The quantum computing supply chain involves multiple stakeholders, including software vendors providing algorithmic libraries and compilers, cloud providers enabling access to diverse quantum backends, hardware providers that design, operate, and host quantum computers, and end users submitting quantum workloads. In the presence of recent advances in quantum hardware control, such as mid-circuit measurements, any stakeholder can potentially exploit these capabilities to introduce malicious or vulnerable quantum circuit designs. In this paper, we propose a new class of Trojan designs introduced at the design stage of the quantum circuits through malicious libraries. The proposed Trojan design exploits mid-circuit measurement and classically controlled quantum operations to leak sensitive information of the quantum circuit. We develop a Trojan-insertion framework that captures how an adversary could embed a rarely triggered internal Trojan, and demonstrate the resulting threat through a conceptual key-leakage payload designed to bypass existing key-based masking/protection methods of the quantum circuit measurement outcomes. Furthermore, we show how to carefully insert the Trojan design at the logical circuit level to minimize the noise and hardware resources. Finally, we propose a majority voting algorithm to facilitate the key recovery in the presence of quantum hardware noise. We evaluate the stealthiness of the Trojan design and measure its attack success rate through experiments on real-world IBM quantum computers.
The quantum computing supply chain involves multiple stakeholders, including software vendors providing algorithmic libraries and compilers, cloud providers enabling access to diverse quantum backends, hardware providers that design, operate, and host quantum computers, and end users submitting quantum workloads. In the presence of recent advances in quantum hardware control, such as mid-circuit measurements, any stakeholder can potentially exploit these capabilities to introduce malicious or vulnerable quantum circuit designs. In this paper, we propose a new class of Trojan designs introduced at the design stage of the quantum circuits through malicious libraries. The proposed Trojan design exploits mid-circuit measurement and classically controlled quantum operations to leak sensitive information of the quantum circuit. We develop a Trojan-insertion framework that captures how an adversary could embed a rarely triggered internal Trojan, and demonstrate the resulting threat through a conceptual key-leakage payload designed to bypass existing key-based masking/protection methods of the quantum circuit measurement outcomes. Furthermore, we show how to carefully insert the Trojan design at the logical circuit level to minimize the noise and hardware resources. Finally, we propose a majority voting algorithm to facilitate the key recovery in the presence of quantum hardware noise. We evaluate the stealthiness of the Trojan design and measure its attack success rate through experiments on real-world IBM quantum computers.
Quantum computing has demonstrated superior efficiency compared to classical computing. Quantum circuits are essential for implementing functions and achieving correct computational outcomes. Quantum circuit compilers, which translate high-level quantum operations into hardware-specific gates while optimizing performance, serve as the interface between the quantum software stack and physical quantum machines. However, untrusted compilers can introduce malicious hardware Trojans into quantum circuits, altering their functionality and leading to incorrect results. In the world of classical computing, effective hardware Trojans are a critical threat to integrated circuits. This process often involves stealthily inserting conditional logic gates that activate under specific input conditions. In this paper, we propose a novel advanced quantum Trojan that is controllable, allowing it to be activated or deactivated under different circumstances. These Trojans remain dormant until triggered by predefined input conditions, making detection challenging. Through a series of benchmark experiments, we demonstrate the feasibility of this method by evaluating the effectiveness of embedding controlled trojans in quantum circuits and measuring their impact on circuit performance and security.
Quantum measurement is important to quantum computing as it extracts the outcome of the circuit at the end of the computation. Previously, all measurements have to be done at the end of the circuit. Otherwise, it will incur significant errors. But it is not the case now. Recently IBM started supporting dynamic circuits through hardware (instead of software by simulator). With mid-circuit hardware measurement, we can improve circuit efficacy and fidelity from three aspects: (a) reduced qubit usage, (b) reduced swap insertion, and (c) improved fidelity. We demonstrate this using real-world applications Bernstein Verizani on real hardware and show that circuit resource usage can be improved by 60\%, and circuit fidelity can be improved by 15\%. We design a compiler-assisted tool that can find and exploit the tradeoff between qubit reuse, fidelity, gate count, and circuit duration. We also developed a method for identifying whether qubit reuse will be beneficial for a given application. We evaluated our method on a representative set of essential applications. We can reduce resource usage by up to 80\% and circuit fidelity by up to 20\%.
