Abstract Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow mutually distrusting parties to compute a function of their inputs without revealing their inputs. Consensus protocols allow mutually distrusting parties to agree on a common output. This article surveys how consensus can help to build MPC protocols that tolerate more corruptions and provide improved security. We describe what MPC results can be achieved with and without consensus, and give intuitions behind these results.
Abstract Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow mutually distrusting parties to compute a function of their inputs without revealing their inputs. Consensus protocols allow mutually distrusting parties to agree on a common output. This article surveys how consensus can help to build MPC protocols that tolerate more corruptions and provide improved security. We describe what MPC results can be achieved with and without consensus, and give intuitions behind these results.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a cryptographic primitive that lets a num- ber N of mutually distrustful parties compute a function f (x1, . . . , xN ) on their private inputs xi such that at the end of the MPC protocol, each honest party obtains the func- tion’s correct output and no adversary controlling a certain subset of parties learns any- thing about the honest parties’ inputs beyond what can be inferred from the function’s output value. In 2002, [Smi01] and [CGS02] introduced the notion of multi-party quan- tum computation (MPQC) in which arbitrary quantum circuits can be evaluated in a distributed manner, secure against a quantum adversary. Few protocols for MPQC are known. We present a fundamental study of the building blocks of MPC and MPQC in the information-theoretic setting with a focus on protocols built on top of (quantum) se- cret sharing schemes. In particular, we point out structural similarities and differences and compile an extensive list of theoretical feasibility results for the maximum number of corrupted parties within classical and quantum secret sharing and MPC protocols.
Securemulti-party computation(MPC) is a fundamental problem in secure distributed computing. An MPC protocol allows a set ofnmutually distrusting parties to carry out any joint computation of their private inputs, without disclosing any additional information about their inputs. MPC withinformation-theoreticsecurity (also calledunconditional security) provides the strongest security guarantees and remains secure even againstcomputationally unboundedadversaries.Perfectly-secureMPC protocols are a class of information-theoretically secure MPC protocols, which provide all the security guarantees in anerror-freefashion. The focus of this work is perfectly-secure MPC. Known protocols are designedassumingeither asynchronousorasynchronouscommunication network. It is well known that perfectly-securesynchronousMPC is possible as long as the adversary can corrupt anyts<n/3parties. On the other hand, perfectly-secureasynchronousMPC protocols can tolerate up tota<n/4corrupt parties. A natural question is does there exist asingleMPC protocol for the setting where the parties arenot awareof the exact network type and which can tolerate up tots<n/3corruptions in a synchronous network and up tota<n/4corruptions in anasynchronousnetwork. We design such abest-of-both-worldsperfectly-secure MPC protocol, provided3ts+ta<nholds. For designing our protocol, we design two important building blocks which are of independent interest. The first building block is a best-of-both-worldsByzantine agreement(BA) protocol toleratingt<n/3corruptions which remains securebothin a synchronous as well as asynchronous network. The second building block is a polynomial-based best-of-both-worldsverifiable secret-sharing(VSS) protocol, which can tolerate up totsandtacorruptions in asynchronousand in anasynchronousnetwork respectively.
Abstract. The goal of Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is to perform an arbitrary computation in a distributed, private, and fault-tolerant way. For this purpose, a fixed set of n parties runs a protocol that tolerates an adversary corrupting a subset of the participating parties, and still preserves certain security guarantees. Most MPC protocols provide security guarantees in an all-or-nothing fashion: Either the set of corrupted parties is tolerated and the protocol provides all specified security guarantees, or the set of corrupted parties is not tolerated and the protocol provides no security guarantees at all. Similarly, corruptions are in an all-or-nothing fashion: Either a party is fully honest, or it is fully corrupted. For example, an actively secure protocol is rendered completely insecure when just one party is corrupted additionally to what is tolerated, even if all corrupted parties are only passive. In this paper, we provide the first treatment of MPC with graceful degradation of both security and corruptions. First of all, our protocols provide graceful degradation of security, i.e., different security guarantees depending on the actual number of corrupted parties: the more corruptions, the weaker the security guarantee. We consider all security properties generally discussed in the literature (secrecy, correctness, robustness, fairness, and agreement on abort). Furthermore, the protocols provide
Abstract We study the problem of constructing secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols thatare completely fair-- meaning that either all the parties learn the output of the function, or nobody does-- even when a majority of the parties are corrupted. We first propose a framework for fairmulti-party computation, within which we formulate a definition of secure and fair protocols. The definition follows the standard simulation paradigm, but is modified to allow the protocol to dependon the runing time of the adversary. In this way, we avoid a well-known impossibility result for fair MPC with corrupted majority; in particular, our definition admits constructions that tolerate upto ( n- 1) corruptions, where n is the total number of parties. Next, we define a "commit-prove-fair-open " functionality and construct an efficient protocol that realizes it, using a new variant of a cryptographic primitive known as "time-lines. " With this functionality, we show that some ofthe existing secure MPC protocols can be easily transformed into fair protocols while preserving their security. Putting these results together, we construct efficient, secure MPC protocols that arecompletely fair even in the presence of corrupted majorities. Furthermore, these protocols remain secure when arbitrarily composed with any protocols, which means, in particular, that they areconcurrently-composable and non-malleable. Finally, as an example of our results, we show a very efficient protocol that fairly and securely solves the socialist millionaires ' problem.
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) is an expression encompassing cryptographic techniques that allow mutually distrustful parties to jointly perform computations over private data, ensuring correctness and preserving privacy despite malicious behavior. Guaranteed output is the strongest security goal for MPC: protocols with this property always deliver results. This is in contrast with weaker notions that allow malicious aborts. The seminal works of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson (STOC’88) and Rabin and Ben-Or (STOC’89) showed interactive protocols to compute any function with guaranteed output and perfect security if fewer than one third of parties are corrupted, or with statistical security (with a small error probability) if fewer than half are corrupted. These results hold when the set of participants is fixed throughout the execution. Ostrovsky and Yung’s proactive model (PODC’91) relaxes this assumption by allowing the set of corrupted parties to evolve over time, better capturing the dynamics of long-lived computations, where machines may be periodically compromised and recovered. The recent YOSO (You Only Speak Once) and fluid MPC models (CRYPTO’21) push this ambitious modelling even further by allowing for fully dynamic participation, with parties joining and leaving the computation at will. In this setting, known protocols with guaranteed output fall short of optimal resilience or rely on non-standard communication and adversarial assumptions. Matching the classical BGW and Rabin–Ben-Or bounds in these settings remained an open problem. We resolve these questions within the Layered MPC abstraction of David et al. (CRYPTO’23), in which the interaction pattern of a protocol is restricted to be a layered graph, meaning parties are partitioned into a sequence of disjoint sets (layers) and can send private and broadcast messages to parties in immediately subsequent layers. We match the BGW and Rabin and Ben-Or bounds in this model, fully characterizing the feasibility landscape of Layered MPC with guaranteed output. As a stepping stone towards our statistically secure protocol, we construct a more efficient and conceptually simpler computationally secure protocol relying on linear non-interactive commitments. Our results yield optimally-resilient and maximally-proactive MPC protocols with guaranteed output for both perfect and statistical security.