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International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)

A Comparative Study of Classical Cryptography and Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms

Varshini B M, Umadevi Ramamorthy

Published Sep 9, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The rapid progress of quantum computing is changing the assumptions on which many modern security systems are built. Public-key methods such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) remain dependable against conventional computers, yet their underlying mathematical problems can be solved efficiently by a sufficiently capable quantum computer using algorithms such as Shor's algorithm. This creates a practical need to evaluate cryptographic techniques that can continue to protect information in a post-quantum environment. This study compares representative classical algorithms - RSA, ECC, and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) - with post-quantum approaches, with particular attention to CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium. The comparison considers security assumptions, key-generation cost, encryption and decryption time, key size, memory demand, and resistance to quantum attacks. The reported benchmark values indicate that RSA has the highest processing cost among the evaluated schemes, whereas CRYSTALS-Kyber provides comparatively fast key generation, encryption, and decryption while maintaining resistance to known quantum attacks. The study also discusses a hybrid migration model in which established classical mechanisms and post-quantum algorithms operate together during the transition period. Overall, the findings support a gradual move toward quantum-resistant communication systems while recognising the deployment and storage overhead introduced by larger post-quantum keys.

DOI
10.21275/mr26908183004

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The rapid progress of quantum computing is changing the assumptions on which many modern security systems are built. Public-key methods such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) remain dependable against conventional computers, yet their underlying mathematical problems can be solved efficiently by a sufficiently capable quantum computer using algorithms such as Shor's algorithm. This creates a practical need to evaluate cryptographic techniques that can continue to protect information in a post-quantum environment. This study compares representative classical algorithms - RSA, ECC, and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) - with post-quantum approaches, with particular attention to CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium. The comparison considers security assumptions, key-generation cost, encryption and decryption time, key size, memory demand, and resistance to quantum attacks. The reported benchmark values indicate that RSA has the highest processing cost among the evaluated schemes, whereas CRYSTALS-Kyber provides comparatively fast key generation, encryption, and decryption while maintaining resistance to known quantum attacks. The study also discusses a hybrid migration model in which established classical mechanisms and post-quantum algorithms operate together during the transition period. Overall, the findings support a gradual move toward quantum-resistant communication systems while recognising the deployment and storage overhead introduced by larger post-quantum keys.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a fundamental threat to classical cryptographic mechanisms that underpin modern digital security. Shor’s algorithm can efficiently solve integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, thereby breaking widely used public-key cryptosystems such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie–Hellman. Grover’s algorithm also reduces the effective security of symmetric encryption and hash functions by half. This paper provides a systematic analysis of the impact of quantum attacks on current cryptographic infrastructures, including TLS, digital signatures, and blockchain. We then review the state of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as standardized by NIST, focusing on three leading candidates: CRYSTALS-Kyber for key encapsulation, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and FALCON for digital signatures. Through simulation using the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) library on a standard x86_64 platform, we measure key generation time, encryption/signing speed, decryption/verification latency, and key/signature sizes. Our results show that Kyber-768 achieves key generation in <0.1 ms and produces public keys of about 1.2 KB, while Dilithium-3 generates signatures of ~2.7 KB with verification times under 0.3 ms. Compared to RSA-2048 and ECDSA-P256, PQC algorithms offer competitive performance at the cost of larger key and signature sizes. Based on these findings, we propose a hybrid transition roadmap that combines classical and PQC algorithms in parallel, minimizing risk while maintaining backward compatibility. The paper concludes that organizations should begin immediate preparations for the post-quantum era, especially for data requiring long-term confidentiality.
Quantum computing threatens current public-key cryptographic systems, necessitating a transition to quantum-resistant alternatives. This paper analyzes how Shor's algorithm enables quantum computers to efficiently break RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography by solving their underlying mathematical problems, demonstrating these systems cannot be salvaged through parameter increases. We evaluate lattice-based cryptography as a post-quantum solution, examining its foundation on high-dimensional lattice problems such as the Shortest Vector Problem and Learning With Errors. Through analysis of NIST-standardized algorithms CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, we assess the security assumptions, computational efficiency, and implementation considerations of lattice-based schemes. Our findings reveal that while quantum computing poses an existential threat to current cryptographic infrastructure, lattice-based cryptography provides a viable quantum-resistant alternative with strong security guarantees and practical performance characteristics.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing threatens to undermine the security foundations of modern cryptographic systems, particularly those based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. Algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s promise exponential or quadratic speedups, rendering RSA, ECC, and certain symmetric schemes vulnerable within the next decade. This paper presents a simulated evaluation of classical cryptographic algorithms against quantum attacks, followed by a performance assessment of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) schemes—specifically lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based algorithms. A testing framework was developed using a quantum simulator (Qiskit) and a classical benchmarking environment to model potential attack timelines and measure computational efficiency. Results demonstrate that RSA-2048 can be theoretically broken within 8 hours on a 4000-qubit fault-tolerant quantum processor, while ECC-P256 succumbs in less than 4 hours. In contrast, lattice-based schemes such as CRYSTALS-Kyber resisted quantum simulation attacks, maintaining equivalent classical security levels with only a 27% performance overhead. The study also analyzes the trade-offs between key size, encryption/decryption speed, and resistance to quantum attacks. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for migration to NIST-recommended PQC algorithms and provide a decision-support matrix for selecting suitable replacements in government and enterprise systems.
