Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) deployments increasingly rely on cloud–edge collaboration while operating with long-lived field devices, heterogeneous hardware, deterministic control requirements, and bandwidth-constrained links. These properties make “PQC everywhere” upgrades costly and operationally risky, yet the edge–device access boundary remains a critical trust bottleneck and an attractive target for impersonation, replay, and key-compromise threats. This paper proposes a selective-deployment approach for post-quantum authentication in industrial systems: rather than enforcing uniform migration, we identify security-critical boundaries and map protocol changes to lifecycle safe points to enable incremental, deployable protection. Building on this framework, we design SDAKA, a lifecycle-oriented post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol spanning onboarding/registration, runtime access, maintenance (key evolution), and decommissioning/ revocation. SDAKA combines the standardized post-quantum signature primitive ML-DSA with an ML-KEM-inspired Module-LWE key-establishment component to establish session keys and authenticate lifecycle operations, while supporting operational needs such as pseudonymous access with accountable traceability. We validate the protocol via machine-checked symbolic analysis (ProVerif) and reduction-style security arguments in the Real-or-Random (RoR) model. A heterogeneous edge–device testbed evaluation further demonstrates that SDAKA’s computational latency and communication overhead remain practical for industrial links, and that different security configurations provide flexible trade-offs between protection strength and deployment cost.
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) deployments increasingly rely on cloud–edge collaboration while operating with long-lived field devices, heterogeneous hardware, deterministic control requirements, and bandwidth-constrained links. These properties make “PQC everywhere” upgrades costly and operationally risky, yet the edge–device access boundary remains a critical trust bottleneck and an attractive target for impersonation, replay, and key-compromise threats. This paper proposes a selective-deployment approach for post-quantum authentication in industrial systems: rather than enforcing uniform migration, we identify security-critical boundaries and map protocol changes to lifecycle safe points to enable incremental, deployable protection. Building on this framework, we design SDAKA, a lifecycle-oriented post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol spanning onboarding/registration, runtime access, maintenance (key evolution), and decommissioning/ revocation. SDAKA combines the standardized post-quantum signature primitive ML-DSA with an ML-KEM-inspired Module-LWE key-establishment component to establish session keys and authenticate lifecycle operations, while supporting operational needs such as pseudonymous access with accountable traceability. We validate the protocol via machine-checked symbolic analysis (ProVerif) and reduction-style security arguments in the Real-or-Random (RoR) model. A heterogeneous edge–device testbed evaluation further demonstrates that SDAKA’s computational latency and communication overhead remain practical for industrial links, and that different security configurations provide flexible trade-offs between protection strength and deployment cost.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is fast becoming a necessity for the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), where security requirements must align with strict latency and resource constraints. Traditional security protocols relying on static identities, centralized revocation, and bulky ciphertexts are ill-suited for dynamic and distributed IIoT systems. This paper introduces a quantum-resilient identity and key management architecture optimized for constrained industrial environments. We propose a lightweight entropy-seeded identity model that leverages biometric, device, and environmental randomness to generate spoof-resistant identities. A compressed key encapsulation delivery protocol based on CRYSTALS Kyber512 is developed using delta encoding, fragmentation, and ZLIB compression to minimize ciphertext overhead. Although a hybrid blockchain integration is conceptually discussed to outline revocation and trust enforcement, our implementation on constrained IIoT devices demonstrates over 48% ciphertext size reduction, 30% latency improvement compared to baseline Kyber, and real-time trust scoring based on behavioral analysis, showing strong potential for scalable, bandwidth-aware, and future-proof security deployment in post-quantum IIoT ecosystems.
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) enables smart manufacturing through advanced sensing, monitoring, and control capabilities. However, securing these resource-constrained IIoT devices poses critical challenges due to limited memory and energy resources, while the emergence of quantum computing threatens existing security mechanisms. This study addresses the urgent need for practical quantum-resistant security solutions for deployment in resource-limited industrial environments. It presents QLight-IIoT, a quantum-resistant authentication and key agreement (AKA) scheme established solely on hash-based hardness assumption, demonstrating that lightweight quantum-resistant authentication is achievable without relying on computationally intensive primitives like lattices or codes. The proposed scheme is deployed and tested over Raspberry Pi 4 to demonstrate its practicality in real-world IIoT environments. Experimental validation shows that the scheme ensures mutual authentication with session key establishment with an average key generation time of 0.3200 seconds. The security of the proposed QLight-IIoT scheme is systematically evaluated using the Real-or-Random (ROR) model, the Scyther tool, and the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) framework. Performance evaluation reveals significant efficiency improvements, achieving 9.29–77.36% reduction in communication cost and 4.41–95.37% reduction in Computational overhead relative to existing schemes. The scheme requires minimal storage of 632 bits per IIoT device, resulting in up to 64.84% reduction in total system storage cost. Comparative security analysis further validates the scheme’s security against various attack vectors. This work provides a practical pathway for industrial organizations to prepare IIoT infrastructure for quantum-resistant security challenges while maintaining compatibility with current resource-constrained hardware.
