Twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) can overcome the fundamental rate-loss bound of repeaterless QKD, enabling secure communication over long distances. However, in practical implementations, its security relies on accurate intensity modulation, which may be compromised by source imperfections and light-injection attacks. In this work, we investigate the security of the NPP TF-QKD protocol in the presence of imperfect intensity modulation, focusing on Trojan-horse attacks and induced photorefractive attacks. By employing the reference technique, we establish a finite-key security proof that explicitly incorporates this source-side information leakage. Numerical simulations show that with realistic transmitter isolation, the NPP TF-QKD protocol can still surpass the rate-loss bound and achieve secret-key rates close to the ideal case. Our results further demonstrate strong robustness against modulation deviations induced by photorefractive effects. These findings confirm the practical security of TF-QKD under realistic source imperfections and provide quantitative guidance for the design of secure quantum communication systems.
Twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) can overcome the fundamental rate-loss bound of repeaterless QKD, enabling secure communication over long distances. However, in practical implementations, its security relies on accurate intensity modulation, which may be compromised by source imperfections and light-injection attacks. In this work, we investigate the security of the NPP TF-QKD protocol in the presence of imperfect intensity modulation, focusing on Trojan-horse attacks and induced photorefractive attacks. By employing the reference technique, we establish a finite-key security proof that explicitly incorporates this source-side information leakage. Numerical simulations show that with realistic transmitter isolation, the NPP TF-QKD protocol can still surpass the rate-loss bound and achieve secret-key rates close to the ideal case. Our results further demonstrate strong robustness against modulation deviations induced by photorefractive effects. These findings confirm the practical security of TF-QKD under realistic source imperfections and provide quantitative guidance for the design of secure quantum communication systems.
Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) surpasses the repeaterless key-rate bound, offering great promise for long-distance quantum communication. Avalanche-photodiode (APD) single-photon detectors are widely used in practical QKD systems, due to their compactness, cost-effectiveness, and room-temperature operation. However, their non-ideal characteristics-including afterpulse probability, dead time, and dark counts-can severely degrade TF-QKD performance. In this work, we develop a comprehensive TF-QKD simulation model incorporating these APD imperfections, enabling quantitative analysis of their individual impacts. Our results reveal that afterpulse induced by high-intensity reference pulses is the dominant performance-limiting factor. Under identical APD conditions, we compare three representative TF-QKD protocols. The sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol demonstrates superior long-distance performance due to its higher signal photon number and enhanced noise tolerance. This study provides practical guidance for the design of compact, APD-based TF-QKD systems and highlights key strategies for performance optimization.
Abstract Twin-Field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) is a major candidate to be the new benchmark for far-distance QKD implementations, since its secret key rate can overcome the repeaterless bound by means of a simple interferometric measurement. Many variants of the original protocol have been recently proven to be secure. Here, we focus on the TF-QKD type protocol proposed by Curty et al (2019 NPJ Quantum Inf. 5 64), which can provide a high secret key rate and whose practical feasibility has been demonstrated in various recent experiments. The security of this protocol relies on the estimation of certain detection probabilities (yields) through the decoy-state technique. Analytical bounds on the relevant yields have been recently derived assuming that both parties use the same set of decoy intensities, thus providing sub-optimal key rates in asymmetric-loss scenarios. Here we derive new analytical bounds when the parties use either two, three or four independent decoy intensity settings each. With the new bounds we optimize the protocol’s performance in asymmetric-loss scenarios and show that the protocol is robust against uncorrelated intensity fluctuations affecting the parties’ lasers.
The twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) and its variants can overcome the fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD. However, their physical implementations with the side channels remain the subject of further research. We test the side channel of a type of external intensity modulation that applies a Mach–Zehnder-type electro-optical intensity modulator, which shows the distinguishability of the signal and decoy states in the frequency domain. Based on this security loophole, we propose a side-channel attack, named the passive frequency-shift attack, on the imperfect implementation of the sending or not-sending (SNS) TF-QKD protocol. We analyze the performance of the SNS protocol with the actively odd-parity pairing (AOPP) method under the side-channel attack by giving the formula of the upper bound of the real secret key rate and comparing it with the lower bound of the secret key rate under Alice and Bob’s estimation. The simulation results quantitatively show the effectiveness of the attack on the imperfect devices at a long distance. Our results emphasize the importance of practical security at the light source and might provide a valuable reference for device selection in the practical implementation of the SNS protocol.
Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD), which is immune to all possible detector side channel attacks, enables two remote legitimate users to perform secure communications without quantum repeaters. With the help of a central node, TF-QKD is expected to overcome the linear key-rate constraint using current technologies. However, the security of the former TF-QKD protocols relies on the hypothesis of infinite-key and stable sources. In this paper, we present the finite-key analysis of a practical decoy-state twin-field quantum key distribution with variant statistical fluctuation models. We examine the composable security of the protocol with intensity fluctuations of unstable sources employing Azuma's inequality. Our simulation results indicate that the secret key rate is able to surpass the linear key-rate bound with limited signal pulses and intensity fluctuations. In addition, the effect of intensity fluctuations is extremely significant for small size of total signals.
Abstract Twin-field quantum key distribution(TF-QKD) protocol and its variants, such as phase-matching QKD, sending-or-not-sending QKD and no phase post-selection TF-QKD(NPP-TFQKD), are very promising for long-distance applications. However, there are still some gaps between theory and practice in these protocols. Concretely, a finite-key size analysis is still missing, and the intensity fluctuations are not taken into account. To address the finite-key size effect, we first give the key rate of NPP-TFQKD against collective attack in finite-key size region and then prove it can be against coherent attack. To deal with the intensity fluctuations, we present an analytical formula of 4-intensity decoy state NPP-TFQKD and a practical intensity fluctuation model. Finally, through detailed simulations, we show NPP-TFQKD can still keep its superiority of high key rate and long achievable distance.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics rather than computational assumptions. While its theoretical foundations are robust, practical implementations necessarily deviate from the idealized models assumed in security analyses, opening the door to side-channel attacks and implementation loopholes. In particular, most research to date has focused on mitigating vulnerabilities in the measurement devices, leading to the development of Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) and Twin-Field QKD (TF-QKD), which effectively close all receiver-side loopholes. By contrast, the security of the source has remained less explored, despite being critical for the overall integrity of QKD systems. The goal of this thesis is to develop security proofs that explicitly account for realistic imperfections in QKD sources. Special emphasis is placed on three main aspects: correlations between emitted pulses that violate independence assumptions, imperfect phase randomization arising from practical modulation schemes, and leakage of internal settings through passive or active side channels. By formulating rigorous methods to analyze these imperfections, the work aims to provide a framework that enables practitioners to quantify and mitigate implementation risks systematically. Additionally, this thesis seeks to clarify under which conditions the commonly used decoy-state method remains secure, and to what extent source assumptions can be relaxed without compromising performance. This thesis aims to advance the understanding of how real-world deviations impact QKD security and to contribute to the development of protocols and devices. Ultimately, this work is motivated by the ambition to help bring QKD from a theoretically promising idea to a mature technology deployable with confidence in practical scenarios.