Quantum computing is rapidly emerging as a trans-formative technology with the potential to solve certain computational problems much faster than classical computers. While this advancement offers significant opportunities in science and technology, it also raises serious concerns for modern crypto-graphic systems. Widely used encryption methods such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) rely on mathematical problems that are difficult for classical computers to solve but may become vulnerable to powerful quantum algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. This paper examines the impact of quantum computing on existing cryptographic techniques and discusses the need for quantum-resistant security solutions. Various post-quantum cryptographic approaches, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, and multivariate cryptographic systems, are reviewed and compared in terms of security, performance, and practical implementation. The study also explores the strengths and limitations of these approaches and evaluates their suitability for future digital security requirements. In addition, the paper highlights the importance of hybrid cryptographic systems that combine classical and post-quantum methods. Such systems can support a gradual transition to quantum-resistant security while maintaining compatibility with existing infrastructure. Although post-quantum cryptography offers promising protection against future quantum threats, challenges such as increased computational requirements, larger key sizes, and implementation complexity remain important considerations. The findings emphasize the need for continued research, standardization, and strategic planning to ensure a secure transition to the post-quantum era. As quantum computing technology continues to advance, the adoption of reliable quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions will be essential for protecting digital communications, sensitive information, and critical infrastructure.
Abstractly, the fast development of quantum computing is a threat to classical public-key cryptographic infrastructures.Asymmetric algorithms (which are widely used and include RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)) are susceptible to the Shor algorithm, which can break them in a time-polynomial manner.This paper will give a detailed comparative study of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) schemes founded on discrete algebraic structures such as lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomials based cryptosystems.These paradigms are systematically assessed according to computational complexity, key and ciphertext sizes, security reduction assumptions, and how they can be deployed on large scale networks.The NIST-standardized algorithms, which are the focus of our analysis, are ML-KEM (CRYSTALS-Kyber), ML-DSA (CRYSTALS Dilithium), FN-DSA (Falcon), and SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+).We also consider hybrid cryptography transitional measures to provide backward compatibility and security guarantee in the process of migrating the classical to quantum-resistant systems.As we found, the current state of lattice-based schemes provides the most desirable ratio of security to performance in large-scale applications, although, in the long run, code-based and multivariate schemes are necessary as their complements.
The emergence of quantum computing is a serious threat to the principles of modern crypto-logical mathematics. The classical public-key cryptography, including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman are very safe against classical adversaries yet become susceptible to quantum algorithms, including the Shor algorithm, which can easily solve the underlying mathematical problems. This weakness is jeopardizing confidentiality and integrity of the world-wide systems of communication, money transactions, and essential structures, and requires the immediate creation of safe alternatives. The current literature on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has covered various classes of algorithm, such as lattice-based, code-based, multivariate schemes, and isogeny-based schemes. Although lattice-based approaches like Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring Unit (NTRU) and FrodoKEM can be highly theoretically resistant, they can be computationally and memory-intensive. Cryptosystems based on code such as Classic McEliece are secure but not practicable because they have huge public key sizes. Multivariate schemes like Rainbow, and isogeny-based schemes like Super singular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) have been attacked recently by cryptanalytic attacks, and broken completely. Such restrictions open the necessity to find more efficient and secure quantum-resistant solutions.This research study postulates a hybrid post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) system that combines CRYSTALS-Kyber for encryption with CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures both of which are approved through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization program. The model will be such that it ensures quantum resistance but at the same time it will be scalable, efficient and compatible with the existing infrastructures. The test outcomes indicate that the hybrid PQC model is 35-45 percent faster to encrypt and decrypt, signature performance is enhanced by up to 40 percent, and the throughput is 20 times higher (98.7 Mbps) than the same base PQC scheme including Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring Unit (NTRU), McEliece and Rainbow. These enhancements affirm that the suggested model provides a viable trade-off between the security, speed, and efficiency in terms of key size, which makes it a viable and a sound base to ensure secure communication in the quantum age.