Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS)

How Companies Address the Threat of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers and Migrate to Post-Quantum Cryptography

Jennifer Brettschneider, Lauri Wessel, Jan Mendling

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

How companies prepare for the migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) remains an open and important question, despite growing awareness of the threat posed by cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs). While PQC standards released by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2024 aim to resist both quantum and classical attacks, migrating to these standards presents significant technical and organizational challenges. Existing research has focused on algorithm design and migration frameworks, but little is known about how companies approach this migration in practice. Through semi-structured interviews, we explore how four companies address the CRQC threat and PQC migration. We have found that companies perceive the timing and threat of CRQC differently, which implies that these perceptions influence PQC migration.

DOI
10.24251/hicss.2026.693

Related papers

Post-Quantum Cryptography: An Introductory Overview and Implementation Challenges of Quantum-Resistant Algorithms

Sherdel A. Käppler, Bettina Schneider

Cryptographic algorithms are an essential measure to ensure confidentiality and integrity of internet communication. The development of quantum computers (QCs) and their potential to utilize Shor’s Law, is increasingly recognized as a threat to asymmetric cryptography. In response, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is gaining prominence as a notable field of research aiming to standardize quantum resistant algorithms before the operational usage of QCs. This paper is addressed to people with preliminary knowledge in the field of cryptography and QC. Based on a literature review, the authors provide an overview of challenges faced by the research community and elaborate the advancements in addressing post-quantum threats. A migration strategy from classical cryptosystems to PQC systems is in development, but obstacles such as time constraints and improper implementation complicate the process. Full implementation could take a decade or more. Until then, our paper aims to create awareness for potential challenges when transitioning towards PQC. As categorization scheme for these potential obstacles, we refer to a well- established model in cybersecurity – the McCumber Cube. Conclusions embrace preparing for risks of improper implementation and deriving a multi-step migration. Special attention is expected to be needed for data migration of existing data sets. As a request for future research in PQC, the authors identified the process of implementing post-cryptography standards, e.g., from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and an assessment of the perceived readiness of industry to adapt.

EPiC series in computing•Jun 20, 2022•28 citations

Post-Quantum Cryptography: Evaluating and Standardizing Quantum-Resistant Algorithms

Godwin Olaoye

The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current cryptographic systems, particularly public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks like Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to develop and standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms to secure digital communications in the quantum era. This paper examines the current landscape of PQC, focusing on the evaluation and standardization efforts led by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We analyze the major families of quantum-resistant algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography, discussing their security guarantees, performance trade-offs, and implementation challenges. Furthermore, we review NIST's PQC standardization process, highlighting selected finalists and alternate candidates, and explore the ongoing transition challenges in adopting these algorithms across industries. Finally, we discuss future directions for PQC research, including hybrid cryptographic systems and the need for continued cryptanalysis to ensure long-term security. This work provides a comprehensive overview of the progress and challenges in deploying quantum-resistant cryptography to safeguard against emerging quantum threats.

•Apr 9, 2025•2 citations

Illuminating the Path of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey of some Recent Literatures

Alvary Kefas Kwala, Alpna Mishra, Shri Kant

Abstract The imminent threat posed by quantum computers to modern public key cryptography has spurred the development of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Over the last two decades, the field of PQC research has thrived, yielding a diverse range of algorithms resilient against quantum attacks. These PQC algorithms are undergoing selection and standardization by prominent bodies ; such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). However, the challenge remains substantial, given the monumental task of migrating numerous new devices to PQC algorithms. This complex, multi-decade transition from classical cryptography to PQC, necessitates careful survey of research articles to consider the current post quantum cryptographic schemes, and key protective strategies against quantum threats, implementation feasibility, compliance and challenges of implementations. This will provide insight and future directions for new researchers and organizations. .

•Nov 6, 2023•0 citations

Cryptographic Challenges and Security in Post Quantum Cryptography Migration: A Prospective Approach

Anoop Kumar Pandey, Aashish Banati, Balaji Rajendran +2 more

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a rapidly developing field that addresses the potential threat quantum computers pose to the security of current cryptographic algorithms. With the rapid advancement of quantum computing technologies, it has become imperative to identify and standardize new cryptographic techniques that can withstand attacks from quantum computers. This paper explores the motivation behind PQC and provides an overview of the experimental research conducted in the field. It highlights the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and ECC, to quantum attacks and emphasizes the need for transitioning to quantum-resistant alternatives. The experiments conducted in the PQC domain encompass the evaluation and analysis of candidate algorithms submitted to the NIST PQC competition. These experiments involve comprehensive security assessments, performance evaluations, and code audits to ensure the suitability and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in real-world scenarios. This paper provides guidelines for organizations and practitioners adopting PQC. It discusses considerations for selecting and implementing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, including security levels, algorithmic characteristics, performance tradeoffs, and integration challenges. It also outlines the importance of a smooth transition from classical to post-quantum cryptographic systems and highlights the need for standardization efforts to ensure interoperability and compatibility.

