Abstract Multi-Party Computation (MPC) enables a set of parties to jointly compute a function while preserving the privacy of their inputs. Although the problem has been studied for several decades, most prior work considers the classical setting in which the set of parties is fixed throughout the protocol execution. This assumption is poorly suited for modern applications that are long-lived and in which parties may join or leave the computation dynamically. Motivated by this limitation, a growing body of recent work has introduced models of MPC with dynamic committees, including YOSO MPC, Fluid MPC, Layered MPC, and SCALES, among others. The proliferation of such models raises natural questions: how do these approaches relate to each other, and can they be unified under a common framework? We show that MPC with dynamic committees can be reduced to the design of a classical MPC protocol with a static set of parties and a general adversary structure, but where the interaction pattern is constrained to follow a fixed layered acyclic graph. Each party corresponds to a node in the graph and can send secret messages along its outgoing edges. We further demonstrate that existing dynamic-committee MPC models can be recovered as specific instantiations of this layered-graph framework.
Abstract Multi-Party Computation (MPC) enables a set of parties to jointly compute a function while preserving the privacy of their inputs. Although the problem has been studied for several decades, most prior work considers the classical setting in which the set of parties is fixed throughout the protocol execution. This assumption is poorly suited for modern applications that are long-lived and in which parties may join or leave the computation dynamically. Motivated by this limitation, a growing body of recent work has introduced models of MPC with dynamic committees, including YOSO MPC, Fluid MPC, Layered MPC, and SCALES, among others. The proliferation of such models raises natural questions: how do these approaches relate to each other, and can they be unified under a common framework? We show that MPC with dynamic committees can be reduced to the design of a classical MPC protocol with a static set of parties and a general adversary structure, but where the interaction pattern is constrained to follow a fixed layered acyclic graph. Each party corresponds to a node in the graph and can send secret messages along its outgoing edges. We further demonstrate that existing dynamic-committee MPC models can be recovered as specific instantiations of this layered-graph framework.
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) is an expression encompassing cryptographic techniques that allow mutually distrustful parties to jointly perform computations over private data, ensuring correctness and preserving privacy despite malicious behavior. Guaranteed output is the strongest security goal for MPC: protocols with this property always deliver results. This is in contrast with weaker notions that allow malicious aborts. The seminal works of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson (STOC’88) and Rabin and Ben-Or (STOC’89) showed interactive protocols to compute any function with guaranteed output and perfect security if fewer than one third of parties are corrupted, or with statistical security (with a small error probability) if fewer than half are corrupted. These results hold when the set of participants is fixed throughout the execution. Ostrovsky and Yung’s proactive model (PODC’91) relaxes this assumption by allowing the set of corrupted parties to evolve over time, better capturing the dynamics of long-lived computations, where machines may be periodically compromised and recovered. The recent YOSO (You Only Speak Once) and fluid MPC models (CRYPTO’21) push this ambitious modelling even further by allowing for fully dynamic participation, with parties joining and leaving the computation at will. In this setting, known protocols with guaranteed output fall short of optimal resilience or rely on non-standard communication and adversarial assumptions. Matching the classical BGW and Rabin–Ben-Or bounds in these settings remained an open problem. We resolve these questions within the Layered MPC abstraction of David et al. (CRYPTO’23), in which the interaction pattern of a protocol is restricted to be a layered graph, meaning parties are partitioned into a sequence of disjoint sets (layers) and can send private and broadcast messages to parties in immediately subsequent layers. We match the BGW and Rabin and Ben-Or bounds in this model, fully characterizing the feasibility landscape of Layered MPC with guaranteed output. As a stepping stone towards our statistically secure protocol, we construct a more efficient and conceptually simpler computationally secure protocol relying on linear non-interactive commitments. Our results yield optimally-resilient and maximally-proactive MPC protocols with guaranteed output for both perfect and statistical security.