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ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC)

Balanced and Adaptively Secure Asynchronous Common Coin and Byzantine Agreement With Sub-Quadratic Communication

Hanwen Feng, Tiancheng Mai, Qiang Tang

Published Jul 1, 2026• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Distributed common randomness generation (i.e., the common coin problem) is a cornerstone of randomized distributed computing. While a long line of research has sought scalable solutions, the asynchronous setting remains a challenge. Specifically, while Blum et al. (TCC'21) achieved sub-quadratic communication complexity, their approach lacks “balance”: certain nodes must still send Ω(n) messages, creating a scalability bottleneck. Furthermore, their solution only tolerates a 1/3 - ε fraction of corrupted nodes, whereas the classic construction by Cachin et al. (PODC'00) tolerates up to 1/2 under the same setup assumptions.

DOI
10.1145/3796701.3815954

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IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P)•May 18, 2026•1 citation
Distributed common randomness generation (i.e., the common coin problem) is a cornerstone of randomized distributed computing. While a long line of research has sought scalable solutions, the asynchronous setting remains a challenge. Specifically, while Blum et al. (TCC'21) achieved sub-quadratic communication complexity, their approach lacks “balance”: certain nodes must still send Ω(n) messages, creating a scalability bottleneck. Furthermore, their solution only tolerates a 1/3 - ε fraction of corrupted nodes, whereas the classic construction by Cachin et al. (PODC'00) tolerates up to 1/2 under the same setup assumptions.
Asynchronous distributed key generation (ADKG) is a fundamental primitive for building threshold cryptosystems and fault-tolerant distributed protocols in adversarial network settings. A central objective in this line of work is to achieve ADKG with O(n²) communication and constant round complexity under minimal setup assumptions. Recent progress has led to subcubic-communication ADKG protocols under different trade-offs. Feng and Tang (CRYPTO 2025) presented an ADKG protocol with O(n²) communication and O(1) rounds, but at the cost of a cubic-communication setup phase in which each party posts a linear-sized public key on a public bulletin board. In contrast, Abraham et al. (PODC 2026) achieved an ADKG protocol with a standard setup phase, where each party posts only a constant-sized public key, but with O(n^{2+1/k}) communication and O(k) rounds for a tunable parameter k ≤ log{n}. These results leave open whether one can simultaneously obtain constant-round complexity and quadratic communication under a standard setup phase. In this work, we resolve this open problem by presenting the first ADKG protocol that achieves O(n²) communication and O(1) rounds while requiring only a standard setup phase in which each party posts a constant-sized public key on a public bulletin board. Our protocol is resilient to a strongly adaptive adversary corrupting up to f < n/3 parties and assumes only random oracles and secure erasures, both of which are also assumed by prior subcubic-communication ADKG constructions.
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is a vital primitive in secure distributed computing. It allows an untrusted dealer to verifiably share a secret among n parties in the presence of an adversary controlling at most t of them. VSS in the synchronous communication model has received tremendous attention in the cryptographic research community. Nevertheless, recent interest in deploying secure distributed computing over the Internet requires going beyond the synchronous communication model and thoroughly investigating VSS in the asynchronous communication model. In this work, we consider the communication complexity of asynchronous VSS in the computational setting for the optimal resilience of n = 3t + 1. The best known asynchronous VSS protocol by Cachin et al. has O(n 2) message complexity and O(κn 3) communication complexity, where κ is a security parameter corresponding to the size of the secret. We close the linear complexity gap between these two measures for asynchronous VSS by presenting two protocols with O(n 2) message complexity and O(κn 2) communication complexity. Our first protocol satisfies the standard VSS definition, and can be used in stand-alone VSS scenarios as well as in applications such as Byzantine agreement. Our second and more intricate protocol satisfies a stronger VSS definition, and is useful in all VSS applications including multiparty computation and threshold cryptography.
