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IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

Public-Key Quantum Money From Standard Assumptions (In The Generic Model)

Jake Doliskani

Published May 5, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Our main result is a quantum polynomial-time reduction from the group action discrete logarithm (DLP) problem to a specific cloning problem. A consequence of this result is that the public-key quantum money scheme proposed by Zhandry (2024), which is based on abelian group actions, is secure in the generic group action model. Specifically, our result shows that breaking the quantum money scheme is equivalent, under quantum polynomial-time reductions, to solving the group action DLP. An immediate implication of our result concerns the relationship between cloning and preparing Fourier states: our main theorem shows that the problem of cloning group action Fourier states is equivalent to the problem of preparing them.

DOI
10.1109/tit.2026.3690438

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Our main result is a quantum polynomial-time reduction from the group action discrete logarithm (DLP) problem to a specific cloning problem. A consequence of this result is that the public-key quantum money scheme proposed by Zhandry (2024), which is based on abelian group actions, is secure in the generic group action model. Specifically, our result shows that breaking the quantum money scheme is equivalent, under quantum polynomial-time reductions, to solving the group action DLP. An immediate implication of our result concerns the relationship between cloning and preparing Fourier states: our main theorem shows that the problem of cloning group action Fourier states is equivalent to the problem of preparing them.
We give a construction of public key quantum money, and even a strengthened version called quantum lightning, from abelian group actions, which can in turn be constructed from suitable isogenies over elliptic curves. We prove security in the generic group model for group actions under a plausible computational assumption, and develop a general toolkit for proving quantum security in this model. Along the way, we explore knowledge assumptions and algebraic group actions in the quantum setting, finding significant limitations of these assumptions/models compared to generic group actions. 62 pages. This is the TheoretiCS journal version
We give a construction of public key quantum money, and even a strengthened version called quantum lightning, from abelian group actions, which can in turn be constructed from suitable isogenies over elliptic curves. We prove security in the generic group model for group actions under a plausible computational assumption, and develop a general toolkit for proving quantum security in this model. Along the way, we explore knowledge assumptions and algebraic group actions in the quantum setting, finding significant limitations of these assumptions/models compared to generic group actions.
Aaronson, Atia, and Susskind (2020) established that efficiently mapping between quantum states ∣ψ⟩|ψ\rangle∣ψ⟩ and ∣ϕ⟩|ϕ\rangle∣ϕ⟩ is computationally equivalent to distinguishing their superpositions ∣ψ⟩±∣ϕ⟩|ψ\rangle \pm |ϕ\rangle∣ψ⟩±∣ϕ⟩. We generalize this insight into a broader duality principle, wherein manipulating quantum states in one basis is equivalent to extracting their value in a complementary basis. This general duality principle states that the ability to implement a unitary representation of a group is computationally equivalent to the ability to perform a Fourier subspace extraction from its irreducible representations. Building on our duality principle, we present the following applications: * We extend the construction of publicly-key quantum money of Zhandry (2024) from Abelian group actions to a construction of quantum lightning from non-Abelian group actions, and eliminate Zhandry's reliance on a black-box model for justifying security. Instead, we prove a direct reduction to a computational assumption -- the pre-action security of cryptographic group actions. Our construction is realizable with symmetric group actions, including those implicit in the McEliece cryptosystem. * We provide an alternative quantum lightning construction from one-way homomorphisms, with security holding under certain conditions. This scheme shows equivalence among four security notions: quantum lightning security, worst-case and average-case cloning security, and security against preparing a canonical state. * We formalize the notion of quantum fire, states that are efficiently clonable, but not efficiently telegraphable. These states can be spread like fire, provided they are kept alive quantumly and do not decohere. The only previously known construction relied on a unitary quantum oracle, whereas we present the first candidate construction of quantum fire using a classical oracle.
Public verification of quantum money has been one of the central objects in quantum cryptography ever since Wiesner's pioneering idea of using quantum mechanics to construct banknotes against counterfeiting. So far, we do not know any publicly-verifiable quantum money scheme that is provably secure from standard assumptions. In this work, we provide both negative and positive results for publicly verifiable quantum money. **In the first part, we give a general theorem, showing that a certain natural class of quantum money schemes from lattices cannot be secure. We use this theorem to break the recent quantum money scheme of Khesin, Lu, and Shor. **In the second part, we propose a framework for building quantum money and quantum lightning we call invariant money which abstracts some of the ideas of quantum money from knots by Farhi et al.(ITCS'12). In addition to formalizing this framework, we provide concrete hard computational problems loosely inspired by classical knowledge-of-exponent assumptions, whose hardness would imply the security of quantum lightning, a strengthening of quantum money where not even the bank can duplicate banknotes. **We discuss potential instantiations of our framework, including an oracle construction using cryptographic group actions and instantiations from rerandomizable functional encryption, isogenies over elliptic curves, and knots.
Public-key quantum money is a cryptographic protocol in which a bank can create quantum states which anyone can verify but no one except possibly the bank can clone or forge. There are no secure public-key quantum money schemes in the literature; as we show in this paper, the only previously published scheme [1] is insecure. We introduce a category of quantum money protocols which we call collision-free. For these protocols, even the bank cannot prepare multiple identical-looking pieces of quantum money. We present a blueprint for how such a protocol might work as well as a concrete example which we believe may be insecure.
Forty years ago, Wiesner proposed using quantum states to create money that is physically impossible to counterfeit, something that cannot be done in the classical world. However, Wiesner's scheme required a central bank to verify the money, and the question of whether there can be unclonable quantum money that anyone can verify has remained open since. One can also ask a related question, which seems to be new: can quantum states be used as copy-protected programs, which let the user evaluate some function f, but not create more programs for f? This paper tackles both questions using the arsenal of modern computational complexity. Our main result is that there exist quantum oracles relative to which publicly-verifiable quantum money is possible, and any family of functions that cannot be efficiently learned from its input-output behavior can be quantumly copy-protected. This provides the first formal evidence that these tasks are achievable. The technical core of our result is a "Complexity-Theoretic No-Cloning Theorem," which generalizes both the standard No-Cloning Theorem and the optimality of Grover search, and might be of independent interest. Our security argument also requires explicit constructions of quantum t-designs. Moving beyond the oracle world, we also present an explicit candidate scheme for publicly-verifiable quantum money, based on random stabilizer states; as well as two explicit schemes for copy-protecting the family of point functions. We do not know how to base the security of these schemes on any existing cryptographic assumption. (Note that without an oracle, we can only hope for security under some computational assumption).