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Q-HKM: A Reliability-Aware Hybrid Key Manager for PQC and QKD Systems

Halil Özbil

Published Jun 29, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Description Q-HKM (Quantum Hybrid Key Manager) is a reliability-aware operational decision framework for hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems. The framework addresses a fundamental operational question in quantum-safe communications: how to dynamically allocate reliance between QKD-derived and PQC-derived key material according to their current operational availability while preserving the security guarantees of hybrid cryptography. Unlike approaches that combine security levels through weighted averaging, Q-HKM explicitly separates security from operational availability. Hybrid security is provided by a standard hybrid KEM combiner, ensuring that the combined key remains secure whenever at least one underlying key source remains secure. The proposed weighting mechanism is applied only to operational availability and quality-of-service, avoiding the conceptual inconsistency of averaging cryptographic security levels. The framework introduces a mathematically grounded hybrid availability functional, availability-tracking allocation, hysteresis-based switching stability, multi-source generalization, and margin-based early-warning analysis. Theoretical properties include boundedness, convex enclosure, risk-availability equivalence, allocation stability, and combiner-independent security composability. Numerical validation is performed using 16,000 synthetic hybrid PQC–QKD operational scenarios, evaluating delivered availability, outage probability, source-switching stability, and early-warning capability under multiple operational conditions, including QKD degradation, PQC deprecation, and correlated failures. Q-HKM does not introduce a new cryptographic primitive, QKD protocol, PQC algorithm, or security proof. Instead, it provides a mathematically rigorous operational decision layer that complements existing hybrid cryptographic architectures by optimizing key-source allocation according to real-time operational availability while preserving established hybrid security guarantees.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.21038285

