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Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques

Survey of isogeny-based signature schemes resistant to Castryck–Decru attack

J. S. Bobrysheva, A. S. Zelenetsky, V. V. Davydov

Published Apr 6, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11416-026-00613-4

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