IEEE International Conference on Public Key Infrastructure and its Applications (PKIA)•Sep 8, 2023•19 citations

Securing the Future: Shifting to Post-Quantum Cryptography Amidst Quantum Threats

Yidan Sun

Current cryptographic systems, heavily reliant on classical algorithms, are increasingly vulnerable to the formidable capabilities of quantum computing. Notably, quantum algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s pose profound threats by accelerating decryption processes, which could soon make existing cryptosystems ineffective. This paper stresses the critical need and complexity of shifting to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to safeguard encrypted communications against these emerging quantum threats. It outlines the timeline of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) efforts in standardizing PQC, elucidating the significant challenges and the essential nature of adopting these new standards. While NIST provides structured guidance, transitioning to PQC presents substantial risks and difficulties, particularly in terms of organizational adaptation and the technical overhaul required. The discourse further explores the tangible implications of quantum advancements on both symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography, highlighting the potential vulnerabilities and the increased risk of security breaches. The paper underscores the imperative for immediate action in initiating the transition towards robust PQC systems, given the rapid development and anticipated deployment of quantum computing technologies capable of decrypting currently secure information. This transition is not merely a technical upgrade but a crucial strategic move to preemptively counteract quantum threats, ensuring the continued confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data across various sectors.

Applied and Computational Engineering•Nov 28, 2024•3 citations

THE PQC TRANSITION: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION

Amit Kumar Singh

The emergence of quantum computing represents a paradigmatic shift that threatens the foundational security assumptions underlying contemporary digital infrastructure.This comprehensive analysis examines the urgent transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) through the lens of recent standardization efforts, technological innovations, and implementation challenges.The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalization of the first three PQC standards in August 2024-FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA)-alongside the March 2025 selection of HQC as a fifth algorithm, marks a critical juncture in cryptographic evolution[1], [2].Expert assessments indicate a 17-34% probability of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) emerging by 2034, escalating to 79% by 2044, while government mandates require National Security Systems to achieve quantum resistance by 2031[3], [4].This research synthesizes current developments in PQC implementation, analyzing performance optimizations that achieve up to 300x speedup for hash-based signatures, examining side-channel vulnerabilities in lattice-based schemes, and evaluating hybrid cryptography strategies as interim solutions[5].The analysis reveals that while the global PQC market is projected to grow from $1.15 billion in 2024 to over $2.39 billion by 2032, only 41% of organizations are actively preparing for migration despite 61% planning transitions Amit Singh https://iaeme.com/Home/journal/IJCET

