Abstract Balogh et al. proposed deterministic secure multiparty computation called private PEZ protocols . In their work, a general construction of private PEZ protocols for computing an arbitrary function with n inputs is presented, but the function’s inputs must be binary . Binary domains are sufficient for computing functions with arbitrary domains because we can use the binary expansion of the inputs. However, such an expansion makes the protocol inefficient because unnecessary privacy is considered among the expanded bits of each input. Hence, we remove the binary expansion technique in this paper and propose a new private PEZ protocol directly applicable to functions with arbitrary domains. The proposed private PEZ protocol for an arbitrary function is much more efficient than Balogh et al.’s protocol. Concretely, an efficiency measure called the length of an initial string is exponentially improved in the domain size m : the order obtained from our construction is $$\mathcal {O}((2m)^{m^{n-1}})$$ O ( ( 2 m ) m n - 1 ) , while the construction of Balogh et al. yields $$\mathrm {\Omega }\bigg (\bigg (2^{\frac{m}{2}}\bigg )^{m^{n-1}}\bigg )$$ Ω ( ( 2 m 2 ) m n - 1 ) . The key idea of our protocol is called the divide and cue strategy, based on a recursive structure of views in private PEZ protocols.
Abstract Balogh et al. proposed deterministic secure multiparty computation called private PEZ protocols . In their work, a general construction of private PEZ protocols for computing an arbitrary function with n inputs is presented, but the function’s inputs must be binary . Binary domains are sufficient for computing functions with arbitrary domains because we can use the binary expansion of the inputs. However, such an expansion makes the protocol inefficient because unnecessary privacy is considered among the expanded bits of each input. Hence, we remove the binary expansion technique in this paper and propose a new private PEZ protocol directly applicable to functions with arbitrary domains. The proposed private PEZ protocol for an arbitrary function is much more efficient than Balogh et al.’s protocol. Concretely, an efficiency measure called the length of an initial string is exponentially improved in the domain size m : the order obtained from our construction is O((2m)mn−1) O ( ( 2 m ) m n - 1 ) , while the construction of Balogh et al. yields Ω((22m)mn−1) Ω ( ( 2 m 2 ) m n - 1 ) . The key idea of our protocol is called the divide and cue strategy, based on a recursive structure of views in private PEZ protocols.
Secure Multiparty Computation (abrv. MPC) is a group of techniques that enable multiple entities to compute some function on their private inputs. Moreformally,itenablesasetofplayers{P1,...,Pn},eachofthemholding private inputs xi, where i is the index of the player, to evaluate a function f(x1,...,xn) = (y1,...,yn) so that every player Pi learns yi. Multiparty Computation has many application scenarios such as private auctioning, computation outsourcing, or private information retrieval. These and other applications make MPC a very appealing object of study, since it may be a solution to problems in different fields. The objective of this thesis is twofold. First, we aim to provide a comprehensive guide to the current state of multiparty computation protocols. Wedosobyinspectingthetwocategorieswheremostgeneralfunctionality secure function evaluation protocols are inserted - boolean or arithmetic circuit evaluation. Moreover, we show how to implement MPC protocols with current constructions, and what problems are inherently connected to the chosen representations. Second, we document some of the design choices behind a partial implementation of a concrete secure arithmetic circuit evaluation protocol - the SPDZ protocol by Damgård et al. [10]. We explain the protocol in general terms, and then go into the details of some subprotocols, namely those that were implemented.
We consider a minimal scenario for secure computation: Parties A and B have private inputs x and y and a shared random string r. A and B are each allowed to send a single message to a third party C, from which C is to learn the value of f(x, y) for some function f, but nothing else. We show that this model is surprisingly powerful: every function f can be securely computed in this fashion. If the messages are required to be of polynomial size, then we exhibit an efficient protocol for any function f computable in nondeterministic logspace. Using a computational notion of security, we exhibit efficient protocols for any polynomial-time computable function f, assuming the existence of one-way functions. The above results generalize to the case where there are more than two parties with private inputs. The minimalistic nature of our model makes it easy to transform positive results achieved in our model to other more general models of secure computation. It also gives hope for lowerbound proofs. We give an alternative characterization of our model in terms of graph embeddings, and use this to show that for most Boolean functions on {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n, the need to hide just one of the input bits from C requires a communication overhead of n bits. 1
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for a set of players to interactively compute a function without revealing their private inputs.MPC is of theoretical and practical importance due to its many interesting applications including voting, sealed-bid auctions and privacy-preserving machine learning.It has been an active research area in cryptography and many different approaches have been proposed to enhance security, functionality and efficiency in the literature.In particular, there are general constructions proving the existence of MPC for arbitrary functions under a set of desirable security notions.However, these general results do not give a satisfactory solution to constructing concrete protocols that are efficient enough to use in practice.It is therefore more effective to give concrete and efficient constructions of MPC protocols tailored to specific functionalities and security notions required in practical applications.In this thesis, we study different approaches to realize efficient MPC for functionalities of practical importance with enhanced security notions including non-threshold adversary structures and malicious security.We attain improvement in communication and round complexity by focusing on specific classes of functions or limited but still non-threshold