The present thesis aimed to evaluate the efficiency and resilience of quantum cryptographic systems against malicious attacks, with emphasis on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).Initially, fundamental concepts of quantum computing and quantum inform ation were examined, such as qubits, superposition, entanglement, decoherence and quantum gates, in order to establish the necessary theoretical background for the reader.Subsequently, key QKD protocols, such as BB84, E91, B92, BBM92 and Decoy-State techniques, were analyzed and compared in terms of security, practical applicability, and sensitivity to different categories of attacks.The methodology of the thesis was based on bibliographic and comparative analysis, using evaluation metrics such as Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), secret key generation rate, throughput, transmission distance, and channel losses.The analysis showed that simple theoretical attacks, such as intercept-resend, are usually more easily detectable due to an increase in QBER, whereas practical implementation attacks, such as detector blinding, time-shift, trojan-horse and photon-number-splitting attacks, can be more dangerous because they exploit device imperfections and do not always cause an obvious increase in errors.In conclusion, the theoretical security of QKD protocols is strong; however, their actual efficiency depends on the quality of implementation, technological limitations and the balance between protection and the final rate of secure key generation.
The present thesis aimed to evaluate the efficiency and resilience of quantum cryptographic systems against malicious attacks, with emphasis on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).Initially, fundamental concepts of quantum computing and quantum inform ation were examined, such as qubits, superposition, entanglement, decoherence and quantum gates, in order to establish the necessary theoretical background for the reader.Subsequently, key QKD protocols, such as BB84, E91, B92, BBM92 and Decoy-State techniques, were analyzed and compared in terms of security, practical applicability, and sensitivity to different categories of attacks.The methodology of the thesis was based on bibliographic and comparative analysis, using evaluation metrics such as Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), secret key generation rate, throughput, transmission distance, and channel losses.The analysis showed that simple theoretical attacks, such as intercept-resend, are usually more easily detectable due to an increase in QBER, whereas practical implementation attacks, such as detector blinding, time-shift, trojan-horse and photon-number-splitting attacks, can be more dangerous because they exploit device imperfections and do not always cause an obvious increase in errors.In conclusion, the theoretical security of QKD protocols is strong; however, their actual efficiency depends on the quality of implementation, technological limitations and the balance between protection and the final rate of secure key generation.
This thesis explores the critical advancements in quantum communication with a primary focus on the BB84 protocol, the foundation of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). It delves into the theoretical principles, practical implementation using Qiskit, and performance evaluation through metrics like entropy, Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), and efficiency. Comparative analysis with alternative protocols, such as B92 and SARG04, highlights their advantages, limitations, and suitability for real-world applications. The work also addresses challenges like photon number splitting attacks and implementation imperfections, contributing to the development of robust quantum cryptographic systems. By bridging theory and practice, the thesis emphasizes the transformative potential of quantum cryptography in securing communication against both classical and quantum threats. This comprehensive study paves the way for advancements in secure, scalable quantum communication technologies.
The rapid advancement of digital technologies has increased the dependence of individuals, businesses, and government institutions on secure communication and data storage systems. However, the emergence of quantum computing presents significant challenges to conventional cryptographic techniques, particularly public-key encryption systems such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which rely on mathematical problems that may become efficiently solvable by sufficiently powerful quantum computers. This growing threat has intensified interest in quantum cryptography as an alternative approach to securing sensitive information. Among the proposed solutions, the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol, introduced by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984, represents a foundational technique for establishing secure cryptographic keys through quantum mechanical principles. This study examines the operational mechanisms, security foundations, and practical vulnerabilities of the BB84 protocol, with particular attention to its application in modern secure communication environments. It explores the fundamental principles of quantum superposition, quantum measurement, and the no-cloning theorem that underpin the protocol's ability to detect unauthorized interception. Furthermore, the study considers potential security threats, including intercept-resend attacks, photon-number-splitting attacks, detector blinding, side-channel exploitation, and imperfections in quantum communication hardware. It also examines implementation challenges associated with photon transmission losses, environmental interference, quantum channel limitations, and the integration of quantum-generated keys into existing cryptographic infrastructures. The analysis highlights the distinction between the theoretical security guarantees of ideal BB84 implementations and the practical security limitations arising from real-world operating conditions. The study emphasizes the importance of advanced implementation techniques, including decoy-state methods, measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution, and improved detector technologies, in strengthening the protocol against emerging attacks. It concludes that although BB84 offers a promising foundation for quantum-resistant key establishment, its practical effectiveness depends on rigorous implementation, continuous security assessment, and the mitigation of hardware-related vulnerabilities. The study contributes to a better understanding of the opportunities and limitations of quantum key distribution in the evolving cybersecurity landscape.