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTER ENGINEERING & TECHNOLOGY•Jul 23, 2025•1 citation
How companies prepare for the migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) remains an open and important question, despite growing awareness of the threat posed by cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs). While PQC standards released by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2024 aim to resist both quantum and classical attacks, migrating to these standards presents significant technical and organizational challenges. Existing research has focused on algorithm design and migration frameworks, but little is known about how companies approach this migration in practice. Through semi-structured interviews, we explore how four companies address the CRQC threat and PQC migration. We have found that companies perceive the timing and threat of CRQC differently, which implies that these perceptions influence PQC migration.
Cryptographic algorithms are an essential measure to ensure confidentiality and integrity of internet communication. The development of quantum computers (QCs) and their potential to utilize Shor’s Law, is increasingly recognized as a threat to asymmetric cryptography. In response, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is gaining prominence as a notable field of research aiming to standardize quantum resistant algorithms before the operational usage of QCs. This paper is addressed to people with preliminary knowledge in the field of cryptography and QC. Based on a literature review, the authors provide an overview of challenges faced by the research community and elaborate the advancements in addressing post-quantum threats. A migration strategy from classical cryptosystems to PQC systems is in development, but obstacles such as time constraints and improper implementation complicate the process. Full implementation could take a decade or more. Until then, our paper aims to create awareness for potential challenges when transitioning towards PQC. As categorization scheme for these potential obstacles, we refer to a well- established model in cybersecurity – the McCumber Cube. Conclusions embrace preparing for risks of improper implementation and deriving a multi-step migration. Special attention is expected to be needed for data migration of existing data sets. As a request for future research in PQC, the authors identified the process of implementing post-cryptography standards, e.g., from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and an assessment of the perceived readiness of industry to adapt.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current cryptographic systems, particularly public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks like Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to develop and standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms to secure digital communications in the quantum era. This paper examines the current landscape of PQC, focusing on the evaluation and standardization efforts led by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We analyze the major families of quantum-resistant algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography, discussing their security guarantees, performance trade-offs, and implementation challenges. Furthermore, we review NIST's PQC standardization process, highlighting selected finalists and alternate candidates, and explore the ongoing transition challenges in adopting these algorithms across industries. Finally, we discuss future directions for PQC research, including hybrid cryptographic systems and the need for continued cryptanalysis to ensure long-term security. This work provides a comprehensive overview of the progress and challenges in deploying quantum-resistant cryptography to safeguard against emerging quantum threats.
Abstract The imminent threat posed by quantum computers to modern public key cryptography has spurred the development of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Over the last two decades, the field of PQC research has thrived, yielding a diverse range of algorithms resilient against quantum attacks. These PQC algorithms are undergoing selection and standardization by prominent bodies ; such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). However, the challenge remains substantial, given the monumental task of migrating numerous new devices to PQC algorithms. This complex, multi-decade transition from classical cryptography to PQC, necessitates careful survey of research articles to consider the current post quantum cryptographic schemes, and key protective strategies against quantum threats, implementation feasibility, compliance and challenges of implementations. This will provide insight and future directions for new researchers and organizations. .
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a rapidly developing field that addresses the potential threat quantum computers pose to the security of current cryptographic algorithms. With the rapid advancement of quantum computing technologies, it has become imperative to identify and standardize new cryptographic techniques that can withstand attacks from quantum computers. This paper explores the motivation behind PQC and provides an overview of the experimental research conducted in the field. It highlights the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and ECC, to quantum attacks and emphasizes the need for transitioning to quantum-resistant alternatives. The experiments conducted in the PQC domain encompass the evaluation and analysis of candidate algorithms submitted to the NIST PQC competition. These experiments involve comprehensive security assessments, performance evaluations, and code audits to ensure the suitability and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in real-world scenarios. This paper provides guidelines for organizations and practitioners adopting PQC. It discusses considerations for selecting and implementing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, including security levels, algorithmic characteristics, performance tradeoffs, and integration challenges. It also outlines the importance of a smooth transition from classical to post-quantum cryptographic systems and highlights the need for standardization efforts to ensure interoperability and compatibility.
Current cryptographic systems, heavily reliant on classical algorithms, are increasingly vulnerable to the formidable capabilities of quantum computing. Notably, quantum algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s pose profound threats by accelerating decryption processes, which could soon make existing cryptosystems ineffective. This paper stresses the critical need and complexity of shifting to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to safeguard encrypted communications against these emerging quantum threats. It outlines the timeline of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) efforts in standardizing PQC, elucidating the significant challenges and the essential nature of adopting these new standards. While NIST provides structured guidance, transitioning to PQC presents substantial risks and difficulties, particularly in terms of organizational adaptation and the technical overhaul required. The discourse further explores the tangible implications of quantum advancements on both symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography, highlighting the potential vulnerabilities and the increased risk of security breaches. The paper underscores the imperative for immediate action in initiating the transition towards robust PQC systems, given the rapid development and anticipated deployment of quantum computing technologies capable of decrypting currently secure information. This transition is not merely a technical upgrade but a crucial strategic move to preemptively counteract quantum threats, ensuring the continued confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data across various sectors.
The emergence of quantum computing represents a paradigmatic shift that threatens the foundational security assumptions underlying contemporary digital infrastructure.This comprehensive analysis examines the urgent transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) through the lens of recent standardization efforts, technological innovations, and implementation challenges.The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalization of the first three PQC standards in August 2024-FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA)-alongside the March 2025 selection of HQC as a fifth algorithm, marks a critical juncture in cryptographic evolution[1], [2].Expert assessments indicate a 17-34% probability of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) emerging by 2034, escalating to 79% by 2044, while government mandates require National Security Systems to achieve quantum resistance by 2031[3], [4].This research synthesizes current developments in PQC implementation, analyzing performance optimizations that achieve up to 300x speedup for hash-based signatures, examining side-channel vulnerabilities in lattice-based schemes, and evaluating hybrid cryptography strategies as interim solutions[5].The analysis reveals that while the global PQC market is projected to grow from $1.15 billion in 2024 to over $2.39 billion by 2032, only 41% of organizations are actively preparing for migration despite 61% planning transitions Amit Singh https://iaeme.com/Home/journal/IJCET