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International Conference on Trends in Quantum Computing and Emerging Business Technologies (TQCEBT)

Security and Performance Evaluation of Hybrid Classical-Post-Quantum Cryptographic Models

Rashmi R. Welekar, Charanjeet Dadiyala, Harshala Shingne, Nandani Narendra Sanghi, Kritank Singh

Published Apr 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum computing development has advanced beyond theoretical frameworks because it now operates as a functional technology which endangers public-key cryptographic systems that currently depend on RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) standards. The algorithms which Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) provides to defend against quantum attacks cannot serve as complete replacements for existing systems because they require extensive system performance testing and development to reach operational readiness. Hybrid cryptography serves as an intermediate solution which enables organizations to safeguard their data through dedicated security systems while adopting post-quantum security measures. This study proposes and evaluates a Parallel Dual-Stack Hybrid Model that investigates how users interact with hybrid key-exchange and signing systems which combine traditional ECDHE and ECDSA algorithms with NIST-approved PQC standards of Kyber, Dilithium and SPHINCS+. We evaluate the computational expenses together with key and signature dimensions and network traffic for systems that function in environments like TLS. Lattice-based hybrid models deliver strong security protections which require only minimal performance impact therefore these models serve as the best method to transition systems into actual operational use.

DOI
10.1109/tqcebt67648.2026.11681636

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As quantum computing advances, current cryptographic protocols are increasingly vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly those based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) like RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). This paper presents a comprehensive review of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as a solution to protect digital systems in the quantum era. We provide an in-depth analysis of various quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, including lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, isogeny-based, and multivariate approaches. The review highlights the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization process, highlighting key algorithms, such as CRYSTALS–Kyber, CRYSTALS–Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+, and discusses the strengths, vulnerabilities, and implementation challenges of the leading algorithms. In addition, we explore transition strategies for organizations, emphasizing hybrid cryptography to ensure backward compatibility during migration. This study offers key insights into the future of cryptographic standards and the critical steps necessary to prepare for the transition from classical to quantum-resistant systems.
The security underpinnings of extensively used encrypted public-key systems are in danger due to the development of massive-scale quantum computation. Digital interactions are now protected by methods like RSA and the Elliptic Curve encryption, which depend on computational challenges that can be effectively resolved by quantum computations. The use of (PQC) studies, which attempts to create secure systems immune from both traditional and quantum threats, has intensified as a result of this growing worry. Specified traditional techniques (such as RSA- 2048 and ECC- P256), and exemplary futuristic systems (Kyber, Dilithium, SPHINCS +, and Classic McEliece) are systematically evaluated for viability in this paper. A single application architecture is used for deploying every algorithm and useful metrics for performance like time taken to execute, key terms of size, and encrypted content or the signature size are used to evaluate them. The contrast study shows that lattice-driven new quantum algorithms offer a better fair tradeoff between integrity and effectiveness, while also highlighting the overpowering computational cost of conventional approaches. The findings provide useful information about the post- quantum cryptography solutions' preparedness for next reliable interaction systems.
The rapid progress of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography, particularly to RSA and elliptic-curve schemes that are vulnerable to Shor and Grover based attacks. This paper investigates the practical transition toward quantum-resilient security through a comprehensive evaluation of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We combine threat modeling, quantum-attack simulation, and empirical benchmarking of NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, including ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and SPHINCS+. Results demonstrate that although PQC introduces larger key sizes and computational overhead, its integration into real network environments via hybrid TLS deployments—remains feasible with acceptable latency and resource impact. Based on these findings, we propose a crypto-agile migration strategy supporting phased deployment, interoperability with legacy systems, and risk-driven prioritization. The study provides practical guidance for organizations preparing for the transition to quantum-resilient infrastructures.