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides an innovative approach for secure communication by utilizing the principles of quantum mechanics. Among various QKD protocols, the BB84 protocol remains the most widely studied and implemented due to its simplicity and theoretical security guarantees. However, practical implementations of BB84 are vulnerable to several eavesdropping attacks and channel imperfections. This paper presents a comprehensive study on the detection and analysis of eavesdropping attacks in the BB84 protocol. The work focuses on common attacks such as intercept-resend attack, photon-number splitting attack, Trojan horse attack, and phase-covariant cloning attack. The effect of these attacks on Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) is analyzed in detail. Simulation-based observations are discussed to demonstrate how QBER increases under malicious interference. The study further explores statistical methods for detecting eavesdropping and examines practical countermeasures including decoy states, privacy amplification, and error correction techniques. The paper concludes that BB84 remains robust against eavesdropping when proper detection and mitigation mechanisms are employed.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols offer a revolutionary approach to secure communication, leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics to enable theoretically unbreakable encryption. This comprehensive review examines the security and efficiency of various QKD protocols, including BB84, E91, and Continuous Variable QKD. We analyze the fundamental principles underpinning these protocols, their implementation challenges, and the practical considerations for real-world deployment. Special emphasis is placed on the security proofs of QKD, addressing potential vulnerabilities such as photon number splitting attacks and detector blinding attacks. Additionally, we explore the efficiency of QKD systems in terms of key generation rates, distance limitations, and integration with existing communication infrastructures. Recent advancements in QKD technology, including satellite-based QKD and quantum repeaters, are also discussed. Our findings highlight the critical role of QKD in future-proofing communication security and the ongoing efforts to enhance its practicality and scalability. This review aims to provide a detailed understanding of the current state of QKD protocols, offering insights into their potential to transform secure communications in the quantum era.
Quantum computing poses significant threats to conventional cryptographic techniques such as RSA and AES, motivating the need for quantum secure communication methods. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information theoretic security based on fundamental quantum principles. This paper presents a simulation-based analysis of well-known QKD protocols, namely BB84, B92, and E91, using the IBM Qiskit framework. Realistic quantum channel effects, including noise, decoherence, and eavesdropping, are modeled to evaluate protocol performance. Key metrics such as error rate, secret key generation, and security characteristics are analyzed and compared. The study highlights practical challenges in QKD implementation, including hardware limitations and channel losses, and discusses insights toward scalable and robust quantum communication systems. The results support the feasibility of QKD as a promising solution for secure communication in the quantum era.
Quantum cryptography, or, more precisely, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to expand a previously shared secret key by sending quantum states through a quantum channel. The goal here is for Alice and Bob to communicate securely in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. The most well-known QKD protocol is the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol, which has been proved unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main advantage of QKD over conventional cryptography is its absolute security. Thus, it is imperative to evaluate the security and performance of QKD protocols and realistic QKD systems. In this thesis, we study the security and performance aspects of QKD in four parts. In the first part, we study the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol. This protocol differs from the BB84 protocol only in the classical post-processing step and uses the same four quantum states as the BB84 protocol. We compared these two protocols and showed that in typical situations, the classical post-processing software for BB84 should be used in order to have a higher performance. In the second part, we prove the security of a three-state protocol. This protocol is similar to the BB84 protocol in that they share the same three qubit states. In the third part, we consider a practical Trojan horse attack on practical QKD systems implementing the BB84 protocol. The attack works by taking advantage of the finite response time of practical phase modulators to remap the states sent out by the legitimate user, Alice. We showed that if Alice and Bob are unaware of our attack, the final key shared between them can be compromised in some situations. In the fourth part, we consider another type of Trojan horse attack, which is based on mismatch between detection efficiencies of detectors. Practical detectors in QKD systems usually do not have identical efficiencies and an eavesdropper Eve may be able to exploit this efficiency mismatch to steal information about the final secret key. We analyze the security of the attack and show that it is possible for Eve to acquire some information on the final secret key if Alice and Bob are unaware of this attack.