Gaussian-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) is a leading candidate for metropolitan-scale quantum-secure communication, yet a critical gap remains between composable finite-size security proofs and real-time FPGA post-processing constraints. We present a cross-layer feasibility analysis that jointly evaluates composable security bounds and projected FPGA resource budgets on a Xilinx Ultrascale+ platform. Our formulation incorporates realistic block sizes (N = 105− 108), channel loss, excess noise, and detector imperfections. Results show that finite-size effects reduce the maximum secure distance by 68.0% (N = 105vs. 108), and excess noise is the most critical impairment (50× increase reduces range by 32.6 km). We identify N = 107as the optimal operating point, achieving 79.6 km secure distance within a 120 ms single-frame latency budget. To address the gap between theoretical projection and physical implementation, we further provide preliminary post-synthesis results for the multidimensional LDPC reconciliation decoder on a Xilinx XCVU9P, confirming timing closure at 250 MHz with 12.9% LUT and 2.9% BRAM utilization at the recommended operating point.
Gaussian-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) is a leading candidate for metropolitan-scale quantum-secure communication, yet a critical gap remains between composable finite-size security proofs and real-time FPGA post-processing constraints. We present a cross-layer feasibility analysis that jointly evaluates composable security bounds and projected FPGA resource budgets on a Xilinx Ultrascale+ platform. Our formulation incorporates realistic block sizes (N = 105− 108), channel loss, excess noise, and detector imperfections. Results show that finite-size effects reduce the maximum secure distance by 68.0% (N = 105vs. 108), and excess noise is the most critical impairment (50× increase reduces range by 32.6 km). We identify N = 107as the optimal operating point, achieving 79.6 km secure distance within a 120 ms single-frame latency budget. To address the gap between theoretical projection and physical implementation, we further provide preliminary post-synthesis results for the multidimensional LDPC reconciliation decoder on a Xilinx XCVU9P, confirming timing closure at 250 MHz with 12.9% LUT and 2.9% BRAM utilization at the recommended operating point.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), providing a way to generate secret keys with information-theoretic security, is arguably one of the most significant achievements in quantum information. The continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) offers the potential advantage of achieving a higher secret key rate (SKR) within a metro area, as well as being compatible with the mature telecom industry. However, the SKR and transmission distance of state-of-the-art CV-QKD systems are currently limited. Here, based on the proposed orthogonal-frequency-division-multiplexing (OFDM) CV-QKD protocol, we demonstrate a high-rate multi-carrier (MC) CV-QKD with a 10 GHz symbol rate that achieves Gbps SKR within 10 km and Mbps SKR over 100 km in the finite-size regime under composable security against collective attacks. The results are achieved by suitable optimization of subcarrier number and modulation variance, well-controlled excess noise induced by both the OFDM mechanism and the efficient DSP scheme, and high-performance post-processing capacity realized by the heterogeneous computing scheme. The composable finite-size SKR reaches 1779.45 Mbps@5 km, 1025.49 Mbps@10 km, 370.50 Mbps@25 km, 99.93 Mbps@50 km, 25.70 Mbps@75 km, and 2.25 Mbps@100 km, which improves the SKR by two orders of magnitude and quintuples the maximal transmission distance compared to the most recently reported CV-QKD results [ Nat. Commun. 13 , 4740 ( 2022 ) NCAOBW 2041-1723 10.1038/s41467-022-32161-y ]. Interestingly, it is experimentally verified that the SKR of the proposed MC CV-QKD can approach five times larger than that of the single-carrier CV-QKD with the same symbol rate without additional hardware costs. Our work constitutes a critical step toward future high-speed quantum metropolitan and access networks.