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is one of the most important primitives in cryptography. Several directions to construct and improve MPC protocols have been studied over the past decades. The majority of existing MPC protocols rely on assumptions such as every party communicates with every other party or every party needs to know every other party and the computation algorithm well in advance. Such assumptions can be difficult to achieve in modern large scale networks. This thesis explores two distinct lines of work leading to new practical models in response to these scenarios.First, we examine communication locality, the total number of other parties that each party communicates with in the protocol, as a new measure for an MPC protocol. Although progress has been made, the question of achieving low communication locality and round complexity at the same time for adaptive adversaries corrupting t l n/2 parties remains open. We show that by assuming a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and a symmetric-key infrastructure (SKI) the above question can be answered affirmatively, under standard assumptions. In particular, we describe a protocol with polylogarithmic communication locality and round complexity which tolerates up to t l n/2 adaptive corruptions. Our results are based on a new model of hidden random graphs obtained from the SKI, and using them to emulate a complete network in polylogarithmic rounds and polylogarithmic locality.We then examine multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE) schemes, which allow computation on data encrypted under different public keys chosen independently of each other. One of the main problems left in MFHE has been on how to deal with malicious users without trusted setup assumptions. We show how this can be done through circuit privacy, which guarantees that even if both ciphertexts and public keys are not well-formed, no information is revealed regarding the computation, other than what follows from the output on some well-formed inputs. Generalizing the result for circuit-private FHE, we provide a framework for adding circuit privacy to existing MFHE schemes.Finally, we incorporate the circuit privacy in a variant of server-assisted MPC, called on-the-fly MPC, where a server or a “cloud” performs an arbitrary dynamically chosen computation on a subset of data uploaded by multiple clients and encrypted under different keys on-the-fly. Circuit privacy allows the server to keep the algorithm used in the computation private even from a malicious adversary corrupting any number of clients. In particular, we construct a three-round on-the-fly MPC protocol with circuit privacy against malicious clients without the trusted setup.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is one of the most important primitives in cryptography. Several directions to construct and improve MPC protocols have been studied over the past decades. The majority of existing MPC protocols rely on assumptions such as every party communicates with every other party or every party needs to know every other party and the computation algorithm well in advance. Such assumptions can be difficult to achieve in modern large scale networks. This thesis explores two distinct lines of work leading to new practical models in response to these scenarios.First, we examine communication locality, the total number of other parties that each party communicates with in the protocol, as a new measure for an MPC protocol. Although progress has been made, the question of achieving low communication locality and round complexity at the same time for adaptive adversaries corrupting t < n/2 parties remains open. We show that by assuming a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and a symmetric-key infrastructure (SKI) the above question can be answered affirmatively, under standard assumptions. In particular, we describe a protocol with polylogarithmic communication locality and round complexity which tolerates up to t < n/2 adaptive corruptions. Our results are based on a new model of hidden random graphs obtained from the SKI, and using them to emulate a complete network in polylogarithmic rounds and polylogarithmic locality.We then examine multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE) schemes, which allow computation on data encrypted under different public keys chosen independently of each other. One of the main problems left in MFHE has been on how to deal with malicious users without trusted setup assumptions. We show how this can be done through circuit privacy, which guarantees that even if both ciphertexts and public keys are not well-formed, no information is revealed regarding the computation, other than what follows from the output on some well-formed inputs. Generalizing the result for circuit-private FHE, we provide a framework for adding circuit privacy to existing MFHE schemes.Finally, we incorporate the circuit privacy in a variant of server-assisted MPC, called on-the-fly MPC, where a server or a “cloud” performs an arbitrary dynamically chosen computation on a subset of data uploaded by multiple clients and encrypted under different keys on-the-fly. Circuit privacy allows the server to keep the algorithm used in the computation private even from a malicious adversary corrupting any number of clients. In particular, we construct a three-round on-the-fly MPC protocol with circuit privacy against malicious clients without the trusted setup.
