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Lecture notes in computer science

Threshold Public-Key Encryption: Definitions, Relations, and CPA-to-CCA Transforms

Chris Brzuska, Michael Klooß, Ivy K. Y. Woo

Published Jan 1, 2026• 2 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-032-26740-5_6

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Impossibility of Post-Quantum Shielding Black-Box Constructions of CCA from CPA

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Proving whether it is possible to build IND-CCA public-key encryption (PKE) from IND-CPA PKE in a black-box manner is a major open problem in theoretical cryptography. In a significant breakthrough, Gertner, Malkin and Myers showed in 2007 that shielding black-box reductions from IND-CCA to IND-CPA do not exist in the standard model. Shielding means that the decryption algorithm of the IND-CCA scheme does not call the encryption algorithm of the underlying IND-CPA scheme. In other words, it implies that every tentative construction of IND-CCA from IND-CPA must have a re-encryption step when decrypting. This result was only proven with respect to classical algorithms. In this work we show that it stands in a post-quantum setting. That is, we prove that there is no post-quantum shielding black-box construction of IND-CCA PKE from IND-CPA PKE. In the type of reductions we consider, i.e. post-quantum ones, the constructions are still classical in the sense that the schemes must be computable on classical computers, but the adversaries and the reduction algorithm can be quantum. This suggests that considering quantum notions, which are stronger than their classical counterparts, and allowing for quantum reductions does not make building IND-CCA public-key encryption easier.

IACR Communications in Cryptology•Apr 9, 2024•0 citations
Proving whether it is possible to build IND-CCA public-key encryption (PKE) from IND-CPA PKE in a black-box manner is a major open problem in theoretical cryptography. In a significant breakthrough, Gertner, Malkin and Myers showed in 2007 that shielding black-box reductions from IND-CCA to IND-CPA do not exist in the standard model. Shielding means that the decryption algorithm of the IND-CCA scheme does not call the encryption algorithm of the underlying IND-CPA scheme. In other words, it implies that every tentative construction of IND-CCA from IND-CPA must have a re-encryption step when decrypting. This result was only proven with respect to classical algorithms. In this work we show that it stands in a post-quantum setting. That is, we prove that there is no post-quantum shielding black-box construction of IND-CCA PKE from IND-CPA PKE. In the type of reductions we consider, i.e. post-quantum ones, the constructions are still classical in the sense that the schemes must be computable on classical computers, but the adversaries and the reduction algorithm can be quantum. This suggests that considering quantum notions, which are stronger than their classical counterparts, and allowing for quantum reductions does not make building IND-CCA public-key encryption easier.