Advanced Topics on Measurement and Simulation (ATOMS)
Measurement and Characterization of Reset Operation Vulnerabilities in Superconducting Quantum Processors
Sorin Bolos, Adrian Coleşa, Tudor Palade
Abstract
We present a measurement and characterization study of security vulnerabilities arising from imperfect passive reset operations in superconducting quantum processors. On IBM Eagle-class 127-qubit backends, we demonstrate two attack vectors: an information leakage attack, where an attacker recovers a victim’s measurement outcomes with perqubit accuracy up to 100%, and a fault injection attack exploiting the second excited state $|2\rangle$ via custom microwave pulses, which corrupts the victim’s initial state to near-random levels ($\boldsymbol{\sim} \mathbf{5 0 \%}$ excitation probability). Both vulnerabilities are validated across all 127 qubits of two independently fabricated processors, confirming they are systemic. A T1-delay-based mitigation suppresses residual excitation below 5% for most qubits at $2.5 \mathrm{~T}_{1}$ delay, at the cost of reduced throughput. Our findings highlight the need for security-aware reset protocols in multi-tenant quantum computing architectures.