In this work, we initiate the study of network-agnostic perfectly-secure multi-party computation (MPC) against general (non-threshold) adversaries, where the corruption capacity of the adversary is specified through an adversary structure, which is a set of potentially corrupt subsets of parties. Known MPC protocols are designed either assuming a synchronous network where every sent message is guaranteed to be delivered within some known time or assuming an asynchronous network where no timing assumptions are made and every sent message is eventually delivered. Perfectly-secure MPC protocols in the synchronous network can be designed as long as the underlying adversary structure satisfies the$ {{\mathcal {Q}}}^{(3)}condition,meaningthattheunionofnothreesubsetsfromtheadversarystructurecoverstheentiresetofparties.Ontheotherhand,perfectly−secureMPCprotocolsintheasynchronousnetworkcanbedesignedonlyagainst {{\mathcal {Q}}}^{(4)}adversarystructures,meaningthattheunionofnofoursubsetsfromtheadversarystructurecoverstheentiresetofparties.AnaturalquestioniswhetherasingleMPCprotocolexists,whichremainssecureevenifthepartiesareunawareofthenetworkconditionsatexecutiontime.Thatis,ifthesynchronyissatisfiedthroughouttheprotocolexecutionthentheprotocolshouldbesecureagainstany {{\mathcal {Q}}}^{(3)}adversarystructure.However,evenifanysynchronyassumptionisviolatedduringtheexecution,theprotocolshouldstillbesecureagainstany {{\mathcal {Q}}}^{(4)}adversarystructure.Weanswertheabovequestionaffirmatively.Fixanyadversarystructure{\mathcal {Z}}_{s}and{\mathcal {Z}}_{a}satisfying {{\mathcal {Q}}}^{(3)}and {{\mathcal {Q}}}^{(4)}conditionsrespectively,suchthat{\mathcal {Z}}_{a} \subset {\mathcal {Z}} _{s}.Weshowtheexistenceofanetwork−agnosticperfectly−secureMPCprotocoltolerating{\mathcal {Z}}_{s}and{\mathcal {Z}}_{a}insynchronousandasynchronousnetworksrespectivelyaslongasthe {{\mathcal {Q}}}^{(3, 1)}conditionissatisfied,meaningthattheunionofnothreesubsetsfrom{\mathcal {Z}}_{s}andonesubsetfrom{\mathcal {Z}}_{a}$covers the entire set of parties. Our result generalizes the result of Appan, Chandramouli and Choudhury (IEEE Transactions on IT, 2023), which presents the only known perfectly-secure network-agnostic MPC protocol against threshold adversaries.
Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) is one of the foundational achievements of modern cryptog-raphy, allowing multiple, distrusting, parties to jointly compute a function of their inputs, while revealing nothing but the output of the function. Following the seminal works of Yao and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson and Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson, the study of MPC has expanded to consider a wide variety of questions, including variants in the attack model, underlying assumptions, complexity and composability of the resulting protocols. One question that appears to have received very little attention, however, is that of MPC over an underlying communication network whose structure is, in itself, sensitive information. This question, in addition to being of pure theoretical interest, arises naturally in many contexts: designing privacy-preserving social-networks, private peer-to-peer computations, vehicle-to-vehicle networks and the “in-ternet of things ” are some of the examples. In this paper, we initiate the study of “topology-hiding computation ” in the computational setting. We give formal definitions in both simulation-based and indistinguishability-based flavors. We show that, even for fail-stop adversaries, there are some strong impossibility results. Despite this, we show that protocols for topology-hiding computation can be constructed in the semi-honest and fail-stop models, if we somewhat restrict the set of nodes the adversary may corrupt.
In 1982, Yao presented a protocol that allowed two parties to compute over their private inputs while revealing nothing but the final output. This first theoretical construction originated a fruitful line of research exploring the possibilities of the cryptographic technique known as multi-party computation, or MPC. Today, we have MPC schemes with practical efficiency that can be used for a wide range of applications and use cases, from securing cryptographic keys to training Machine Learning models on private data. Despite the advancements from the past few decades, we have only started to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and several obstacles stand in the way of the widespread adoption of MPC. First, the performance overhead depends heavily on the computation we want to perform. Not all computations are well-suited to be distributed with MPC, and algorithms must usually be refactored before they can be executed securely. Furthermore, the practical efficiency of most modern protocols quickly deteriorates as the number of parties increases and comes at the expense of the security guarantees provided. On the other hand, almost all academic works assume a static set of MPC parties, all pairwise connected by dedicated channels in a network without delays or failures. Yet, these assumptions are hardly achievable in current real-world networks. In this thesis, we study three practical aspects of multi-party computation: (i) we discuss how to improve performance by designing algorithms tailor-made for execution with MPC. To this end, we present and evaluate secure auction mechanisms for the financial setting and for the peer-to-peer electricity market. (ii) We analyse the information leakage from the MPC computation outputs. In particular, we focus on the case of individual and private correlated outputs, for which we propose a new privacy notion. Lastly, (iii) we consider the problem of building efficient large-scale MPC. We explore the possibilities and limitations associated with standard (fully connected) networks and present a new protocol with a star-like network topology and resilience against delayed parties.