Distributed cooperative jamming (DCJ) is one of the approaches to physical-layer security, which can significantly enhance the security of wireless communication networks. An efficient jamming cancellation (JC) algorithm is a fundamental prerequisite for creating channel disparity and ensuring secure communication. This paper designs a dedicated JC architecture tailored for DCJ scenarios and validates it on a hardware testbed platform. Experimental results show that the proposed architecture achieves a maximum JC capability of 27.86 dB, defined as the suppression of cooperative jamming power at the legitimate receiver, with an associated noise floor increase of approximately 5 dB. Under the DCJ transmission scenario and measured channel conditions, the system achieves a secure achievable rate of 3.75 bps/Hz.
Distributed cooperative jamming (DCJ) is one of the approaches to physical-layer security, which can significantly enhance the security of wireless communication networks. An efficient jamming cancellation (JC) algorithm is a fundamental prerequisite for creating channel disparity and ensuring secure communication. This paper designs a dedicated JC architecture tailored for DCJ scenarios and validates it on a hardware testbed platform. Experimental results show that the proposed architecture achieves a maximum JC capability of 27.86 dB, defined as the suppression of cooperative jamming power at the legitimate receiver, with an associated noise floor increase of approximately 5 dB. Under the DCJ transmission scenario and measured channel conditions, the system achieves a secure achievable rate of 3.75 bps/Hz.
Cooperative jamming (CJ) can effectively improve the security of wireless communication system in the physical layer, but such improvement is conditional on effective CJ cancellation at the authorized receiver. In this letter, by considering the point-to-point communication system, a CJ cancellation architecture is provided, and a testbed is designed and implemented to verify its feasibility. In a lab environment under line-of-sight (LOS) propagation, experimental results demonstrate that the proposed CJ cancellation architecture can provide about 51 dB CJ cancellation capability, while the noise floor is raised by 5 dB because of the imperfect time-frequency synchronization and the imperfect channel estimation. Besides, the system achieves 7.3 bps/Hz on secrecy capacity, as compared to perfect CJ cancellation, it causes about 0.8 bps/Hz degradation.
In the Internet of Things (IoT), distributed idle devices can transmit cooperative jamming to confuse eaves-dropping devices, while authorized receivers utilize distributed cooperative jamming (DCJ) cancellation techniques to achieve signal-to-noise ratio gain, thereby enabling physical layer secure connectivity. However, constrained by the cost and size of IoT terminals, the crystal oscillators they employ typically exhibit low frequency stability, leading to challenges in achieving precise time-frequency alignment during DCJ cancellation. This significantly degrades the DCJ cancellation capability. To address this, the effect of time-frequency mismatch on DCJ cancellation and system sensitivity loss are analysed, and a closed-form expression for the jamming cancellation ratio with respect to the normalized time-frequency error is derived. Simulation results confirm the theoretical analysis that time-frequency mismatch causes a dramatic degradation in the performance of DCJ cancellation and results in a significant increase in the system sensitivity loss, particularly under scenarios involving large-scale jamming nodes.
Cooperative jamming is one of the promising technologies for securing wireless communications. The cooperative jammer transmits jamming to deteriorate the eavesdropping channel, while the authorized receiver implements cooperative jamming cancellation (CJC) using the pre-stored prior information, thus achieving confidential communication at the physical layer. However, the signal transmission will introduce time delay and frequency offset, as well as zero-intermediate-frequency structures that will cause in-phase and quadrature (IQ) imbalances and local oscillator (LO) leakage, which lead to degradation of the CJC performance. In this paper, we specifically analyze the combined effect of time-frequency mismatch, IQ imbalance and LO leakage on the CJC performance by deducing the closed-form expression for the jamming cancellation ratio. A CJC architecture considering time-frequency mismatch, IQ imbalance and LO leakage is proposed, and the corresponding recursive algorithm for CJC is presented. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can effectively improve the CJC performance with the presence of time-frequency mismatch, IQ imbalance and LO leakage, and thus improves the security of the communication system.
While 6G provides communication services for massive wireless devices, it faces huge security risks due to its open feature. Cooperative jamming techniques in physical layer security provide a viable way to ensure 6G security. By actively transmitting jamming signals to deteriorate the eavesdropping channel, while authorized receivers implement cooperative jamming cancellation (CJC) using the prior knowledge of cooperative jamming, thus securing the communication at the physical layer. In practice, incomplete matching of oscillator device characteristics will lead to the in-phase and quadrature (IQ) imbalance problem, where the quadrature branches of the up and down converted carrier signals are not perfectly orthogonal to the in-phase branches, which may degrade the CJC performance. For this reason, this paper specifically analyzes the impact of the IQ imbalance problem on the CJC performance, where a closed-form expression of the jamming cancellation ratio (JCR) with respect to amplitude imbalance and phase imbalance is derived. The simulation results show that when jamming-to-noise ratio (JNR) is 35 dB, the system can tolerate up to 1% amplitude imbalance and 1° phase imbalance with 3 dB JCR degradation. Moreover, the IQ imbalance has a noticeable effect on the reachable security rate of the communication system.
In the presence of some eavesdroppers, cooperative jamming cancellation (CJC) plays a significant role in physical layer security for wireless communications. The assumption that the cooperative jamming is cancelled ideally with perfect frequency and timing synchronization is commonly used in the past literatures. Due to the instability of crystal oscillators and the relative motion between the cooperative node and the receiving node, residual frequency offset always exists between these two nodes, resulting in performance degradation during CJC. In this paper, a scenario in which all nodes equipped with single antenna is considered. To explicitly analyze the effect of frequency offset on CJC, we model frequency offset as an inter-frequency interference (IFI) in the frequency domain, and evaluate the CJC performance by jamming cancellation ratio (JCR), which is derived as the closed-form expression. Theoretical and simulation results show that, for the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, when the ideal received jamming-to-noise ratio (JNR) is 60dB, the jamming bandwidth is 10MHz, and the sampling period of analog-digital converter (ADC) is 100ns, the maximum tolerable frequency offsets that incur 0.1dB, 1dB, and 3dB JCR degradation are 0.82Hz, 2.74Hz, and 5.37Hz, respectively.
Physical layer security is a sought-after concept to complement the established upper layer security techniques in wireless communications. An appealing approach to achieve physical layer security is to use cooperative jamming with interference that is known to and suppressible by the legitimate receiver but unknown to, and hence not suppressible by, the eavesdropper. Suppressing known interference (KI), however, is challenging due to the numerous unknowns, including carrier and sampling frequency offsets, that impact its reception. This letter presents a measurement campaign that captures this challenge and then demonstrates the feasibility of solving that challenge by cancelling the KI using the frequency offsets least mean squares (FO-LMS) algorithm. Results show that KI suppression directly improves processing the signal-of-interest and that cooperative jamming effectively provides security at the physical layer.