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Cybersecurity

Constructing quantum circuits for Grover key search in MK-3 featuring 16-bit S-boxes

Haoyu Liao, Qing-bin Luo, Yuanmeng Zheng, Yi Lv, Lang Ding

Published Jun 17, 2026• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Quantum computing poses a significant threat to modern cryptosystems, prompting nations to initiate the development of next-generation cryptographic algorithms where quantum security assessment constitutes a critical task. In this work, we present the first complete quantum attack circuit construction and security evaluation of quantum resistance for the authenticated encryption algorithm MK-3, which features 16-bit S-boxes. Firstly, we achieve breakthroughs in finite field arithmetic. The arrangement method of Toffoli gates in the subfield $$F_{2^4}$$ F 2 4 enables two types of optimized $$F_{2^8}$$ F 2 8 multiplication circuits to reduce DW-cost by at least 50%. For $$F_{2^8}$$ F 2 8 inversion, by proposing a new intermediate state uncomputing technique, the DW-cost of the inversion circuit is reduced by at least 40% compared with existing solutions. This can also be used to optimize the quantum circuits of block ciphers such as AES and SM4. Secondly, we propose three types of quantum circuits for MK-3’s 16-bit S-box. The basic circuit reduces multiplicative bit operations to 115, representing at least 20% reduction. We propose a more compact S-box structure, reducing the number of circuit qubits for two types of S-boxes from 52 to 40. Finally, we implement full-algorithm quantum attacks and conduct security evaluations for MK-3. Complete quantum circuits supporting 128-bit and 256-bit keys are constructed, enabling Grover key search attacks. Security assessments confirm the 128-bit version meets NIST Security Category 1 (with reasonable inference of achieving Category 2), while the 256-bit version satisfies the highest Category 5 standards, demonstrating resistance against large-scale quantum computing attacks. This work achieves the first quantum circuit implementation for 16-bit S-boxes and provides critical evaluation benchmarks for post-quantum cryptography standardization.