Current cellular authentication mechanisms rely primarily on SIM-based Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA), which have scaled successfully worldwide but face challenges as the Internet of Things (IoT) grows to billions of devices. SIM provisioning and lifecycle management become increasingly costly, while reliance on long-term symmetric keys limits revocation flexibility and cross-operator support. To address these issues, we propose a SIM-less, certificate-based authentication framework that integrates Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Specifically, the framework employs Kyber for key encapsulation and Dilithium for digital signatures, providing quantum-resistant protection for future networks. A key challenge is the computational overhead of PQC on constrained IoT devices; we address this by offloading cryptographic operations to trusted edge servers, whose integrity is validated using attestation mechanisms such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) or secure enclaves. We implement and evaluate the framework in a simulated FutureG environment, comparing IoT-only execution against edge-assisted configurations. Results show that edge offloading reduces TLS handshake latency by up to 96% while maintaining minimal resource usage on devices. These findings demonstrate that PQC-enabled PKI, combined with edge-assisted execution, offers a scalable and practical complement to SIM/AKA for secure and quantum-resilient authentication in FutureG IoT deployments.
The rapid proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in smart cities, industrial automation, and healthcare systems has significantly increased the demand for secure and efficient communication mechanisms. However, the emergence of quantum computing poses a serious threat to conventional public-key cryptographic schemes, potentially compromising the confidentiality and authenticity of IoT communications. Existing authentication and key agreement protocols primarily rely on classical cryptographic algorithms, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks and often impose considerable computational and communication overhead on resource-constrained IoT devices. Furthermore, many current solutions fail to provide a balanced trade-off between security strength and energy efficiency in edge-enabled IoT environments. To address these challenges, this paper proposes EdgePQ-Auth, a lightweight lattice-based mutual authentication and key agreement framework designed for quantum-resilient Edge-IoT networks. The proposed framework consists of four modules: Device Registration, Mutual Authentication, Post-Quantum Key Agreement (PQKA), and Secure Data Transmission using Symmetric Encryption. By leveraging lattice-based cryptography for authentication and session key establishment while utilizing lightweight symmetric encryption for subsequent communications, the framework minimizes computational burden on IoT devices and delegates intensive operations to the edge gateway. The proposed scheme ensures resistance against replay, impersonation, man-in-the-middle, and quantum-enabled attacks while maintaining low resource consumption. Experimental evaluation demonstrates that EdgePQ-Auth achieves superior performance in terms of authentication latency, communication overhead, and energy consumption compared with existing PQ IoT security protocols. The results indicate that the proposed framework provides an effective and scalable solution for securing next-generation quantum-resilient Edge-IoT deployments.
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) integrates control systems with IoT technology to enable automation and intelligent operations in industrial environments. As IIoT deployments expand, reliance on wireless communication channels increases the attack surface and exposes systems to various security and privacy threats. Moreover, the limited computational capabilities of IIoT devices and the need to preserve device anonymity introduce additional security requirements. Insufficient protection against these challenges can result in operational disruption and significant economic losses. Existing symmetric-key and hash-based schemes are lightweight but lack scalability for large IIoT deployments, whereas public-key methods provide stronger security. However, the emergence of quantum computing threatens the long-term security of such protocols, as quantum algorithms can efficiently break conventional number-theoretic cryptosystems. To address these challenges, we propose a quantum-resistant three-party authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol for the IIoT. The ring learning with errors (RLWE)-based protocol provides quantum-safe and efficient mutual authentication and secure session key establishment between workers and devices. Comprehensive security and performance analyses demonstrate that the proposed protocol is robust against security attacks. Performance evaluations confirm lower computational and communication overhead than existing post-quantum schemes, proving its practicality for IIoT.
The emergence of Industry 4.0 emphasizes automation, interconnectivity, and data-driven intelligence across industrial infrastructures, with the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) serving as a critical enabler. However, the proliferation of connected smart devices and the advent of quantum computing pose significant challenges to security and authentication mechanisms in such environments. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a lightweight, lattice-based authentication protocol for post-quantum IIoT environments. The proposed protocol enables secure mutual authentication and session key establishment between IIoT sensing devices and the gateway node. It integrates Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to provide hardware-level device trust, eliminates the need to store long-term cryptographic keys in device memory, and uses one-time challenge-response pairs to prevent CRP reuse. The security of the proposed protocol is based on the hardness of the Ring LearningWith Errors (RLWE) problem, ensuring resistance against quantum adversaries. The protocol is formally validated under the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model and evaluated for its resistance to impersonation, replay, desynchronization, and device forgery attacks. Performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme reduces computational cost by 43.11% and communication overhead by 12.67% compared to existing lattice-based authentication protocols. These results confirm its suitability as an efficient and quantum-resilient authentication solution for future Industry 4.0-driven IIoT systems.