In a distributed coin-flipping protocol, Blum [ACM Transactions on Computer Systems ’83], the parties try to output a common (close to) uniform bit, even when some adversarially chosen parties try to bias the common output. In an adaptively secure full-information coin flip, Ben-Or and Linial [FOCS ’85], the parties communicate over a broadcast channel, and a computationally unbounded adversary can choose which parties to corrupt along the protocol execution. Ben-Or and Linial proved that the n -party majority protocol is resilient to O(n)O(\sqrt {n})O(n​) corruptions, and conjectured this is a tight upper bound for any n -party protocol (of any round complexity). Their conjecture was proved to be correct, up to polylogarithmic factors, for single-turn (each party sends a single message) single-bit (a message is one bit) protocols Lichtenstein et al. [Combinatorica ’89], symmetric protocols Goldwasser et al. [ICALP ’15], and recently for (arbitrary message length) single-turn protocols Tauman Kalai et al. [DISC ’18]. Yet, the question of many-turn protocols was left entirely open. In this work, we close the above gap, proving that no n -party protocol (of any round complexity) is resilient to Ω(n⋅log⁡3n)\Omega (\sqrt {n} \cdot \log ^3 n)Ω(n​⋅log3n) adaptive corruptions. Namely, majority is the optimal coin-flipping protocol against adaptive adversaries (up to polylogarithmic factors).
In this work we study the effect of rounds of interaction on the common randomness generation (CRG) problem. In the CRG problem, two parties, Alice and Bob, receive samples Xi and Yi, respectively, where (Xi, Yi) are drawn jointly from a source distribution μ. The two parties wish to agree on a common random key consisting of many bits of randomness, by exchanging messages that depend on each party's respective input and the previous messages. In this work we study the amortized version of the problem, i.e., the number of bits of communication needed per random bit output by Alice and Bob, in the limit as the number of bits generated tends to infinity. The amortized version of the CRG problem has been extensively studied in the information theory literature, though very little was known about the effect of interaction on this problem. Recently Bafna et al. (SODA 2019) considered the non-amortized version of the problem (so here the goal of the interaction is to generate a fixed number of random bits): they gave a family of sources μr,n parameterized by r,n ϵ ℕ, such that with r + 2 rounds of communication one can generate n bits of common randomness with this source with O(r log n) communication, whereas with roughly r/2 rounds the communication complexity is Ω(n/ poly log n). Note in particular that their source is designed with the target number of bits in mind and hence the result does not apply to the amortized setting. In this work we strengthen the work of Bafna et al. in two ways: First we show that the results extend to the classical amortized setting. We also reduce the gap between the round complexity in the upper and lower bounds to an additive constant. Specifically we show that for every pair r, n ϵ ℕ the (amortized) communication complexity to generate Ω(n) bits of common randomness from the source μr,n using r + 2 rounds of communication is O(r log n) whereas the amortized communication required to generate the same amount of randomness from r rounds is . Our techniques exploit known connections between information complexity and CRG, and the main novelty is our ability to analyze the information complexity of protocols getting inputs from the source μr,n.
In this paper, we study practical constructions of asynchronous distributed key reconfiguration (ADKR), which enables an asynchronous fault-tolerant system with an existing threshold cryptosystem to efficiently generate a new threshold cryptosystem for a reconfigured set of participants. While existing asynchronous distributed threshold key generation (ADKG) protocols theoretically solve ADKR, they fail to deliver satisfactory scalability due to cubic communication overhead, even with simplifications to the reconfiguration setting. We introduce an efficient share-dispersal-then-agree-andrecast paradigm for constructing efficient ADKR while preserving adaptive security. Our method reduces the total overhead toO(κn2)O\left(\kappa n^{2}\right)O(κn2)fromO(n3)O\left(n^{3}\right)O(n3), whereκ\kappaκis a small constant (typically∼30\sim 30∼30or less). And our further optimizations in PVSS minimize redundant computations across different parties and reduce the dominating PVSS verification cost by about one-third. Our techniques developed for ADKR can also be leveraged to improve the asymptotic efficiency of various other asynchronous protocols: (i) it implies the first (coin-assisted) quadratic-communication ADKG; and (ii) it can be extended to realize the first quadratic-communication asynchronous dynamic proactive secret sharing (ADPSS) with adaptive security. Experimental evaluations on a global network of 256 AWS servers show up to 40 % lower latency compared to the state-of-the-art ADKG protocols that are simplified to the reconfiguration setting, highlighting the practicality of our ADKR in large-scale asynchronous systems.