adversary structures.The main contributions of this thesis consist of five parts, which concern the following specific MPC tasks: non-interactive MPC (NIMPC) for symmetric functions and linear classifiers, homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) for low-degree polynomials, verifiably multiplicative secret sharing (VMSS), private information retrieval (PIR), and distributed noise generation for differential privacy.Concretely, we first propose efficient constructions of NIMPC protocols tailored to symmetric functions and linear classifiers.Our protocols improve the best-known communication complexity of existing protocols.In addition, we reveal that a previously proposed method to enhance security of NIMPC does not satisfy specified security requirements and we also fix the problem.Secondly, we propose constructions of HSS schemes that tolerate multipartite and general adversary structures assuming homomorphic encryption.Our schemes support parallel evaluation of a single low-degree polynomial and hence achieve better communication complexity than if we simply execute the previous HSS schemes in parallel.Thirdly, we present VMSS schemes tolerating multipartite adversary structures.Our schemes have smaller communication complexity than those obtained from the previous constructions applicable to general adversary structures.In the fourth part, we study the optimal communication complexity of error-correcting PIR.We asymptotically characterize it as a function of the database size and as a corollary, obtain more communication-efficient error-correcting PIR schemes than the previous ones.Finally, we provide three kinds of MPC protocols for generating noise drawn from probability distributions providing differential privacy.We improve the round or communication complexity of the previous protocols for distributed noise generation.We also extend our protocols so that they provide differential privacy against malicious adversaries.
Abstract Card-based cryptography is a variant of multi-party computation using physical cards like playing cards. There are two models on card-based cryptography, called public and private models. The public model assumes that all operations are executed publicly, while the private model allows the players private operations called private permutations (PP, for short). Much of the existing card-based protocols were developed under the public model. Under the public model, 2ncards are necessary for every protocol withn-bit input since at least two cards are required to express a bit. In this paper, we proposen-bit input protocols with fewer than 2ncards by utilizing PP, which shows the power of PP. In particular, we show that a protocol for (n-bit input) threshold function can be realized with only n+1 n+1 cards by reducing the threshold function to the majority voting. Toward this end, we first offer that two-bit input protocols for logic gates can be realized with fewer than four cards. Furthermore, we construct a new protocol for three-input majority voting with only four cards by observing the relationship between AND/OR operations. This protocol can be easily extended to more participants, and to the protocol for threshold functions.
Multiparty computation protocols (MPC) are said to be secure against covert adversaries if the honest parties are guaranteed to detect any misbehavior by the malicious parties with a constant probability. Protocols that, upon detecting a cheating attempt, additionally allow the honest parties to compute certificates, which enable third parties to be convinced of the malicious behavior of the accused parties, are called publicly verifiable. In this work, we make several contributions to the domain of MPC with security against covert adversaries. We identify a subtle flaw in a protocol of Goyal, Mohassel, and Smith (Eurocrypt 2008), meaning that their protocol does not allow to identify a cheating party, and show how to fix their original construction to obtain security against covert adversaries. We present generic compilers that transform arbitrary passively secure preprocessing protocols, i.e. protocols where the parties have no private inputs, into protocols that are secure against covert adversaries and publicly verifiable. Using our compiler, we construct the first efficient variants of the BMR and the SPDZ protocols that are secure and publicly verifiable against a covert adversary that corrupts all but one party, and also construct variants with covert security and identifiable abort. We observe that an existing impossibility result by Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu (TCC 2012) can be used to show that there exist certain functionalities that cannot be realized by parties, that have oracle-access to broadcast and arbitrary two-party functionalities, with information-theoretic security against a covert adversary.
A protocol for computing a functionality is secure if an adversary in this protocol cannot cause more harm than in an ideal computation where parties give their inputs to a trusted party which returns the output of the functionality to all parties. In particular, in the ideal model such computation is fair -- all parties get the output. Cleve (STOC 1986) proved that, in general, fairness is not possible without an honest majority. To overcome this impossibility, Gordon and Katz (Eurocrypt 2010) suggested a relaxed definition -- 1/p-secure computation -- which guarantees partial fairness. For two parties, they construct 1/p-secure protocols for functionalities for which the size of either their domain or their range is polynomial (in the security parameter). Gordon and Katz ask whether their results can be extended to multiparty protocols. We study 1/p-secure protocols in the multiparty setting for general functionalities. Our main result is constructions of 1/p-secure protocols when the number of parties is constant provided that less than 2/3 of the parties are corrupt. Our protocols require that either (1) the functionality is deterministic and the size of the domain is polynomial (in the security parameter), or (2) the functionality can be randomized and the size of the range is polynomial. If the size of the domain is constant and the functionality is deterministic, then our protocol is efficient even when the number of parties is O(log log n) (where n is the security parameter). On the negative side, we show that when the number of parties is super-constant, 1/p-secure protocols are not possible when the size of the domain is polynomial.