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IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics

Key Recovery of the Edge-Based Quantum-Secure Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

Jiseung Kim, Hyung Tae Lee

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Modern consumer technologies increasingly rely on cloud services and edge computing to process sensitive user data, which must remain private even during computation. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) offers a powerful mechanism for enabling such privacy-preserving computation by allowing data to be processed directly in encrypted form. Since Gentry’s breakthrough, all FHE schemes achieving indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) have relied on noise-bearing designs. In these constructions, noise plays a central role in ensuring security, but also introduces substantial efficiency overhead. Thus, whether a secure and efficientnoise-freeFHE scheme is possible has remained an open question. A recent work marketed as “edge-based quantum-secure FHE’’ (EB-QFHE) claims to resolve this challenge by proposing a noise-free construction over a prime field and asserting both IND-CPA security and improved efficiency (IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, 2025). In this paper, we present polynomial-time key-recovery attacks against EB-QFHE schemes. Our attacks derive two low-degree univariate polynomials from public information, whose unique common root corresponds to the secret key, and recover it by applying standard polynomial root-finding algorithms. Our theoretical analysis shows that the attacks succeed with overwhelming probability. Furthermore, our SageMath implementation demonstrates that the proposed attacks recover the secret key with a 100% success rate in under one second under the parameter settings recommended in the original paper. Our findings have direct implications for consumer electronics security: edge devices, gateways for the Internet of Things (IoT), and smart appliances that adopt EB-QFHE become completely vulnerable, since an adversary can recover the secret key solely from publicly available parameters.

