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IACR Communications in Cryptology

StarFortress: Hybrid KEMs with Diffie-Hellman Inlining

Deirdre Connolly, Paul Grubbs

Published May 4, 2026• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

This short paper formally specifies and analyzes the UG hybrid KEM construction from the IRTF CFRG's recent draft on hybrid (post-quantum/traditional) KEMs. The UG construction is an optimized hybrid of a Diffie-Hellman (DH)-based KEM in a nominal group and a generic IND-CCA KEM. The main optimization is that the group elements derived in the DH-based KEM are “inlined” in the key derivation, saving unnecessary hashing. We perform two security analyses of the UG construction: one shows UG is IND-CCA even if the generic IND-CCA KEM is broken; the other complementary analysis shows UG is IND-CCA even if the DH assumptions in the nominal group are broken (by, e.g., a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer).

DOI
10.62056/ahmp-49p1

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This short paper formally specifies and analyzes the UG hybrid KEM construction from the IRTF CFRG's recent draft on hybrid (post-quantum/traditional) KEMs. The UG construction is an optimized hybrid of a Diffie-Hellman (DH)-based KEM in a nominal group and a generic IND-CCA KEM. The main optimization is that the group elements derived in the DH-based KEM are “inlined” in the key derivation, saving unnecessary hashing. We perform two security analyses of the UG construction: one shows UG is IND-CCA even if the generic IND-CCA KEM is broken; the other complementary analysis shows UG is IND-CCA even if the DH assumptions in the nominal group are broken (by, e.g., a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer).
Abstract The rapid progress of quantum computing threatens widely deployed public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and Diffie–Hellman, accelerating the transition toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC). During this migration, hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) that combine classical and post-quantum primitives are strongly recommended by standardization bodies and cybersecurity agencies. However, existing hybrid designs mainly focus on combining post-quantum KEMs with Diffie–Hellman–style constructions, while the systematic integration of standardized classical public-key encryption (PKE) schemes with post-quantum KEMs remains largely unexplored. In this work, we introduce two generic hybrid constructions, and , that combine a classical PKE scheme with a post-quantum KEM satisfying ciphertext second-preimage resistance (C2PRI). We prove that both constructions achieve IND-CCA security in the standard model. The refined construction additionally relies on a new security notion of the classical PKE scheme, termed partial ciphertext second-preimage resistance (PC2PRI), which captures second-preimage resistance when a designated ciphertext component is fixed. This new property enables shared-key derivation from only a designated PKE ciphertext component in . Finally, we provide a systematic analysis of the PC2PRI property for several standardized classical encryption schemes, including ECIES, PSEC, and SM2.
The threat of quantum computers becoming strong enough to break classical cryptographic primitives grows only more realistic with time. With increasing urgency, organizations are beginning to migrate their systems to quantum-resistant solutions. One of the areas encompassed by the post-quantum migration is secure network protocols. To protect traffic from quantum adversaries, classical cryptographic primitives inside network protocols must be replaced with quantum-resistant ones. While this transition is relatively straightforward for protocols that use key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) in their classical variants, that is not the case for protocols that rely on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH). This simple cryptographic primitive plays a key role in many secure network protocols. It is the component that ensures asynchronicity of instant messaging protocols such as Signal – a property that key encapsulation mechanisms cannot achieve. Because of this, replacing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a post-quantum solution – many of which are based on KEMs – is non-trivial and may require changes to these protocols. We examine the obstacles and challenges of post-quantum migration in DH-based protocols and provide a comprehensive comparison of potential solutions proposed in the existing literature.
The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol is one of the first security protocols on the Internet to upgrade itself to resist attacks against future quantum computers, with the default adoption of the “quantum (otherwise, classically)” secure hybrid key exchange in OpenSSH from April 2022. However, there is a lack of a comprehensive security analysis of this quantum-resistant version of SSH in the literature: related works either focus on the hybrid key exchange in isolation and do not consider security of the overall protocol, or analyze the protocol in security models which are not appropriate for SSH, especially in the “post-quantum” setting. In this paper, we remedy the state of affairs by providing a thorough post-quantum cryptographic analysis of SSH. We follow a “top-down” approach wherein we first prove security of SSH in a more appropriate model, namely, our post-quantum extension of the so-called authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocol security model; our extension which captures “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks could be of independent interest. Then we establish the cryptographic properties of SSH's underlying primitives, as concretely instantiated in practice, based on our protocol-level ACCE security analysis: for example, we prove relevant cryptographic properties of “Streamlined NTRU Prime”, a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) which is used in recent versions of OpenSSH and TinySSH, in the quantum random oracle model, and address open problems related to its analysis in the literature. Notably, our ACCE security analysis of post-quantum SSH relies on the weaker notion of IND-CPA security of the ephemeral KEMs used in the hybrid key exchange. This is in contrast to prior works which rely on the stronger assumption of IND-CCA secure ephemeral KEMs. Hence we conclude the paper with a discussion on potentially replacing IND-CCA secure KEMs in current post-quantum implementations of SSH with simpler and faster IND-CPA secure counterparts, and also provide the corresponding benchmarks.