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A Hybrid Post-Quantum KEM: RSA-2048 (Furui-Sieved Primes) + ML-KEM-768

Ryoji Furui

Published Jun 8, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper describes a hybrid key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM): a way for two parties to agree on a shared 32-byte secret that stays safe as long as either of two very different building blocks remains unbroken. The first building block is classical RSA-2048. The second is ML-KEM-768, the lattice-based KEM that NIST standardized as FIPS 203. We run both, then mix their two secrets with HKDF-SHA-256 to produce one session key. The pay-off is simple: an attacker has to break both RSA and ML-KEM to learn the session key, so the scheme protects you today (when RSA is strong) and continues to protect you after a quantum computer breaks RSA (when ML-KEM carries the load). A second, independent idea appears here only as an engineering optimization: the Furui 6n±1 sieve, a fast way to generate RSA primes. We are explicit that the sieve contributes nothing to security — it just makes classical key generation cheaper during the migration period, when systems keep minting new RSA keys. We prove this carefully so that no reader mistakes a performance trick for a security feature. The paper is written for engineers who want to deploy a hybrid KEM correctly. The main text explains the construction, the threat model, and how to implement it safely. The appendices give the full formal security reduction, the statistical validation of the sieve, and a reproducible benchmark methodology for readers who want the underlying detail.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.20585593

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This paper describes a hybrid key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM): a way for two parties to agree on a shared 32-byte secret that stays safe as long as either of two very different building blocks remains unbroken. The first building block is classical RSA-2048. The second is ML-KEM-768, the lattice-based KEM that NIST standardized as FIPS 203. We run both, then mix their two secrets with HKDF-SHA-256 to produce one session key. The pay-off is simple: an attacker has to break both RSA and ML-KEM to learn the session key, so the scheme protects you today (when RSA is strong) and continues to protect you after a quantum computer breaks RSA (when ML-KEM carries the load). A second, independent idea appears here only as an engineering optimization: the Furui 6n±1 sieve, a fast way to generate RSA primes. We are explicit that the sieve contributes nothing to security — it just makes classical key generation cheaper during the migration period, when systems keep minting new RSA keys. We prove this carefully so that no reader mistakes a performance trick for a security feature. The paper is written for engineers who want to deploy a hybrid KEM correctly. The main text explains the construction, the threat model, and how to implement it safely. The appendices give the full formal security reduction, the statistical validation of the sieve, and a reproducible benchmark methodology for readers who want the underlying detail.
Classical public-key cryptography, mainly RSA, is at risk from the emergence of quantum computers. A complete shift to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) faces vulnerabilities due to implementation and trust issues, despite NIST's approval of standards such as ML-KEM (Kyber). This paper presented a performance and bandwidth trade-off study of a proposed Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism that fused the NIST-standardized ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) with the traditional RSA-3072. Two separate secret keys S1 and S2 were produced and encapsulated utilizing both classical and post-quantum public keys in our dual-layered model. In order to create a strong session key that ensures trust transition and backward compatibility with current network infrastructures, these secrets were then combined using a Hybrid Key Derivation Function (HKDF). In comparison to standalone systems, the study assessed the computational cost and communication latency brought about by this hybrid overhead. According to experimental data, the hybrid architecture offers a crucial security fail-safe against both classical flaws and future quantum threats without prohibitively high performance, even though it increases ciphertext size.
