for the possibility of the description of all experience. This marked the abandonment of his earlier attempt to replace classical concepts with quantum concepts. The recognition of the primacy of classical language forms the point of departure for much of Heisenberg's later thought, which brought him into contact with the attempts in the German-speaking world in the 1920s to reconstruct Kantian epistemology. By the mid-1930s, Heisenberg advocated a 'pragmatic transformation' of Kantian philosophy, in which classical concepts were held to be a priori in the sense that they remained the conditions for the possibility of experience, but were no longer held to be necessary or universal in a strict Kantian sense. After 1940 Heisenberg saw the paradoxes of quantum mechanics under the aegis of what can be termed a 'transcendental conception of language', according to which language is not a mere tool, but actively shapes, gives form, and objectifies, our 'reality'. The limits of a classical 'description' in quantum mechanics therefore came to signify for Heisenberg, the limits of 'objective reality'. While Bohr exerted perhaps the most important philosophical influence on Heisenberg, their intellectual relationship was characterised by disagreement and misunderstanding. This is most strikingly displayed in their respective views on wave-particle duality and complementarily. While after 1927 Heisenberg accepted Bohr's basic insight that our knowledge of the quantum world is mediated through classical language, he did not share Rohr's interpretation of complementarity. While Heisenberg certainly used terms such as 'complementarity' and wave-particle duality' in his writings, a close reading reveals that these terms had very different meanings for the two physicists. This is particularly evident in the contrast between Heisenberg's notion of wave-particle equivalence and Bohr's idea of complementarity. In bringing to light these divergences between Bohr and Heisenberg, this thesis lends further weight to the view - already advocated by scholars such as John Hendry and Mara Beller - that the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics should not be thought of as a unified philosophical position, but actually comprises a number of different strands.
This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion of how to interpret the Bohmian ontology. Bohmian Mechanics is a quantum theory that describes the motion of particles, whose trajectories are determined by the quantum wave-function. This theory faces two key questions. The former concerns the metaphysical characterization of the particles; the latter relates to the ontological status of the wave-function. \nAfter briefly presenting two possible metaphysical characterizations of the particles, I dedicate the bulk of this work to investigating the status of the wave-function. In particular, I analyse the realist view (which regards the wave-function as a multi-dimensional field) and the nomological view (which considers the wave-function as a law-like entity). My investigation touches upon different levels of inquiry. First, I show that these two ontological interpretations depend on contrasting formulations of the law that dictates the particle motion. Second, I argue that both views defend very problematic ontologies that not only violate familiar metaphysical criteria but also fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the relation between the particles and the wave-function. Third, I spell out the implicit methodologies that underlie the two views, arguing that they conflate three important categories that should rather be kept separate: the informationally-complete representation of the system, the ontologically-complete representation of the system, and the ontology itself. \nFinally, I present and advocate structural realism as the metaphysical framework for investigating and understanding the Bohmian ontology. According to the structuralist interpretation, the wave-function represents a network of modal relations whose relata are the particles. I argue that this third view provides the best account of the Bohmian system for three reasons. First of all, it offers a parsimonious ontology that does not create any issue of metaphysical underdetermination. Secondly, it supplies an explanatorily powerful ontology. Thirdly, it relies on a sound methodological program. I conclude with an interesting insight: this structuralist interpretation can be regarded as reconciling the realist view and the nomological view given that it takes on aspects of both views and is compatible with both formulations of the law of motion for the particles. \n