IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)
QubitHammer: Remotely Inducing Qubit State Change on Superconducting Quantum Computers
Yizhuo Tan, Navnil Choudhury, Kanad Basu, Jakub M. Szefer
Abstract
As cloud quantum platforms scale, multi-tenant execution models have been proposed to improve utilization but introduce new security and reliability risks for shared hardware. In this paper, we introduce QubitHammer, a novel attack in which an unprivileged user can remotely induce unauthorized quantum state transitions in a co-located tenant's qubits using only publicly available pulse-level interfaces. Extensive evaluations on IBM's and Rigetti's real superconducting quantum processors show that QubitHammer reliably disrupts victim computations, reaching variational distances of up to 0.938. We further demonstrate that the attack remains effective against existing hardware-level countermeasures. Our cross platform analysis suggests architectural behaviors consistent with long range physical coupling effects, revealing a previously overlooked vulnerability in emerging multi-tenant designs: logical isolation alone does not guarantee physical isolation at the microwave control layer, underscoring the need for new hardware aware protections.