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Optics Express

Evaluation of photon number distribution for security certification of decoy quantum key distribution

Ryoji Matsumoto, TAKUMI MATSUURA, Atsushi Okamoto, Akihisa Tomita

Published May 27, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) requires information about the photon number distribution of the light sources. The photon number distribution of weak coherent photon sources has been assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. However, it is not yet clear whether picosecond laser pulses, used in high-speed QKD systems, satisfy this assumption due to the significant and rapid changes in carrier density and photon density in the laser cavity. It is necessary to establish a method to experimentally evaluate the photon number distribution of laser pulses with a duration of less than 100 ps. We have implemented three methods to identify a suitable approach for evaluating light sources in quantum key distribution systems. Our findings indicate that all three methods conclude that the photon numbers of the gain-switching laser pulse are consistent with a Poisson distribution. We then compared these methods based on their accuracy of photon number probability and ease of implementation. These considerations will establish a method suitable for the security certification of high-speed quantum key distributed devices.

DOI
10.1364/oe.593332

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Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) requires information about the photon number distribution of the light sources. The photon number distribution of weak coherent photon sources has been assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. However, it is not yet clear whether picosecond laser pulses, used in high-speed QKD systems, satisfy this assumption due to the significant and rapid changes in carrier density and photon density in the laser cavity. It is necessary to establish a method to experimentally evaluate the photon number distribution of laser pulses with a duration of less than 100 ps. We have implemented three methods to identify a suitable approach for evaluating light sources in quantum key distribution systems. Our findings indicate that all three methods conclude that the photon numbers of the gain-switching laser pulse are consistent with a Poisson distribution. We then compared these methods based on their accuracy of photon number probability and ease of implementation. These considerations will establish a method suitable for the security certification of high-speed quantum key distributed devices.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides Alice and Bob with a secure key to prevent third-party eavesdropping. Due to the lack of an ideal single-photon source, weak coherent light sources are widely used. The decoy state method can make up for the security loophole brought by weak coherent light sources - photon number splitting attack (PNS). The specific method of decoy state quantum key distribution is to send light pulses of different intensity levels. Taking the three-intensity decoy state method as an example, one is a signal state with an average photon number of u; one is a decoy state with an average photon number of d; and one is a vacuum state with an average photon number of v. Even if the eavesdropper is more powerful, he cannot distinguish which state the pulse comes from. Therefore, the accuracy of the light pulse intensity is crucial to the security of decoy state quantum key distribution [1] .
The decoy-state method in quantum key distribution (QKD) is a popular technique to approximately achieve the performance of ideal single-photon sources by means of simpler and practical laser sources. In high-speed decoy-state QKD systems, however, intensity correlations between succeeding pulses leak information about the users' intensity settings, thus invalidating a key assumption of this approach. Here, we solve this pressing problem by developing a general technique to incorporate arbitrary intensity correlations to the security analysis of decoy-state QKD. This technique only requires to experimentally quantify two main parameters: the correlation range and the maximum relative deviation between the selected and the actually emitted intensities. As a side contribution, we provide a non-standard derivation of the asymptotic secret key rate formula from the non-asymptotic one, in so revealing a necessary condition for the significance of the former.
High-speed light source is realized for decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) at telecom wavelength of 1.55 µm.By implementing two different electrical pulses together and triggering with 100 MHz pseudorandom number to drive the laser diode, the signal-state and the decoy-state pulses are prepared with identical pulse duration of 25 ps and similar spectral characteristics, avoiding the eavesdropper's attack by temporal and spectral analysis.The intensity fluctuation of the light source is quantified to satisfy the practical decoy-state QKD with random intensity error.The characteristics of the light source are analyzed with a high-speed single-photon detector.
The decoy-state protocol has been considered to be one of the most important methods to protect the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a weak coherent source. Here we test two experimental approaches to generating the decoy states with different intensities: modulation of the pump current of a semiconductor laser diode, and external modulation by an optical intensity modulator. The former approach shows a side channel in the time domain that allows an attacker to distinguish s signal state from a decoy state, breaking a basic assumption in the protocol. We model a photon-number-splitting attack based on our experimental data, and show that it compromises the system's security. Then, based on the work of Tamaki et al. [New J. Phys. 18, 065008 (2016)], we obtain two analytical formulas to estimate the yield and error rate of single-photon pulses when the signal and decoy states are distinguishable. The distinguishability reduces the secure key rate below that of a perfect decoy-state protocol. To mitigate this reduction, we propose to calibrate the transmittance of the receiver (Bob's) unit. We apply our method to three QKD systems and estimate their secure key rates.
A commonly held tenet is that lasers well above threshold emit photons in a coherent state, which follow Poissonian statistics when measured in photon number. This feature is often exploited to build quantum-based random number generators or to derive the secure key rate of quantum key distribution systems. Hence the photon number distribution of the light source can directly impact the randomness and the security distilled from such devices. Here, we propose a method based on measuring correlation functions to experimentally characterize a light source's photon statistics and use it in the estimation of a quantum key distribution system's key rate. This promises to be a useful tool for the certification of quantum-related technologies.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically offers unconditional security. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice threatens side-channel attacks on practical QKD systems. Many well-known QKD protocols use weak coherent laser pulses to encode the quantum information. These sources differ from ideal single photon sources and follow Poisson statistics. Many protocols, such as decoy state and coincidence detection protocols, rely on monitoring the photon statistics to detect any information leakage. The accurate measurement and characterization of photon statistics enable the detection of adversarial attacks and the estimation of secure key rates, strengthening the overall security of the QKD system. We have rigorously characterized our source to estimate the mean photon number employing multiple detectors for comparison against measurements made with a single detector. Furthermore, we have also studied intensity fluctuations to help identify and mitigate any potential information leakage due to state preparation flaws. We aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice to achieve information-theoretic security.