This paper develops a novel metasource-based secret key (MBSK) generation scheme achieving physical-layer security in wireless communications. The core mechanism dynamically varies the low-density parity-check (LDPC) matrix for each transmission, using the random channel gain of the legitimate link as a driving parameter. Since eavesdroppers lack access to the legitimate channel state information (CSI), they cannot identify the specific LDPC matrix employed in the legitimate link, thus failing to successfully decode. In practice, however, the legitimate transmitter and receiver perform channel estimation independently. The estimation errors might result in a mismatch between the LDPC matrices used at each end. To address this challenge, we integrate a federated learning framework to enhance the accuracy and consistency of channel estimation. This approach minimizes the mismatch probability while ensuring that eavesdroppers remain ignorant of both the CSI and the corresponding LDPC matrix. Simulation results substantiate that, even against computationally unbounded eavesdroppers, the developed MBSK scheme robustly guarantees the physical-layer security without relying on higher-layer encryption mechanisms.
This paper develops a novel metasource-based secret key (MBSK) generation scheme achieving physical-layer security in wireless communications. The core mechanism dynamically varies the low-density parity-check (LDPC) matrix for each transmission, using the random channel gain of the legitimate link as a driving parameter. Since eavesdroppers lack access to the legitimate channel state information (CSI), they cannot identify the specific LDPC matrix employed in the legitimate link, thus failing to successfully decode. In practice, however, the legitimate transmitter and receiver perform channel estimation independently. The estimation errors might result in a mismatch between the LDPC matrices used at each end. To address this challenge, we integrate a federated learning framework to enhance the accuracy and consistency of channel estimation. This approach minimizes the mismatch probability while ensuring that eavesdroppers remain ignorant of both the CSI and the corresponding LDPC matrix. Simulation results substantiate that, even against computationally unbounded eavesdroppers, the developed MBSK scheme robustly guarantees the physical-layer security without relying on higher-layer encryption mechanisms.
Recently, the concept of metasource-based secret key (MBSK) has been proposed for enhancing physical-layer security. In this paper, we propose a new approach of MBSK generation, via low-density parity-check (LDPC) patterns, where the parity-check matrix is varied and determined by the random channel gain of the legitimate link in each transmission. As there is no information on the legitimate channel gain delivered over the link between the legitimate transmitter and its desired receiver, eavesdroppers are unable to know which parity check matrix is being adopted in the legitimate LDPC encoding and, therefore, they fail to appropriately decode the confidential information protected by the MBSK via LDPC patterns. The security performance of our MBSK approach is evaluated in terms of the error rate difference between legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. Illustrative simulation results substantiate that, even in the presence of powerful eavesdroppers possessing unlimited computing resources, our MBSK approach via LDPC patterns guarantees the physical-layer security without the aid of upper-layer encryption.
Physical-layer security (PLS) is a promising concept to complement upper-layer cryptographic technologies in wireless networks. Various chan-nel-based approaches were conceived to exploit random channel characteristics in providing PLS, for example, through secret-key extraction, directional modulation, and artificial-noise injection. For overcoming the drawbacks associated with these approaches, legitimate channel-gain-mapped sources have recently been proposed to create a new family of physical-layer secret key generation techniques, herein referred to as metasource-based secret key (MBSK). In contrast to the channel-based approaches, the MBSK family not only promotes the actual realization of the PLS concept but also enables green communication infrastructure. The aim of this treatise is to elucidate the prominent MBSK techniques by delving into their fundamental principles, underlying mechanisms, and design rationales from a broad communications security perspective. Specifically, the latest advances and open issues in the MBSK realm are discussed to facilitate researchers who might be familiar with channel-based PLS approaches and would like to kick-start their understanding of the PLS frontiers established by MBSK.