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Description Q-HKM (Quantum Hybrid Key Manager) is a reliability-aware operational decision framework for hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems. The framework addresses a fundamental operational question in quantum-safe communications: how to dynamically allocate reliance between QKD-derived and PQC-derived key material according to their current operational availability while preserving the security guarantees of hybrid cryptography. Unlike approaches that combine security levels through weighted averaging, Q-HKM explicitly separates security from operational availability. Hybrid security is provided by a standard hybrid KEM combiner, ensuring that the combined key remains secure whenever at least one underlying key source remains secure. The proposed weighting mechanism is applied only to operational availability and quality-of-service, avoiding the conceptual inconsistency of averaging cryptographic security levels. The framework introduces a mathematically grounded hybrid availability functional, availability-tracking allocation, hysteresis-based switching stability, multi-source generalization, and margin-based early-warning analysis. Theoretical properties include boundedness, convex enclosure, risk-availability equivalence, allocation stability, and combiner-independent security composability. Numerical validation is performed using 16,000 synthetic hybrid PQC–QKD operational scenarios, evaluating delivered availability, outage probability, source-switching stability, and early-warning capability under multiple operational conditions, including QKD degradation, PQC deprecation, and correlated failures. Q-HKM does not introduce a new cryptographic primitive, QKD protocol, PQC algorithm, or security proof. Instead, it provides a mathematically rigorous operational decision layer that complements existing hybrid cryptographic architectures by optimizing key-source allocation according to real-time operational availability while preserving established hybrid security guarantees.
Quantum computing is growing rapidly, and traditional cryptographic algorithms are becoming obsolete. Practical frameworks are needed for the dynamic integration of quantum and post-quantum security mechanisms into network infrastructures. Conventional key management systems are largely static, relying on isolated cryptographic domains and fixed rekey policies, which restrict their ability to adjust to evolving quantum channel conditions or changes in key availability. This paper presents the Quantum-Enhanced Decision Framework with Key Orchestrator (QEDF-KO), a crypto-agile, standardscompliant architecture that dynamically synchronizes Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to provide adaptive, quantum-resistant key management at the IPsec/IKEv2 control plane. Unlike static techniques, hybrid QEDF-KO deploys a real-time analytical control layer that uses derived closed-form models to quantify key demand, compute the QKD coverage ratio, and predict expected rekey latency and composite security strength. The framework applies analytical derivations to achieve sub-10-millisecond rekey latency under optimal quantum key conditions, ensuring continuous, resilient, and adaptive quantum-safe performance by seamlessly transitioning to PQC-based key generation when quantum key availability decreases, while maintaining uninterrupted operation. The model enables deterministic, zero-downtime transitions by precisely defining three operational zones: like PQC-dominant, hybrid, and QKD-dominant. QEDF-KO extends prior art by providing a deployable, auditable orchestration engine that quantitatively selects, blends, and continuously monitors essential sources. The results demonstrate analytical validation against Monte Carlo simulation and real-world benchmarks, including metro QKD links≥10kb/s\boldsymbol{\geq} \mathbf{1 0} \boldsymbol{k} \boldsymbol{b} / \boldsymbol{s}≥10kb/sand PQC TLS/IKEv2 handshakes ˜10 ms. This enables resilient quantum-safe operation in diverse, dynamic network environments, information-theoretic security uplift, and sub-10 ms rekeying.
The security of today’s communication networks rests on public-key primitives—RSA and elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman—that a large quantum computer would break with Shor’s algorithm, while the “harvest-now, decrypt-later” threat means traffic captured today is already at risk. Two defences exist but each is incomplete: quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security yet fails open under eavesdropping or channel loss, while post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is computationally secure and always available but lacks physical-layer guarantees. This paper presents a dual-layer, trust-aware key-management framework that uses BB84 QKD as the primary channel and a Ring-LWE/Kyber key-encapsulation mechanism as a quantum-safe fallback, governed by a controller monitoring the quantum bit-error rate (QBER) and a trust signal. When intercept-resend eavesdropping pushes the QBER past the 11% abort threshold—reached at roughly 40% interception—the controller falls back to PQC, holding secure availability at 100% where a QKD-only system degrades to 78.5%. The lattice fallback is cheap ( ≈ 0.47 m per operation) and Kyber-768 gives 192-bit quantum-safe security. Coupling the fallback and re-keying rate to a node trust score integrates physical-layer and computational security into one always-available, forward-secure key-management layer. To our knowledge, this is the first key-management framework in which a single network-layer trust signal jointly governs QKD/PQC layer selection and the re-keying cadence, unifying physical-layer eavesdropping detection, computational quantum-safety, and forward secrecy in one cross-layer policy.
Q-ERUM (Quantum Early-warning Reliability Under Monitoring) is a structure-sensitive temporal monitoring framework for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems. Unlike conventional monitoring approaches that generate alarms only after a critical threshold has been crossed, Q-ERUM is designed to detect progressive operational degradation before the communication link reaches an unacceptable reliability level. The framework operates on the instantaneous reliability-risk functional introduced by the companion ΩQKD methodology and extends it with temporal analysis through risk velocity, acceleration, baseline anomaly detection, and a false-alarm-controlled decision engine. It provides mathematically grounded early-warning capabilities supported by boundedness, monotonicity, additive drift accumulation, Lipschitz stability, risk-entropy analysis, and lead-time estimation under linear extrapolation. Numerical validation includes Monte Carlo simulations with up to 100,000 synthetic QKD time-series episodes, demonstrating substantial improvements in early-warning performance compared with threshold-only monitoring and QBER-only anomaly detection. Additional analyses evaluate parameter sensitivity, measurement-noise robustness, and transferability across representative BB84, Decoy-State, MDI-QKD, and Twin-Field QKD operational profiles. Q-ERUM does not introduce a new QKD protocol or a new information-theoretic security proof. Instead, it provides a mathematically rigorous operational early-warning and trend-monitoring methodology intended to complement existing QKD security analyses by continuously assessing the reliability evolution of practical quantum communication systems.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computers poses a significant threat to current cryptographic protocols, particularly Transport Layer Security (TLS), which relies on RSA and elliptic curve cryptography vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. This paper presents a hybrid framework for quantum-resistant TLS handshakes that integrates post-quantum cryptography (PQC), quantum key distribution (QKD) and classical cryptography to provide comprehensive protection against both classical and quantum attacks. The approach employs three QKD protocols; BB84, E91, and Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) alongside NIST-standardized PQC algorithms as well as alternative candidates such as HQC and BIKE. A key innovation is the QKD key management module, which addresses performance bottlenecks through periodic key generation and secure reuse within predefined retention periods, significantly reducing QKD overhead in TLS handshakes. The experimental implementation using the quantum network simulator evaluated 144 distinct cryptographic protocol combinations. Results demonstrate that ML-KEM combined with ML-DSA provides optimal PQC performance, while QKD protocol selection is distance-dependent: BB84 for short-range and MDI-QKD for long-distance communication. The framework includes various attack mitigation mechanisms and ensure security as long as at least one cryptographic method remains uncompromised. Consistent with current global quantum network usage, the proposed TLS approach is designed primarily for MAN and WAN environments rather than the Internet, providing a balanced solution that combines theoretical security guarantees with computational efficiency.
The advent of quantum computing threatens classical cryptographic mechanisms, demanding new strategies for securing communication networks. Since real-world networks cannot be fully Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-enabled due to infrastructure constraints, practical security solutions must support hybrid operation. This paper presents an adaptive security framework that enables quantum-safe communications across real-world heterogeneous networks by combining QKD and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Building upon a hierarchical key management architecture with Virtual Key Management Systems (vKMS) and a centralized Quantum Security Controller (QuSeC), the framework dynamically assigns security levels based on node capabilities. By transitioning between pure QKD, hybrid, and PQC modes, it ensures end-to-end quantum-safe protection regardless of the underlying node capabilities. The framework has been implemented and validated on a Kubernetes-based containerized testbed, demonstrating robust operation and performance across all scenarios. Results highlight its potential to support the gradual integration of quantum-safe technologies into existing infrastructures, paving the way toward fully quantum-safe communication networks.
The Hybrid approach in Quantum Cryptography creates adaptable security model which provides the safest Communication in the emerging quantum era. The development of quantum computing raise questions about the long-term security. Traditional algorithms, such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman, which is seemed computationally secure but it can be effectively solved by quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's. This problem leads to the origination of two key trends in current studies, namely Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), designing mathematical approaches to encryption resistant to quantum attacks; Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) using the principles of quantum mechanics to assure security in communications. Accordingly, this research proposes a hybrid security framework including reliable data encryption and authentication using PQC, combined with the safe key- exchange method of QKD. The model is implemented in Python, Qiskit, and PQClean's Kyber and Dilithium algorithms to show how these two paradigms can cooperate toward quantum- resilient communication. To present the system performance, key exchange efficiency, computational overhead, and security strength have been considered. According to the results, this hybrid approach gives superior defense against quantum threats while maintaining practical effectiveness for real-world applications such as cloud security, 6G networks, and the Internet of Things.