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International Conference Laser Optics (ICLO)

Wavelength-tunable optical injection attacks on the QKD transmitter

Бондарь К.Д., Ivan S. Sushchev, Daniil S. Bulavkin, Dmitri Melkonian, Kirill E. Bugai, Anna S. Sidelnikova, Veronika M. Vakhrusheva, D.A. Dvoretskiy

Published Jun 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the effects of optical injection attacks on the transmitter side of QKD systems. Previous studies have primarily considered such attacks in the context of optical injection locking with slight frequency detuning between the master (Eve) and slave (Alice) lasers. Here, we demonstrate the impact of these attacks over a broad spectral range λ = 1260 − 1650 nm, showing a reduction in the relative key length under the decoy-state BB84 protocol.

DOI
10.1109/iclo69056.2026.11625206

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We experimentally investigate the effects of optical injection attacks on the transmitter side of QKD systems. Previous studies have primarily considered such attacks in the context of optical injection locking with slight frequency detuning between the master (Eve) and slave (Alice) lasers. Here, we demonstrate the impact of these attacks over a broad spectral range λ = 1260 − 1650 nm, showing a reduction in the relative key length under the decoy-state BB84 protocol.
Many security loopholes exist in quantum key distribution (QKD) due to the imperfections of realistic devices. On the source side, the decoy-state method can defend against the most severe photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack and improve the performance of QKD. Measurement-device-independent QKD and twin-field QKD have further closed all loopholes on the detection side. In this paper, we propose a valuable optical injection-locking loophole for the case when the internal isolator inside the laser is removed. We first introduce the effects of the injection locking with different injection intensities on the source frequency. Through the successive responses of adjacent pulses from frequency ports of the dense wavelength division multiplexer, the decoy state and the signal state can be partially distinguished. The specific injection-locking-loophole analysis of the isolatorless decoy phase-encoding Bennet-Brassard 1984 QKD and decoy phase-matching QKD protocols with external optical injection has been deeply studied. Simulation results show that, if we maintain the same observed gain statistics as normal after an external optical injection locking, the loophole cannot be exploited for a PNS attack when the QKD distance is short. As the QKD distance increases, a PNS attack at a medium distance using the optical injection-locking loophole does not threaten the security; the security is still valid. With the further increase of the QKD distance, the lower-bound secure key rate is higher than the upper-bound secure key rate given by a PNS attack at a long distance, some of the keys must be insecure, and information will be leaked.
Wavelength tunability in quantum key distribution (QKD) is desirable as noise can be introduced to the quantum channel if there is significant traffic near the same wavelength as the quantum data. Today’s QKD systems are typically of fixed wavelength due to the single-mode lasers used to encode qubits. We present a new optical transmitter design consisting of a multi-modal Fabry Perot laser optically injection locked by a tunable laser, capable of encoding qubits at GHz speeds with a tunable wavelength of < 65 nm and perform proof-of-principle BB84 QKD over a range of wavelengths with secure bit rates of order Mb/s.
While ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are well-understood, practical implementations face various vulnerabilities, such as side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections. Current security proofs for decoy-state BB84 protocols either assume uniform phase randomization of Alice’s signals, which is compromised by practical limitations and attacks like injection locking, or rely on a (partially) characterized phase distribution. This work presents an experimental method to characterize the phase de-randomization from injection locking using a heterodyne detection setup, providing a lower bound on the degree of isolation required to protect QKD transmitters against injection-locking attacks. The methods presented are source-agnostic and can be used to evaluate general QKD systems against injection-locking attacks.
In principle BB84 protocol supports secure quantum communication by assuming transmitter and receiver devices to be ideal. However, practically it is very challenging to build an ideal single photon source and detector. These imperfections in practical devices (i.e., wavelength mismatch, full width at half maximum (FWHM) pulse width mismatch and different arrival times of photon) leads to side channel attacks. In this work, we have analyzed the wavelength mismatch issue associated with four laser diode based practical BB84 transmitter. An asymptotically achievable rate of extraction of secure key (also known as key generation rate) is estimated from side-channel leakage calculation between transmitter (Alice) and adversary (Eve).
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is recognized for its unconditional security through the principles of quantum mechanics. The decoy-state method is widely used in QKD for its resilience to photon-number-splitting attacks [1]. In this method, Alice prepares decoy states alongside the standard signal state, which differ only in intensity. This approach enabled the BB84 system to transmit over distances of up to 421 km and achieve key rates as high as 115.8 Mbps. While high-speed intensity modulators are essential for these systems, directly modulated lasers offer an alternative by simplifying the transmitter and reducing system costs.
In the transmitter of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, a wavelength-division multiplexer (WDM) is typically used to combine quantum and synchronization signals and is directly connected to the quantum channel. As a result, it becomes the first optical component exposed to laser-injection attacks. Therefore, understanding the behavior of WDMs under such attacks is essential for assessing the practical security of QKD systems. In this work, we systematically investigate the characteristics of WDMs under high-power laser illumination. Our experimental results show that certain WDM samples exhibit pronounced changes in their spectral features once the injected laser power surpasses a specific threshold. Taking the Trojan-horse attack as an illustrative example, we further perform a theoretical analysis of the resulting spectral side channel and show that it can reduce the maximum secure transmission distance to below 66.9%66.9\%66.9% of its original value. By combining experimental observations with theoretical modeling, this study advances the understanding of the influence of WDMs on the practical security of QKD systems.