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Applied Physics Letters

Feasibility of bright illumination attack using 830 nm coherent light on the practical quantum key distribution systems

Toshitsugu Kato, K. Yoshino, 藤原 幹生, Go Kato, Masahide Sasaki, Akihisa Tomita

Published Apr 20, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Bright illumination attack (BIA) is considered one of the most serious eavesdropping attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Various countermeasures have been proposed to eliminate this threat. Most of them focus on bright light at the telecom wavelength of 1550 nm, often involving power monitors with a sensitivity range from 900 to 1700 nm. However, BIA at other wavelengths—typically shorter than 900 nm—could also pose a threat. The light in this wavelength range has been overlooked because avalanche photodiodes (APDs) in QKD systems have low detection efficiency for communication. However, Indium Phosphide (InP) layers, commonly used as the avalanche-amplification layer and substrate in APDs, can absorb light at these shorter wavelengths, potentially causing blinding due to photocurrent. Such attacks cannot be detected by power monitors designed for telecom wavelengths. In this study, we experimentally investigated the feasibility of BIA on practical QKD systems using the 830-nm continuous-wave light. We found clear evidence of APD blinding, which reduces quantum efficiency. This finding suggests that the security certification of commercial QKD systems should consider potential attacks using near-infrared light.

DOI
10.1063/5.0299568

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Bright illumination attack (BIA) is considered one of the most serious eavesdropping attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Various countermeasures have been proposed to eliminate this threat. Most of them focus on bright light at the telecom wavelength of 1550 nm, often involving power monitors with a sensitivity range from 900 to 1700 nm. However, BIA at other wavelengths—typically shorter than 900 nm—could also pose a threat. The light in this wavelength range has been overlooked because avalanche photodiodes (APDs) in QKD systems have low detection efficiency for communication. However, Indium Phosphide (InP) layers, commonly used as the avalanche-amplification layer and substrate in APDs, can absorb light at these shorter wavelengths, potentially causing blinding due to photocurrent. Such attacks cannot be detected by power monitors designed for telecom wavelengths. In this study, we experimentally investigated the feasibility of BIA on practical QKD systems using the 830-nm continuous-wave light. We found clear evidence of APD blinding, which reduces quantum efficiency. This finding suggests that the security certification of commercial QKD systems should consider potential attacks using near-infrared light.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD), rooted in quantum mechanics, offers information-theoretic security. However, practical systems open security threats due to imperfections, notably bright-light blinding attacks targeting single-photon detectors. Here, we propose a concise, robust defense strategy for protecting single-photon detectors in QKD systems against blinding attacks. Our strategy uses a dual approach: detecting the bias current of the avalanche photodiode (APD) to defend against continuous-wave blinding attacks, and monitoring the avalanche amplitude to protect against pulsed blinding attacks. By integrating these two branches, the proposed solution effectively identifies and mitigates a wide range of bright light injection attempts, significantly enhancing the resilience of QKD systems against various bright-light blinding attacks. This method fortifies the safeguards of quantum communications and offers a crucial contribution to the field of quantum information security.
Semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are commonly used for single photon detection in quantum key distribution. Recently, many attacks using bright illumination have been proposed to manipulate gated InGaAs APDs. In order to devise effective countermeasures, careful analysis of these attacks must be carried out to distinguish between incorrect operation and genuine loopholes. Here, we show that correctly operated, gated APDs are immune to continuous-wave illumination attacks, while monitoring the photocurrent for anomalously high values is a straightforward countermeasure against attacks using temporally tailored light.
In this paper, we investigate spectral vulnerabilities in quantum key distribution systems arising from the use of shorter-wavelength radiation in the 400–800 nm range, with particular focus on the induced photorefraction attack (IPA). Crucial elements influenced by the IPA include various types of both phase and intensity modulators, and we consider different scenarios and their implications. Through combined theoretical and experimental analysis, we demonstrate that optical components commonly used as countermeasures in the telecom band (1000–2100 nm) exhibit significantly reduced effectiveness at shorter wavelengths. The efficiency of IPA is shown to increase as the wavelength decreases, posing a substantial threat to phase-modulation-based QKD protocols. We analyze the impact of IPA across different QKD architectures and assess the feasibility of potential countermeasures under realistic implementation scenarios. Our results highlight the necessity of broadband security evaluations and wavelength-aware component design in future QKD systems.
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.
Implementation of high-speed quantum key distribution (QKD) has become one of the major focuses in the field, which produces a high key-generation rate for applications. To achieve high-speed QKD, tailored techniques are developed and employed to quickly generate and detect quantum states. However, these techniques may introduce unique loopholes to compromise the security of QKD systems. In this paper, we investigate the loopholes of the self-differencing (SD) avalanche photodiode (APD) detector, typically used for high-speed detection in a QKD system, and demonstrate experimental testing of the SD APD detector under strong-pulse-illumination attack. This attack presents blinding stability and helps an eavesdropper to learn the secret key without introducing extra quantum bit rate error. Based on this testing, we propose a set of criteria for protecting SD APD detectors from the strong-pulse-illumination attack.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) at telecom wavelengths (1260 - 1625 nm) has the potential for fast deployment due to existing optical fibre infrastructure and mature telecom technologies. At these wavelengths, Indium Gallium Arsenide (InGaAs) avalanche photodiode (APD) based detectors are the preferred choice for photon detection. Similar to their Silicon counterparts used at shorter wavelengths, they exhibit fluorescence from recombination of electron-hole pairs generated in the avalanche breakdown process. This fluorescence may open side channels for attacks on QKD systems. Here, we characterize the breakdown fluorescence from two commercial InGaAs single photon counting modules, and find a spectral distribution between 1000 nm and 1600 nm. We also show that by spectral filtering, this side channel can be efficiently suppressed.