Satellite-based continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) is fundamentally constrained by finite communication windows, channel attenuation, and statistical fluctuations arising from a limited number of exchanged quantum states. This work develops a finite-size CV-QKD framework for satellite quantum communication under a hybrid noise model that jointly incorporates satellite geometry, atmospheric and propagation losses, quantum Poissonian noise coexisting with classical additive white Gaussian noise, detector imperfections, and composable finite-key security under collective attacks. A single canonical finite-size secret key rate (SKR) expression is derived in which the finite-size correction is stated in a strictly decreasing form in the block size, removing the ambiguity between the segmented and the block-level formulations used in earlier treatments. The finite-size accounting is further extended to the quantum bit error ratio (QBER) through an explicit parameter estimation penalty, so that the feasibility constraint inherits the same block-size dependence as the key rate. The framework quantifies the influence of reconciliation efficiency, transmission efficiency, detection efficiency, receiver aperture, beam waist, zenith angle, wavelength, and effective communication time. Numerical results reveal a significant performance gap between finite-size and asymptotic operation, indicating that asymptotic analysis can overestimate the feasible satellite altitude by a factor of several, and that the achievable range is governed by the number of signals actually exchanged rather than by any single physical channel parameter. These results establish block size as a first-class design variable for satellite CV-QKD mission dimensioning.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) guarantees information-theoretic security by the laws of physics, but deployment at scale requires compact, manufacturable photonic terminals. Continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) is well suited for this transition through telecom-compatible, room-temperature coherent detection. However, unifying full on-chip core terminal integration, room-temperature operation, high loss tolerance, and composable end-to-end security in long-distance QKD remains a key bottleneck. Here we report a fully integrated CV-QKD platform in which two hybrid III--V/Si3N4 integrated lasers, a silicon transmitter, and a silicon coherent receiver implement the core terminal functions, operating with a local local oscillator (LLO) over fibre links of 25--150 km. A Bayesian machine-learning algorithm maintains robust phase lock throughout the long records required for composable security, consistently outperforming the conventional unscented Kalman filter, while rate-matched multidimensional reconciliation approaches the Shannon limit. The system certifies a composable finite-size secret-key rate of 29.3 kbps at 100 km from a 140-billion-symbol block, with 12.9 kbps at 125 km under finite-size analysis and 9.17 kbps at 150 km under asymptotic analysis. By establishing the longest finite-size and asymptotic reaches and the highest secret-key rate per symbol reported for integrated CV-QKD, this work advances the development of practical chip-based quantum networks.
In this paper, using the full security framework for continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), we provide a composable security proof for the CV-QKD system in a realistic implementation.We take into account equipment losses and contributions from various components of excess noise and evaluate performance against collective and coherent attacks assuming trusted hardware noise.The calculation showed that the system remains operable at channel losses up to 10.2 dB in the presence of collective attacks and up to 7.5 dB in the presence of coherent ones.
This article presents an analysis of the practical challenges and implementation perspectives of point-to-point continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems over optical fiber. The study addresses the physical layer, including the design of transmitters, quantum channels, and receivers, with emphasis on impairments such as attenuation, chromatic dispersion, polarization fluctuations, and coexistence with classical channels. We further examine the role of digital signal processing (DSP) as the bridge between quantum state transmission and classical post-processing, highlighting its impact on excess noise mitigation, covariance matrix estimation, and reconciliation efficiency. The post-processing pipeline is detailed with a focus on parameter estimation in the finite-size regime, information reconciliation using LDPC-based codes optimized for low-SNR conditions, and privacy amplification employing large-block universal hashing. From a hardware perspective, we discuss modular digital architectures that integrate dedicated accelerators with programmable processors, supported by a reference software framework (CV-QKD-ModSim) for algorithm validation and hardware co-design. Finally, we outline perspectives for the deployment of CV-QKD in Brazil, starting from metropolitan testbeds and extending toward hybrid fiber/FSO and space-based infrastructures. The work establishes the foundations for the first point-to-point CV-QKD system in Brazil, while providing a roadmap for scalable and interoperable quantum communication networks.
Discrete-Modulated (DM) Continuous-Variable (CV) Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an experimentally attractive approach to quantum cryptography, offering high key rates over metropolitan-scale distances while relying on state-of-the-art telecom infrastructure. However, a fundamental gap has remained between this experimental promise and rigorous security: for more than two decades, DM CV-QKD has lacked a complete composable finite-size security proof against coherent attacks. Existing works either restrict the adversary to collective attacks, impose additional finite-dimensional assumptions, apply only to specific modulation formats, or fail to recover the known asymptotic rates. Here, we resolve this longstanding problem by establishing the first complete composable finite-size security proof for DM CV-QKD protocols against coherent attacks, incorporating imperfect detectors and both fixed- and variable-length protocol variants. Our proof introduces two central results of broader interest: an infinite-dimensional marginal-constrained entropy accumulation theorem (iMEAT) and a rigorous dimension-reduction technique that makes the infinite-dimensional security bounds numerically tractable. The resulting key rates recover the known asymptotic rates and outperform established finite-size bounds based on collective attacks, while yielding positive key rates beyond 70km for experimentally relevant block sizes and parameters. Thus, our work closes a longstanding gap and places an experimentally attractive class of CV-QKD protocols on a rigorous composable security footing and provides a pathway towards their practical deployment.