Classical public-key cryptography (RSA-2048, ECDH) is vulnerable to Shor's algorithm on quantum computers, with harvest-now-decrypt-later threats already targeting archived cloud traffic for future decryption. While NIST's 2024 ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) standards provide quantumresistant primitives, uniform PQC deployment across diverse cloud workloads remains computationally inefficient and lacks validated hybrid security and scalability. This paper introduces AH-KEM, an adaptive hybrid key encapsulation mechanism for TLS 1.3-compatible cloud communication. The AH-KEM algorithm determines a risk rating for each session from three dimensions-sensitivity of the data, expected length of the session, and network exposure-and then uses a deterministic method to choose among four modes of cryptography, which include Classical-only (X25519/ECDSA), Parallel-Hybrid (X25519/ML-KEM-512/ML-DSA-44), PQC-Dominant(ML-KEM-768/ML-DSA-65), and Full-Hybrid (X25519/ML-KEM-1024/ML-DSA-87). The safe dual-PRF combiner combines the classical and post-quantum shared keys to obtain a single session key that is secure in the Quantum Random Oracle Model if either KEM used is secure. Implemented in Python with FIPS-compliant software stubs on a Lenovo LOQ 15APH8 (AMD Ryzen 7 7840HS), AH-KEM demonstrates that, when both are generated fresh per session to satisfy forward secrecy, ML-KEM-768 key generation is over 11, 000× faster than RSA-2048 (0.004 ms vs. 44.335 ms); note RSA keys are not conventionally regenerated per session in deployed TLS, so this comparison isolates the cost of per-session ephemeral generation rather than RSA's typical amortized cost. Full-Hybrid end-to-end handshake latency is 0.514 ms (a sub-millisecond overhead); servers sustain zero errors at 250 concurrent clients; and risk classification achieves 100.0% accuracy over 10,000 sessions.
The advent of large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers threatens the mathematical foundations - namely integer factorization and discrete-logarithm hardness - on which today's public-key cryptography relies could be rendered insecure. This has shifted the need to move to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) from a theoretical to an engineering priority. This work presents an extensive empirical comparison of the NIST standardized primitives used for key encapsulation (FIPS 203: ML-KEM) and digital signatures (FIPS 204: ML-DSA) with the standardised classical RSA-3072 primitives at similar security levels as defined by the NIST security level. This paper evaluates three fundamental performance metrics: (i) computational latency in CPU clock cycles; (ii) communication cost in bytes; and (iii) memory usage during the cryptographic operation, and combines them into a unified evaluation framework. Additionally, the paper discusses the mathematical principles of the standardized quantum-resistant schemes, namely Module Short Integer Solution (MSIS) and Module Learning With Errors (MLWE) focusing on their security principles. Benchmarking reveals that, despite lattice-based schemes incurring larger public key and signature sizes-up to32×32 \times32×relative to elliptic-curve counterpartsML-KEM-768 decapsulation is approximately108×108 \times108×faster than an RSA-3072 private-key operation, and ML-DSA-65 signing is approximately 19× faster than RSA-3072 signing. To support cryptographic agility during the post-quantum migration period, this paper proposes a modular hybrid architecture validated through a triple-hybrid (ECDH + Kyber + BB84 QKD) demonstration.
The emergence of fault-tolerant quantum computing poses an existential threat to classical public-key cryptographic systems, including RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), through Shor's polynomial-time factorization algorithm. The Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) attack paradigm further amplifies this threat by enabling adversaries to archive ciphertext today for future quantum-enabled decryption, rendering long-term data confidentiality immediately at risk. While the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalized post-quantum cryptographic standards ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) in August 2024, their practical integration into complete application-level communication systems remains a largely unaddressed research gap. This paper presents QuantumShield, a hybrid post-quantum secure peer-to-peer communication platform that integrates ML-KEM-768 for quantum-safe key encapsulation, ML-DSA-65 for authenticated digital signatures, and AES-256-GCM for high-throughput symmetric encryption. Our primary research contribution is a rigorous empirical analysis of PQC integration overhead in a real-world communication pipeline, quantifying latency, key size, and security trade-offs against classical RSA-2048 and ECC-256 baselines under controlled experimental conditions. Experimental evaluation across 1,000 iterations demonstrates that ML-KEM-768 encapsulation completes in 2.8 ± 0.2 ms compared to 4.1 ± 0.3 ms for ECDH key agreement — a 32% latency reduction while providing NIST Level 3 post-quantum security. The complete secure transfer pipeline processes 1 MB files in under 22 ms on commodity hardware. The system further provides interactive cryptographic visualization, adversary threat modeling, tamper detection simulation, and a hybrid migration framework demonstrating practical transition from classical to post-quantum infrastructure. QuantumShield establishes that quantum-safe communication is not merely theoretical but deployable today with negligible performance compromise.