Physical layer encryption is an emerging security paradigm which supplements the higher-layer encryption solutions. To realize physical layer encryption, channel measurement is typically utilized as a randomness source to generate secret keys. Due to non-perfect reciprocity of the channels and the inevitable channel estimation errors resulting from noises and interferences, the channel measurements at the legitimate transceivers are not the same, yielding a mismatch in the generated keys. To address this issue, a distributed physical layer key generation scheme based on deep learning is proposed in this paper. A channel state information (CSI) learning neural network (CLNet) based on the autoencoder is deployed at both the transmitter and the receiver side to refine the initial channel estimation results. The CLNet takes the least square (LS) channel estimations as input and outputs the channel estimations more similar to the real channel. To train this CLNet, a channel equalization module together with a pre-trained maximum-likelihood (ML) detection network is deployed, which is used to make a decision on the transmitted pilot signal. Since the pilot is known as a priori, the cross entropy loss between the known pilot and the recovered one can be calculated, which implicitly indicates the accuracy of the refined CSI. Further, the weighted sum of the aforementioned cross entropy loss and the mean square loss between the original and the refined CSI estimates is utilized for training, which not only improves the CSI estimation quality but also avoids the over-fitting effect. Extensive simulation results show that compared with benchmark schemes, the proposed scheme improves the key agreement rate and the key generation rate at the legitimate users. Moreover, our method ensures a higher key disagreement rate between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper as well, especially in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime.
This work introduces security for unsourced random access (URA) via a physical-layer security approach. To achieve confidentiality, the proposed system opportunistically exploits intrinsic features of feedback-aided URA without altering its original structure or operational characteristics. As a result, the system preserves URA's efficiency, including low delay and minimal signaling overhead, while ensuring secure communication. To secure transmission, each user generates a secret key from a feedback signal broadcast by the BS in a previous transmission round, which depends on the BS-user channel and can thus be treated as private. Each user then encrypts its data using the secret key before transmission. Along with the encrypted data, only the parity bits of the LDPC-encoded key are transmitted, enabling secret key recovery at the legitimate receiver via Slepian-Wolf decoding with side information. We propose a receiver algorithm to recover both the encrypted data and the encoded secret key at the legitimate receiver. We further present a theoretical analysis to derive analytical error probabilities for both the legitimate receiver and the passive eavesdropper, as well as to quantify the additional load imposed by the security measures on the URA system. It is shown, based on both theoretical analysis and simulation results, that meaningful secrecy is achieved with only negligible extra overhead compared to the standard URA system.
Physical layer security is a promising technology for non-terrestrial wireless networks due to the lack of infrastructure over the low-altitude and high-altitude uncrewed aerial vehicle platforms. Physical layer security can be addressed using key-based and keyless approaches, such as channel adaptation and channel coding. In the key-based approach, the legitimate users generate secret keys by exploiting the unique random channel gains, which can be further used for information encryption and decryption. In non-terrestrial networks, the physical layer exploitation and the matching of generated secret keys on legitimate ends become more complex due to the 3-dimensional channel models, and the high mobility of uncrewed aerial vehicles, resulting in nonzero key. To address this challenge, this paper proposes an artificial intelligence-based key exchange mechanism where the secret keys are generated on the legitimate nodes of the communications links. The transmitter is responsible for training the neural network and transmitting the final synapses to the receiver to reconcile the information. The results are presented in terms of secret key waveforms. The success rate against the number of errors that occur in a single 128-bit key and 256-bit key shows a significant improvement.
Due to the broadcast and time‐varying natures of wireless channels, traditional communication systems that provide data encryption at the application layer suffer many challenges such as error diffusion. In this paper, we propose a code‐hopping based secrecy transmission scheme that uses dynamic nonsystematic low‐density parity‐check (LDPC) codes and automatic repeat‐request (ARQ) mechanism to jointly encode and encrypt source messages at the physical layer. In this scheme, secret keys at the transmitter and the legitimate receiver are generated dynamically upon the source messages that have been transmitted successfully. During the transmission, each source message is jointly encoded and encrypted by a parity‐check matrix, which is dynamically selected from a set of LDPC matrices based on the shared dynamic secret key. As for the eavesdropper (Eve), the uncorrectable decoding errors prevent her from generating the same secret key as the legitimate parties. Thus she cannot select the correct LDPC matrix to recover the source message. We demonstrate that our scheme can be compatible with traditional cryptosystems and enhance the security without sacrificing the error‐correction performance. Numerical results show that the bit error rate (BER) of Eve approaches 0.5 as the number of transmitted source messages increases and the security gap of the system is small.