In cryptography, generic transformations are often used to strengthen simpler but weaker schemes, into more sophisticated and stronger ones. This thesis aims to establish rigorous, provable notions of security for various such transformations that are relevant in the scope of post-quantum cryptography. We achieve this via formal mathematical proofs, and in some cases, via proposing new security definitions, when existing ones are inadequate. Most analyses are treated in an idealized setting known as the random oracle model.
In cryptography, generic transformations are often used to strengthen simpler but weaker schemes, into more sophisticated and stronger ones. This thesis aims to establish rigorous, provable notions of security for various such transformations that are relevant in the scope of post-quantum cryptography. We achieve this via formal mathematical proofs, and in some cases, via proposing new security definitions, when existing ones are inadequate. Most analyses are treated in an idealized setting known as the random oracle model.
Recent developments in quantum computers pose an imminent threat to cryptography since many widely used cryptographic schemes will no longer be secure. This worrisome scenario motivated a growing interest in the field of post-quantum cryptography, which aims to design cryptosystems that are postquantum secure, i.e. secure against quantum-capable adversaries. While finding post-quantum computational hardness assumptions is pivotal to achieve this goal, an issue that is often overlooked is provable security. In fact, to prove that the post-quantum computational hardness necessarily implies post-quantum security of the derived cryptosystem, the reduction argument that establishes this implication also needs to be post-quantum. As such, many new methods have been devised in the last few years to handle this adaptation to the quantum setting. In particular, the quantum analogue of the Random Oracle Model has garnered special interest, as it is the foundation of many cryptographic schemes, from public-key encryption to digital signatures. It is also very problematic and usually the main culprit of the failure of security proofs when transitioning to the quantum setting. This work offers a comprehensive exposition on the most influential techniques developed in the last decade to enable or facilitate the construction of security proofs in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM). Each presented technique offers an unique purpose and a solution to a problem provoked by the QROM, and, as such, as a whole, this works allows for an understanding of the most common strategies to construct these type of security proofs. This is accomplished by presenting and analyzing the security proof of three cryptographic schemes set in this model, which underlines the central role these techniques take in provable quantum security.
We call quantum security the area of IT security dealing with scenarios where one or more parties have access to quantum hardware. This encompasses both the fields of post-quantum cryptography (that is, traditional cryptography engineered to be resistant against quantum adversaries), and quantum cryptography (that is, security protocols designed to be natively run on a quantum infrastructure, such as quantum key distribution). Moreover, there exist also hybrid models, where traditional cryptographic schemes are somehow `mixed' with quantum operations in certain scenarios. Even if a fully-fledged, scalable quantum computer has yet to be built, recent results and the pace of research in its realization call for attention, lest we suddenly find ourselves one day with an obsolete security infrastructure. For this reason, in the last two decades research in quantum security has experienced an exponential growth in interest and investments. In this work, we propose the first systematic classification of quantum security scenarios, and for each of them we recall the main tools and results, as well as presenting new ones. We achieve this goal by identifying four distinct quantum security classes, or domains, each of them encompassing the security notions and constructions related to a particular scenario. We start with the class QS0, which is `classical cryptography' (meaning that no quantum scenario is considered), where we present some classical constructions and results as a preliminary step. Regarding post-quantum cryptography, we introduce the class QS1, where we discuss in detail the problems arising when designing a classical cryptographic object meant to be resistant against adversaries with local quantum computing power, and we provide a classification of the possible quantum security reductions in this scenario when considering provable security. Moreover, we present results about the quantum security and insecurity of the Fiat-Shamir transformation (a useful tool used to turn interactive identification schemes into digital signatures), and ORAMs (protocols used to outsource a database in a private way). In respect to hybrid classical-quantum models, in the security class QS2 we discuss in detail the possible scenarios where these scenarios arise, and what a correct formalization should be in terms of quantum oracle access. We also provide a novel framework for the quantum security (both in terms of indistinguishability and semantic security) of secret-key encryption schemes, and we give explicit secure constructions, as well as impossibility results. Finally, in the class QS3 we consider all those cryptographic constructions designed to run natively on quantum hardware. We give constructions for quantum encryption schemes (both in the secret- and public-key scenario), and we introduce transformations for obtaining such schemes by conceptually simpler schemes from the class QS2. Moreover, we introduce a quantum version of ORAM, called quantum ORAM (QORAM), aimed at outsourcing in a private way a database composed of quantum data. In proposing a suitable security model and an explicit construction for QORAMs, we also introduce a technique of independent interest which models a quantum adversary able to extract information from a quantum system without disturbing it `too much'. We believe that the framework we introduce in this work will be a valuable tool for the scientific community in addressing the challenges arising when formalizing sound constructions and notions of security in the quantum world.