Hybrid key establishment runs a post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) alongside a classical Diffie-Hellman primitive, so that the session key stays secure while either component resists attack. This design is now standardized in the Transport Layer Security protocol, Secure Shell, and the Internet Key Exchange, with the standardized module-lattice KEM (ML-KEM) as the post-quantum component. A hybrid KEM secures the derived key, but not the integrity of the negotiation that selects which primitives are used. Full protocols authenticate that negotiation through a handshake transcript; a hybrid KEM deployed as a standalone drop-in primitive, or inside a minimal handshake without transcript authentication, inherits no such guarantee, and an active attacker can strip the post-quantum option. We ask what the key schedule alone must contain to make downgrade resilience a local property of the combiner. We give a game-based definition at the combiner layer and prove a two-sided separation: a combiner that ignores the transcript is downgraded with certainty, whereas one that binds the session key and the confirmation tag to a hash of the transcript blocks every such attempt, up to a term negligible for a 256-bit transcript hash. We also give an explicit strongest-link security bound. Using a calibrated cost model composed from published Cortex-M4 measurements, transcript binding adds one hash per party - about 11.8% of handshake computation but only 1.5% of radio-inclusive energy - and adds no messages or bytes on the wire. Every reported number is produced by a released harness that passes a 30-check validation gate.
Enterprise databases routinely hold records — financial ledgers, electronic health records, genomic biobank entries, government archives — whose confidentiality must survive for decades, yet the asymmetric key-wrapping operations that protect them today (RSA and elliptic-curve key exchange inside transparent data encryption, TDE) are efficiently broken by a sufficiently large quantum computer running Shor's algorithm. Published resource estimates for that attack have fallen roughly three orders of magnitude in thirteen years — from approximately 10^9 physical qubits in 2012 to under 10^6 in 2025 — and the harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) threat means an adversary can exfiltrate encrypted backups today and decrypt them once such a machine exists. A record's effective confidentiality horizon is therefore bounded by whichever comes first: its retention obligation, or the arrival of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC). This paper studies that boundary at the key-management layer specifically, since bulk symmetric encryption (AES-256) already resists Grover's algorithm and is out of scope. We present a lattice-based post-quantum envelope-encryption architecture that replaces the RSA/ECC key-wrapping tier of a conventional TDE key hierarchy with a hybrid ML-KEM/classical key-encapsulation combiner, authenticates key-rotation metadata with ML-DSA or FN-DSA signatures over a hash-chained audit log, and negotiates between classical-only, hybrid, and pure post-quantum modes under policy control. The design is grounded in the Module-LWE and NTRU-lattice hardness assumptions behind NIST's finalized ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and the still-draft FN-DSA (FIPS 206); we give seven explicit algorithms — hybrid encapsulation and decapsulation, enterprise-scale rekeying, signed audit and verification, crypto-agility negotiation, and exposure-ranked migration scheduling — with a composed security argument and an analytical cost model calibrated against published lattice-scheme parameters. That model puts the hybrid combiner's overhead at a modeled 9.0% added latency per key-rewrap relative to an all-classical baseline (12% at the highest NIST security level); shows full-estate rekeying of ten million keys falling from over ten hours at one worker to under ninety seconds at 512 parallel workers; and projects a signed, ML-DSA-authenticated ten-year audit trail for one thousand tenants at roughly 400 MB — about thirteen times an ECDSA baseline — a gap FN-DSA's compact, still-draft signatures narrow to roughly 100 MB. Four illustrative case studies — a 30-year financial ledger, a 50-year health/device archive, a 60-year genomic biobank, and a multinational deployment under CNSA 2.0 and EU deadlines — show migration completing in well under an hour of modeled compute for every estate, yet the two longest-horizon records would carry 41 to 57 years of residual exposure under Mosca's inequality if that migration were skipped: the key-management tier, not the migration's computational cost, is the binding constraint. The paper closes by positioning the framework against current mandates (NIST, NSA CNSA 2.0, the 2026 U.S. federal schedule, and the EU roadmap) and naming the engineering work — constant-time FN-DSA, HSM firmware support, and empirical validation — that separates this analytical architecture from a production deployment.