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging threat that large-scale quantum computing poses to classical public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which form the backbone of contemporary digital security infrastructures. In response to this threat, the study aims to analyze post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a viable long-term solution capable of resisting both classical and quantum adversaries. The paper further seeks to assess the urgency of PQC adoption in light of the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model and to evaluate the practical readiness of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms currently under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Materials and Methods: This study employs a qualitative and analytical research methodology grounded in an extensive review of authoritative sources, including NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization documents, recent academic literature, industry white papers, and policy reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation and Cloudflare. The analysis systematically surveys major families of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms namely lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes and evaluates them based on security assumptions, computational efficiency, implementation complexity, and standardization maturity. Findings: The analysis indicates that Lattice-based cryptographic schemes demonstrate the highest maturity and practical readiness, evidenced by their selection in NIST’s PQC process. Code- and hash-based methods provide strong security but face key size and performance challenges. The lack of scalable quantum computers does not reduce urgency, as data harvesting persists. Artificial intelligence emerges as a key enabler for accelerating PQC adoption. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The paper recommends a proactive, phased post-quantum migration using hybrid cryptographic architectures. Organizations should conduct inventories, benchmarking, and pilot deployments aligned with NIST standards. AI-driven tools are advised to improve key management and reduce complexity. Continued interdisciplinary research and policy support are encouraged to ensure a secure, scalable transition to quantum-resistant security systems.
The emergence of quantum computing is a serious threat to the principles of modern crypto-logical mathematics. The classical public-key cryptography, including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman are very safe against classical adversaries yet become susceptible to quantum algorithms, including the Shor algorithm, which can easily solve the underlying mathematical problems. This weakness is jeopardizing confidentiality and integrity of the world-wide systems of communication, money transactions, and essential structures, and requires the immediate creation of safe alternatives. The current literature on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has covered various classes of algorithm, such as lattice-based, code-based, multivariate schemes, and isogeny-based schemes. Although lattice-based approaches like Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring Unit (NTRU) and FrodoKEM can be highly theoretically resistant, they can be computationally and memory-intensive. Cryptosystems based on code such as Classic McEliece are secure but not practicable because they have huge public key sizes. Multivariate schemes like Rainbow, and isogeny-based schemes like Super singular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) have been attacked recently by cryptanalytic attacks, and broken completely. Such restrictions open the necessity to find more efficient and secure quantum-resistant solutions.This research study postulates a hybrid post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) system that combines CRYSTALS-Kyber for encryption with CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures both of which are approved through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization program. The model will be such that it ensures quantum resistance but at the same time it will be scalable, efficient and compatible with the existing infrastructures. The test outcomes indicate that the hybrid PQC model is 35-45 percent faster to encrypt and decrypt, signature performance is enhanced by up to 40 percent, and the throughput is 20 times higher (98.7 Mbps) than the same base PQC scheme including Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring Unit (NTRU), McEliece and Rainbow. These enhancements affirm that the suggested model provides a viable trade-off between the security, speed, and efficiency in terms of key size, which makes it a viable and a sound base to ensure secure communication in the quantum age.
Quantum computing is developing quickly, and that's a big problem for traditional encryption techniques such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. Shor's algorithm, a quantum algorithm, specifically calls into question the long-term security that Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) currently rely on. So, this thesis investigates how new post-quantum cryptography methods can be integrated into the public key infrastructure that businesses already use. This thesis examines the problems, both theoretical and practical, that arise when switching to cryptography resistant to quantum attacks. This thesis specifically examines how the NIST-selected algorithms, Kyber and Dilithium, are used in hybrid X.509 certificates that combine classical and post-quantum signatures.A test PKI environment was set up using OpenSSL-OQS and OpenXPKI to facilitate the testing process. Important PKI processes were examined in this setting, including TLS handshakes, certificate issuance, validation, and revocation. The results show that integrating PQC increases key and certificate sizes and also causes a moderate performance overhead. However, hybrid approaches offer a practical way to switch over. Lattice-based algorithms are particularly advantageous because they provide a strong balance of security, speed, and compatibility with existing systems. Using this information, a method was developed to help organizations gradually transition to a more secure system for managing their digital keys. This thesis connects advanced cryptography research with how businesses actually use it. It offers useful ideas and advice for companies getting ready for an age after quantum computing.