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Strong secrecy communication of arbitrarily varying wiretap channels with causal state information at the encoder

Chen Yiqi, Dong Chen, Luo Yuan

Published Apr 1, 2026• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

To achieve reliable and secure communication over a channel in presence of a jammer and an eavesdropper, in which the encoder observed the jamming signal before transmitting each input symbol, a coding scheme was proposed, and the fundamental limits of the communication system was studied. The proposed coding scheme encoded each message using the observed jamming signal and was constructed as a code for reliable and secure communication over compound channels. Then, a set of random permutations over the codewords was used and the compound channel code was transformed into a code that could achieve reliable and secure communication over channels against arbitrarily varying jamming signals. A lower bound of the strong secrecy communication rate has been established. By analyzing the code over channels whose main channel is severely less noisy than the wiretap channel, the strong secrecy capacity of the channel is established and the proposed coding scheme is the optimal scheme.

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To achieve reliable and secure communication over a channel in presence of a jammer and an eavesdropper, in which the encoder observes the jamming signal before transmitting each input symbol, a coding scheme was proposed, and the fundamental limit of the communication system was studied. The proposed coding scheme encoded each message using the observed jamming signal and was constructed as a code for reliable and secure communication over compound channels. Then, a set of random permutations over the codewords was used and the compound channel code was transformed into a code that could achieve reliable and secure communication over channels against arbitrarily varying jamming signals. A lower bound of the strong secrecy communication rate has been established. By analyzing the code over channels whose main channel is severely less noisy than the wiretap channel, the strong secrecy capacity of the channel is established and the proposed coding scheme is the optima scheme.

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To achieve reliable and secure communication over a channel in presence of a jammer and an eavesdropper, in which the encoder observed the jamming signal before transmitting each input symbol, a coding scheme was proposed, and the fundamental limits of the communication system was studied. The proposed coding scheme encoded each message using the observed jamming signal and was constructed as a code for reliable and secure communication over compound channels. Then, a set of random permutations over the codewords was used and the compound channel code was transformed into a code that could achieve reliable and secure communication over channels against arbitrarily varying jamming signals. A lower bound of the strong secrecy communication rate has been established. By analyzing the code over channels whose main channel is severely less noisy than the wiretap channel, the strong secrecy capacity of the channel is established and the proposed coding scheme is the optimal scheme.
To achieve reliable and secure communication over a channel in presence of a jammer and an eavesdropper, in which the encoder observes the jamming signal before transmitting each input symbol, a coding scheme was proposed, and the fundamental limit of the communication system was studied. The proposed coding scheme encoded each message using the observed jamming signal and was constructed as a code for reliable and secure communication over compound channels. Then, a set of random permutations over the codewords was used and the compound channel code was transformed into a code that could achieve reliable and secure communication over channels against arbitrarily varying jamming signals. A lower bound of the strong secrecy communication rate has been established. By analyzing the code over channels whose main channel is severely less noisy than the wiretap channel, the strong secrecy capacity of the channel is established and the proposed coding scheme is the optima scheme.
In this thesis, we consider a class of information protection problems requiring confidentiality (secrecy) from eavesdropping and integrity (reliability) from jamming in an information-theoretic context. For this purpose, we introduce the arbitrarily varying wire-tap channel (AVWTC) model consisting of a family of wiretap channels indexed by some state that is selected by the jammer in an arbitrary and time-varying manner. We study this model for traditional wiretap codes and randomized wiretap codes, and develop insights about the corresponding secrecy capacity and randomized-code secrecy capacity, respectively. We characterize a lower bound on the randomized-code secrecy capacity of the AVWTC that suggests the secrecy is mainly dictated by a worst-case scenario. Additionally, we establish two upper bounds on the randomized-code secrecy capacity that suggest a single bad ``averaged' state can preclude secure communication, while certain superiorities of the legitimate receiver over the eavesdropper in all ``averaged' states result in a positive secrecy capacity. Finally, we prove that the secrecy capacity of the AVWTC is either zero or equal to its randomized-code secrecy capacity. We show that a ``two-layer' wiretap code is appropriate for combatting the two non-colluding jamming and eavesdropping adversaries.
We investigate the effect of certain active attacks on the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels by considering arbitrarily varying wiretap channels. We establish a lower bound for the secrecy capacity with randomized coding of a class of such channels and an upper bound for that of all such channels. We show that if the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel possesses a bad ¿averaged¿ state, namely one in which the legitimate receiver is degraded with respect to the eavesdropper, then secure communication is not possible.
We study a secure communication scenario in which the channel is under two classes of attacks at the same time: a passive eavesdropper and an active jammer. This scenario is modelled using the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC), in which the channel varies from one channel use to the other. It has been shown that in general reliable communication over AVWCs requires some sort of coordination between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. However, most of the established coding techniques use an amount of coordination resources that grows with the code block length. Recently, it was shown that if we allow for a small but non vanishing average error probability and weak secrecy information leakage, we can construct a correlated random code that only requires finite coordination resources. In this paper, we extend this result to the strong secrecy criterion. In particular, we show that we can construct a correlated random code with finite correlated randomness, such that the information leakage in terms of the strong secrecy criterion decays exponentially fast.
We investigate secure communication over a channel that undergoes two different classes of attacks at the same time: passive eavesdropping and active jamming. This scenario is perfectly modeled by the concept of arbitrarily varying wiretap channels (AVWCs). We derive a full characterization of the secrecy capacity of AVWCs under list decoding. We show that the list secrecy capacity is either equivalent to the correlated random secrecy capacity or zero depending on the order of symmetrizability of the legitimate AVC. Differently from correlated random codes, our coding scheme does not assume any restrictions on the communication between the eavesdropper and the jammer.
We investigate the Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel (AVWC) with non-causal side information at the jammer for the case that there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper. Non-causal side information means that codewords are known at an active adversary before they are transmitted. By considering the maximum error criterion, we allow also messages to be known at the jammer before the corresponding codeword is transmitted. A multi letter formula for the common randomness secrecy capacity is derived. Furthermore, we compare our results to the random code secrecy capacity for the cases of maximum error criterion but without non-causal side information at the jammer, maximum error criterion with non-causal side information of the messages at the jammer, and the case of average error criterion without non-causal side information at the jammer.