Abstract Superconducting qubits have emerged as the leading qubit modality for quantum computing. Recent efforts by both academic and industrial researchers aim to enable high-speed, low-noise, and potentially scalable control and measurement of these qubits with superconducting digital electronics. Because the technology is still in an early phase of development, the classical control plane that communicates with quantum systems represents an attack surface that has not yet been thoroughly examined. This work exposes a critical vulnerability by presenting a frequency-activated hardware Trojan—termed as the data transmission Trojan (DT-Trojan)—embedded within a single-flux-quantum (SFQ) digital logic path. The DT-Trojan is functionally indistinguishable from a nominal flip-flop during conventional low-frequency bias-margin testing, but gets triggered at higher frequencies through a magnetically coupled feedback loop that introduces deterministic phase perturbations. Once triggered, the Trojan corrupts high-frequency SFQ pulse streams by disrupting phase coherence, which reduces quantum gate fidelity and leaks information covertly through spectral sidebands. Comprehensive circuit-level simulations using the JoSIM superconducting circuit simulator validate this dual-mode behavior. The results demonstrate a greater than 75% reduction in control fidelity and measurable spectral leakage once activated, underscoring the difficulty of detecting frequency-dependent Trojans in cryogenic environments. This work highlights an emerging class of security threats in SFQ-based quantum control and calls for verification strategies that account for high-frequency switching dynamics and magnetic-coupling effects in superconducting electronics.
Quantum computing holds tremendous potential for various applications, but its security remains a crucial concern. Quantum circuits need high-quality compilers to optimize the depth and gate count to boost the success probability on current noisy quantum computers. There is a rise of efficient but unreliable/untrusted compilers; however, they present a risk of tampering, such as malicious insertion of Trojans, which can degrade circuit performance and reliability. This work focuses on analyzing the impact of Trojans in Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm (QAOA) circuits, which are widely used for solving combinatorial optimization problems. We propose a methodology to reveal vulnerable locations and adversarial gate types for Trojan insertion that maximizes the negative impact on QAOA’s approximation ratio in solving Max-Cut problem. By disrupting critical paths and altering qubit states, the strategic insertion of additional gates degrade the approximation ratio by up to 50% based on evaluations on benchmark graphs. These insights on plausible attack mechanisms advance the understanding of optimization-oriented Trojan vulnerabilities specific to quantum computing. Additionally, a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model, referred to as QTrojanNet, is presented to detect the presence of Trojans in compiled QAOA circuits by learning inherent features that indicate malicious modifications. Experimental results showcase an average accuracy of 98.80% and an average F1-score of 98.53% in effectively detecting and classifying Trojan-inserted QAOA circuits.
Mid-circuit measurement (MCM) enables qubit reuse and dynamic control in quantum processors, underpinning resource-efficient algorithms and quantum error correction. However, MCM introduces non-negligible errors, including measurement-induced crosstalk, idling-qubit decoherence, and reset infidelity. Additionally, MCM error rates vary across qubits within the same processor, with some exhibiting substantially higher errors. Existing compilers, including Qiskit-compiler and QR-Map, ignore MCM error variations, leading to fidelity loss in circuits with frequent MCM operations.
In this paper, we present MERA, an MCM-error-aware quantum compilation framework that integrates MCM error modeling into the layout, routing, and scheduling stages. We first use the lightweight profiling method to capture a per-qubit MCM error distribution that remains stable for over 24 hours. The distribution guides MERA in applying MCM-error-aware layout and routing, while MERA further incorporates context-aware dynamic decoupling to improve fidelity. In evaluation, MERA delivers 24.94% -- 80.48% average fidelity gains over the Qiskit-compiler (optimization level 3) across different groups in selected benchmarks without additional SWAP overhead. It also boosts the fidelity of QR-Map-generated circuits by 29.26% on average (up to 122.58%), demonstrating its effectiveness for circuits with frequent MCM operations.
The development of quantum computers has been advancing rapidly in recent years. As quantum computers become more widely accessible, potentially malicious users could try to execute their code on the machines to leak information from other users, interfere with or manipulate the results of other users, or reverse engineer the underlying quantum computer architecture and its intellectual property. Among different security threats, previous work has demonstrated information leakage across the reset operations, and it then proposed a secure reset operation could be an enabling technology that allows the sharing of a quantum computer among different users or different quantum programs of the same user. In this study, we delve deeper into the reset attack, aiming to augment its efficacy and capabilities and the countermeasure to protect from this attack. First, we propose a set of new extended reset attacks that could be more stealthy by hiding the intention of the attacker's circuit. This work shows various concealing circuits and how attackers can retrieve information from the execution of a previous shot of a circuit, even if the concealing circuit is used between the reset operation (of the victim, after the shot of the circuit is executed) and the measurement (of the attacker). Second, based on the uncovered new possible attacks, this work proposes a set of heuristic checks that could be applied at transpile time to check for the existence of malicious circuits that try to steal information via the attack on the reset operation. Unlike run-time protection or added secure reset gates, this work proposes a complimentary, compile-time security solution to the attacks on reset operation.