DOI
10.1186/s42400-025-00504-z

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With the advancement of quantum computing, quantum circuit implementations of symmetric cryptographic algorithms are essential for evaluating their resistance to quantum attacks. As an ISO-standardized cipher, the efficient quantum circuit construction of Camellia is of great significance. Focusing on minimizing the DW-cost (qubits × Toffoli-depth) while balancing ancilla qubits and Toffoli-depth, this paper proposes an optimized quantum circuit design for Camellia. Specifically: (1) using a serial-multiplication and out-of-place inversion architecture under composite-field decomposition, combined with hierarchical screening for parallelizing bilinear multiplications, a compact in-place S-box quantum circuit is constructed with a DW-cost of 276, 28% lower than the state of the art; (2) a low-gate-count linear-layer circuit is obtained via heuristic search, and gate-sequence reordering then reduces the full depth from 9 to 7 without increasing the gate count; (3) Camellia-128/192/256 quantum circuits are constructed with DW-costs of 119,168, 257,664, and 257,664, achieving reductions of 48%, 52%, and 52% respectively over prior work. A pipelined Grover oracle is further designed and the total resources required for a full Grover search attacking Camellia are evaluated. For Camellia-128, the complete Grover search requires a T-depth of 2.10 × 2⁷⁶ and a total TDW-cost (qubits × T-depth) of 1.00 × 2⁸⁶, reducing T-depth by 75% and TDW-cost by 84% over prior work. The first full Grover search resource estimates for Camellia-192/256 are also presented, with T-depths of 7.20 × 2¹⁰⁸ and 8.11 × 2¹⁴⁰ and TDW-costs of 2.03 × 2¹²³ and 2.79 × 2¹⁵³, respectively. These results show that Grover's attack on Camellia requires fewer quantum resources than on AES at the 128-bit level, implying comparatively weaker post-quantum security at that key size, while the picture reverses at larger key sizes (Section 4).
To quantify security levels in a postquantum scenario, it is common to use the quantum resources needed to attack the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as a reference value. Specifically, in the National Institute of Standards and Technology's ongoing postquantum standardization effort, different security categories are defined that reflect the quantum resources needed to attack AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. This article presents a quantum circuit to implement the S-box of AES. Also, leveraging an improved implementation of the key expansion, we identify new quantum circuits for all three AES key lengths. For AES-128, the number of Toffoli gates can be reduced by more than 88% compared to Almazrooie et al.'s and Grassl et al.'s estimates while simultaneously reducing the number of qubits. Our circuits can be used to simplify a Grover-based key search for AES.
In this work, a quantum design for the Simplified-Advanced Encryption Standard (S-AES) algorithm is presented. Also, a quantum Grover attack is modeled on the proposed quantum S-AES. First, quantum circuits for the main components of S-AES in the finite field F2[x]/(x4 + x + 1), are constructed. Then, the constructed circuits are put together to form a quantum version of S-AES. A C-NOT synthesis is used to decompose some of the functions to reduce the number of the needed qubits. The quantum S-AES is integrated into a black-box queried by Grover's algorithm. A new approach is proposed to uniquely recover the secret key when Grover attack is applied. The entire work is simulated and tested on a quantum mechanics simulator. The complexity analysis shows that a block cipher can be designed as a quantum circuit with a polynomial cost. In addition, the secret key is recovered in quadratic speedup as promised by Grover's algorithm.
Quantum computing enabled cryptanalytic techniques are able to concretely reduce the security margin of existing cryptographic primitives. While this reduction is only polynomial for symmetric cryptosystems, it still provides a reduction in their security margin. In this work, we propose a detailed quantum circuit designed to cryptanalyze both the Data Encryption Standard (DES) cryptosystem, and its successor Triple-DES (3DES), currently standardized in ISO/IEC 18033–3, and still widely employed in satellite data and bank card encryption. To do so, we introduce the first quantum circuit implementation of the 8 substitution tables (a.k.a. S-boxes), applying a bitslicing strategy, which is currently the most efficient classical combinatorial circuit design in terms of number of two inputs Boolean gates. Secondly, we present the complete quantum circuits required to attack both DES and 3DES leveraging Grover's algorithm. We provide finite regime, closed form equations, delineating the circuits complexities in terms of the number of qubits, gates, depth and number of qubits multiplied by depth. The complexity analysis is based on two distinct gate sets: a NOT-CNOT-Toffoli (NCT) extended with the Hadamard gate; and the fault-tolerant Clifford+T. Finally, akin to the classical attack to the 3DES, we introduce a meet-in-the-middle strategy relying on an exponential amount of Quantum Random Access Memory. Our findings show that the 3DES with keying option 2, the most widely employed variant of 3DES, can be attacked with a circuit depth of approximately2672^{67}267and less than a thousand qubits. This is close to the2642^{64}264value suggested by NIST for the depth achievable sequentially by a single quantum computer in a decade. Our technique can be further sped up parallelizing the approach onto multiple devices, pointing to the practicality of cryptanalyzing 3DES in such a scenario.
Quantum computing advancements pose security challenges for cryptography. Specifically, Grover’s search algorithm affects the reduction in the search complexity of symmetric-key encryption and hash functions. Recent efforts have been made to estimate the complexity of Grover’s search and evaluate post-quantum security. In this paper, we propose a depth-optimized quantum circuit implementation for ASCON, including both symmetric-key encryption and hashing algorithms, as a part of the lightweight cryptography standardization by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). As far as we know, this is the first implementation of a quantum circuit for the ASCON AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) scheme, which is a symmetric-key algorithm. Also, our quantum circuit implementation of the ASCON-HASH achieves a reduction of more than 88.9% in the Toffoli depth and more than 80.5% in the full depth compared to the previous work. As per our understanding, the most effective strategy against Grover’s search involves minimizing the depth of the quantum circuit for the target cipher. We showcase the optimal Grover’s search cost for ASCON and introduce a proposed quantum circuit optimized for depth. Furthermore, we utilize the estimated cost to evaluate post-quantum security strength of ASCON, employing the relevant evaluation criteria and the latest advancements in research.
Grover search algorithm is the most representative quantum attack method that threatens the security of symmetric key cryptography. If the Grover search algorithm is applied to symmetric key cryptography, the security level of target symmetric key cryptography can be lowered from n-bit to n2-bit. When applying Grover’s search algorithm to the block cipher that is the target of potential quantum attacks, the target block cipher must be implemented as quantum circuits. Starting with the AES block cipher, a number of works have been conducted to optimize and implement target block ciphers into quantum circuits. Recently, many studies have been published to implement lightweight block ciphers as quantum circuits. In this paper, we present optimal quantum circuit designs of symmetric key cryptography, including PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers. The proposed method optimized PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers by minimizing qubits, quantum gates, and circuit depth. We compare proposed PRESENT and GIFT quantum circuits with other results of lightweight block cipher implementations in quantum circuits. Finally, quantum resources of PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers required for the oracle of the Grover search algorithm were estimated.