DOI
10.1109/tce.2026.3730849

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Modern consumer technologies increasingly rely on cloud services and edge computing to process sensitive user data, which must remain private even during computation. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) offers a powerful mechanism for enabling such privacy-preserving computation by allowing data to be processed directly in encrypted form. Since Gentry’s breakthrough, all FHE schemes achieving indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) have relied on noise-bearing designs. In these constructions, noise plays a central role in ensuring security, but also introduces substantial efficiency overhead. Thus, whether a secure and efficientnoise-freeFHE scheme is possible has remained an open question. A recent work marketed as “edge-based quantum-secure FHE’’ (EB-QFHE) claims to resolve this challenge by proposing a noise-free construction over a prime field and asserting both IND-CPA security and improved efficiency (IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, 2025). In this paper, we present polynomial-time key-recovery attacks against EB-QFHE schemes. Our attacks derive two low-degree univariate polynomials from public information, whose unique common root corresponds to the secret key, and recover it by applying standard polynomial root-finding algorithms. Our theoretical analysis shows that the attacks succeed with overwhelming probability. Furthermore, our SageMath implementation demonstrates that the proposed attacks recover the secret key with a 100% success rate in under one second under the parameter settings recommended in the original paper. Our findings have direct implications for consumer electronics security: edge devices, gateways for the Internet of Things (IoT), and smart appliances that adopt EB-QFHE become completely vulnerable, since an adversary can recover the secret key solely from publicly available parameters.
IND-CPA-D security is an extension of IND-CPA security introduced in the context of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). It captures the situation where the computation result is known to the adversary; it is in particular necessary for FHE with threshold decryption. This work presents three new attacks in this situation on the BFV and BGV FHE schemes, when their parameters are instantiated with heuristic assumptions commonly used to enable correctness. We first extend the bootstrapping failure attacks from Cheon et al. [CCS'24] on the DM/CGGI and CKKS schemes, to both BFV and BGV. We focus on BGV when instantiated with the so-called powerful-basis representation of ring elements. The second attack relies on skewing the ciphertext noise in BFV, making it outpace the heuristic noise bounds for plaintext-ciphertext multiplications. This is achieved by crafting plaintexts, for which the noise bounds do not hold. The third and last attack focuses on outpacing the noise growth in BFV ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications. For this purpose, we skew the mask part of the ciphertext by selecting a random encryption of zero, whose addition yields a ciphertext with a sufficiently large mask norm. While the first two attacks successfully recover the secret key, the last attack instead breaks the IND-CPA-D indistinguishability game. We report experiments on all these attacks, based on the HElib and OpenFHE libraries, respectively, for BGV and BFV. Notably, the second attack implemented in OpenFHE fully recovers the secret key in a few minutes to a few hours, depending on the parameters.
As artificial intelligence becomes increasingly integrated into data-driven decision-making and edge applications, concerns around cybersecurity and privacy preservation have intensified. Fully homomorphic (FH) encryption addresses some challenges by providing arbitrary secure artificial intelligence computations directly on encrypted data. However, current FH solutions are often too complex, insufficiently efficient, or vulnerable to future quantum threats. This article presents a new edge-based, quantum-resistant, FH encryption scheme tailored to the constraints of low-end and IoT devices. The core idea of the proposed scheme is built on a regulator-based design that employs an encrypted set of random values r1,r2,r3,rn satisfying 1nri1n, which plays a central role both during the encryption process and in enabling efficient homomorphic multiplication. The mathematical analysis proves that the designed scheme achieves robust homomorphic properties and computational agility while maintaining strong post-quantum security guarantees. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the feasibility of the scheme for real-world IoT scenarios, offering parametrizable encryption settings that adapt to varying security performance requirements. The proposed scheme achieved a lower complexity compared to classical and post-quantum schemes O(nl2) vs. O(n3),O(nlogn); and a high entropy of 7.27 vs. 7.13, 3.32.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) has important applications in cloud computing. However, almost all fully homomorphic encryption schemes share two common flaws that they all use large-scale secret keys and some operations are inefficient. In this paper, the 'special b' variant of the learning with errors problem (bLWE) is presented, and helps us construct the first circularly secure key switching process which can replace the key switching process and similar re-linearisation process used by the existing FHE schemes. Then, we present an efficient FHE. Compared with Brakerski's scheme, our scheme reduces L secret keys to one and is more efficient. Finally, we prove the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) security of the fully homomorphic scheme and the circular security of key switching process in standard model under the learning with errors problem (LWE) assumption.
The idea of computing on encrypted data without decryption dates back to the notion of privacy homomorphisms introduced by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos (1978). Their proposals built using the elegant structure of Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), were later shown to be insecure under simple known-plaintext attacks. Subsequent CRT-based fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) over the integers addresses this algebraic transparency by injecting noise and basing security on approximate common divisor–type assumptions, but the resulting designs are burdened by large public keys and costly ciphertext refresh procedures. In this work, we develop a new CRT-based FHE scheme whose security relies on the Ring-LWE (RLWE) hardness assumption. For this purpose, we introduce the CRT-RLWE problem. We show that the problem is at least as hard as the RLWE, thereby positioning our construction within the established post-quantum security landscape of RLWE-based cryptography. Our scheme retains an explicit CRT embedding, separating a message component modulo a prime-power plaintext modulus and an auxiliary CRT component, while using RLWE-style key and ring arithmetic for compactness and efficiency. Finally, we make it fully homomorphic by using a new bootstrapping procedure, that adopts the recryption paradigm for BGV/BFV schemes utilizing the linear transformation and digit extraction techniques.
Suppose some data have been encrypted, can you compute with the data without decrypting them? This problem has been studied as homomorphic encryption and blind computing. We consider this problem in the context of quantum information processing, and present the definitions of quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) and quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE). Then, based on quantum one-time pad (QOTP), we construct a symmetric QFHE scheme, where the evaluate algorithm depends on the secret key. This scheme permits any unitary transformation on any nnn-qubit state that has been encrypted. Compared with classical homomorphic encryption, the QFHE scheme has perfect security. Finally, we also construct a QOTP-based symmetric QHE scheme, where the evaluate algorithm is independent of the secret key.
Homomorphic encryption is a recent and fundamental breakthrough in modern cryptography, which allows the performance of operations on encrypted data without unveiling the data. Leveraging quantum mechanics principles, quantum computers can potentially solve certain computational problems exponentially faster than classical computers. This immense computational power offers new possibilities for various fields, including cryptography. The rapid evolution of both these fields has led to the development of quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE), which makes the capabilities of classical HE extend into the quantum domain. However, many existing QFHE schemes require significant memory due to complex calculations and fault-tolerance needs. This paper contributes in two ways. First, we provide a comprehensive survey of two specific QFHE schemes, discussing their underlying principles, mathematical frameworks, security aspects, and practical applications. We also explore the challenges posed by quantum computing and how QFHE addresses these to achieve both security and computational efficiency. Second, we propose a new hierarchical memory management system for QFHE, which includes a “quantum cache” (a specialized memory storage for quantum data) and a “reinforcement learning agent” (an intelligent system that learns from experience to optimize decisions). This system dynamically manages data movement between the cache and classical memory, improving memory efficiency and potentially boosting computational performance.