This paper presents an investigation into the application of quantum key distribution (QKD) technologies to secure communications of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems within power system networks. The cryptographic systems currently deployed across the smart grid are vulnerable to quantum-computational attacks. The security of these classical cryptographic systems is quantitatively assessed through experimentation with field-deployed QKD systems connected to the power system’s fiber-optic communications links. The results of these experiments reveal that current implementations of protocols such as decoy-state BB84 can achieve sufficient key rates to secure SCADA communications over distances of 10-40 km between substations, with quantum bit error rates of less than 5%. While current QKD systems exhibit limitations in relation to the trust in their network nodes, the scalability of the systems, and their ability to cover long distances along the communication links, the implementation of a hybrid system that utilizes both QKD and post-quantum cryptographic systems is proposed as a way to provide secure communications along the smart grid network.
This paper presents an investigation into the application of quantum key distribution (QKD) technologies to secure communications of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems within power system networks. The cryptographic systems currently deployed across the smart grid are vulnerable to quantum-computational attacks. The security of these classical cryptographic systems is quantitatively assessed through experimentation with field-deployed QKD systems connected to the power system’s fiber-optic communications links. The results of these experiments reveal that current implementations of protocols such as decoy-state BB84 can achieve sufficient key rates to secure SCADA communications over distances of 10-40 km between substations, with quantum bit error rates of less than 5%. While current QKD systems exhibit limitations in relation to the trust in their network nodes, the scalability of the systems, and their ability to cover long distances along the communication links, the implementation of a hybrid system that utilizes both QKD and post-quantum cryptographic systems is proposed as a way to provide secure communications along the smart grid network.
Smart grid solutions enable utilities and customers to better monitor and control energy use via information and communications technology. Information technology is intended to improve the future electric grid's reliability, efficiency, and sustainability by implementing advanced monitoring and control systems. However, leveraging modern communications systems also makes the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks. Here we report the first use of quantum key distribution (QKD) keys in the authentication of smart grid communications. In particular, we make such demonstration on a deployed electric utility fiber network. The developed method was prototyped in a software package to manage and utilize cryptographic keys to authenticate machine-to-machine communications used for supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). This demonstration showcases the feasibility of using QKD to improve the security of critical infrastructure, including future distributed energy resources (DERs), such as energy storage.
Quantum computing promises significant computational speed-ups that could compromise the security of current public-key cryptography. As quantum technologies advance, SCADA systems will increasingly require enhanced cybersecurity measures. Two main quantum-safe approaches exist: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). QKD offers the unique advantage of information-theoretic security, ensuring security regardless of an adversary’s computational power. This thesis addresses two identified research gaps: protecting SCADA networks against potential quantum-computer-based attacks and identifying relevant use cases for QKD to guide further research and adoption. The objective was to assess whether QKD is a viable solution for securing SCADA communications in hydropower plants against quantum threats. The analysis included designing a QKD-based SCADA communication architecture for a hydropower network, conducting a quantum vulnerability assessment, simulating the proposed setup and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of QKD migration. The results indicate that, at the time of writing, QKD is not a viable option for securing SCADA communications in hydropower plants, as its disadvantages outweigh its benefits. For instance, QKD cannot guarantee availability, which is a critical requirement for SCADA in many critical infrastructures, including hydropower, and it is more costly than alternative quantum-safe solutions.
The fast integration of information technology with operational technology in cyber-physical systems (CPS) has introduced new cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure systems including power grids. Current cryptographic systems fail to protect data because emerging quantum computing technology will break existing standard encryption methods. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) employs principles of quantum physics to provide secure communication through an unbreakable method. This paper examines the implementation of QKD technology for CPS systems focusing on SCADA systems of the power grid infrastructure. The paper delivers an extensive evaluation of the QKD system architecture together with feature extraction and classification approaches and practical system implementations. The analysis focuses on hydroelectric systems and wide-area SCADA deployments and post-quantum cryptographic resilience. An extensive review of the existing literature helps us understand the current state, while providing essential knowledge gaps before suggesting research pathways for quantum-enhanced CPS security.
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) provides customers with utilities and smart grid solutions, enabling enhanced monitoring and control of energy management systems. This technology is poised to elevate the reliability, sustainability, and efficiency of future electric grids through the implementation of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). However, current Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems lack trusted machine authentication in smart grid communications, leaving the electric grid vulnerable to cyberattacks via sophisticated network technologies such as wireless access points, sensors, routers, and gateways. Therefore, ensuring proper management of data integrity from field sensors is crucial to enhance the reliability of SCADA systems. In this context, the utilization of quantum key distribution (QKD) key pairs is proposed to uphold integrity in smart grid communications. This paper presents a fibre optic blockchain network designed to manage and utilize cryptographic keys, facilitating the authentication of peer-to-peer (P2P) communications in SCADA systems. This demonstration underscores the feasibility of employing QKD and blockchain to further strengthen the integrity and authentication of smart grid communications. Additionally, this paper delves into discussing the performance metrics and overhead expenses of the proposed scheme in comparison with existing state-of-the-art proposals. Simulation results highlight the significant impact of blockchain size on the system setup’s throughput and latency.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems represent the cyber-physical infrastructure core of critical infrastructure, where any security violation can cause severe operational and physical repercussions. The integration of operational technology with Information Technology networks has introduced new vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, while the emergence of quantum computing poses a basic threat to classical cryptographic approaches currently in use within industrial control systems. This paper presents a novel Zero-Trust Post-Quantum Cryptographic (ZT-PQC) solution specifically tailored for resource-constrained SCADA systems. The solution combines lightweight symmetric encryption for field devices, hybrid and pure post-quantum cryptography for higher layers, and continuous Zero-Trust policy enforcement throughout the communication process. A layer-aware cryptographic offloading approach is utilized to strike a balance between quantum resilience and real-time operational requirements. The feasibility of the proposed solution is assessed using a validated synthetic SCADA dataset simulating practical communication patterns, attack models, and system constraints. Experimental results show that the solution provides quantum-resistant security with acceptable latency, minimal communication overhead, and compatibility with existing SCADA systems, thus being amenable to incremental deployment in critical infrastructure systems.
The current state, emerging trends, and practical challenges of optical fiber-based power network SCADA quantum communication must be addressed to fully utilize the technological platform's potential in real-world power system SCADA communications involving massive volumes of real-time data, as well as in managing, encoding, and applications such as quantum cryptography. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an essential part of the cybersecurity paradigm for quantum communication. Even though quantum computing with individual circuits yields probabilistic outcomes for the problem at hand, real-world datasets are complex and challenging to handle, even with telemetry. When using the cybersecurity triad of availability, confidentiality, and integrity (CIA) in reverse order (AIC), availability is given priority in electric power networks. This research assesses the use of the BB84, E91, B92, and SARG04 cryptographic protocols by applying them to large, multivariate power-system SCADA datasets and comparing the outcomes. By leveraging the variety of QKD protocols available with quantum electronics hardware, this simulation work provides a promising avenue for developing implementable frameworks and deploying SCADA/PMU networks in actual power systems.