Modern cryptographic transformations require provable security against a relatively wide class of threats. Typically, such evidentiary security is achieved through formal analysis within the chosen security model. The development of quantum computers led to the emergence of new attack vectors to which classical cryptography was vulnerable. However, there are cryptographic systems that are considered resistant to quantum attacks and some of them are even standardized. The formal analysis of such systems has faced difficulties for a long time, which were associated with the impossibility of applying classical methods of proof to formal models that take into account quantum effects. However, in recent years, many new results have appeared that allow obtaining formal security proofs for quite complex cryptographic transformations, and most of the existing post-quantum asymmetric encryption and key encapsulation schemes currently have corresponding formal proofs within the quantum random oracle model, the most widespread security model for of post-quantum cryptography. DSTU 8961:2019 is the Ukrainian post-quantum standard for asymmetric encryption and key encapsulation. However, security proofs in the quantum random oracle model have not yet been published for it. As part of this work, security evidence was obtained for the design of the key encapsulation mechanism described in DSTU 8961:209. The obtained result is generalized for an arbitrary asymmetric encryption scheme, which may contain decryption errors and can be used to assess the security of not only DSTU 8961:2019, but also other similar asymmetric transformations.
Shor's quantum factoring algorithm and a few other efficient quantum algorithms break many classical crypto-systems. In response, people proposed post-quantum cryptography based on computational problems that are believed hard even for quantum computers. However, security of these schemes against \emph{quantum} attacks is elusive. This is because existing security analysis (almost) only deals with classical attackers and arguing security in the presence of quantum adversaries is challenging due to unique quantum features such as no-cloning. This work proposes a general framework to study which classical security proofs can be restored in the quantum setting. Basically, we split a security proof into (a sequence of) classical security reductions, and investigate what security reductions are "quantum-friendly". We characterize sufficient conditions such that a classical reduction can be "lifted" to the quantum setting. We then apply our lifting theorems to post-quantum signature schemes. We are able to show that the classical generic construction of hash-tree based signatures from one-way functions and and a more efficient variant proposed in~\cite{BDH11} carry over to the quantum setting. Namely, assuming existence of (classical) one-way functions that are resistant to efficient quantum inversion algorithms, there exists a quantum-secure signature scheme. We note that the scheme in~\cite{BDH11} is a promising (post-quantum) candidate to be implemented in practice and our result further justifies it. Finally we demonstrate the generality of our framework by showing that several existing works (Full-Domain hash in the quantum random-oracle model~\cite{Zha12ibe} and the simple hybrid arguments framework in~\cite{HSS11}) can be reformulated under our unified framework.
With the development of quantum computation, quantum computers will break the almost classical cryptography. It is imminent to design post-quantum cryptography algorithm that could resist quantum adversaries. Lattice-based problem has been verified that could resist quantum attacks. Our goal is to design a signature and try to prove it is secure in the quantum random oracle model. Our new signature scheme is redesigned based on the signature proposed by Lyu, but that scheme only proved secure in the random oracle model. The difference between the two signature is that we introduce the middle-product operation. So our signature is based on middle-product LWE hard assumption, which enjoys a security proof from PL WE. Then we combine the secure chameleon hash function and our new scheme, prove that our new combined signature is still secure in the quantum random oracle model.
The fundamental security of cryptographic protocols hinges on two intertwined pillars: secrecy and randomness. In classical cryptography, the relationship between these concepts is well-understood, often formalized through information theory and computational complexity. However, the advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to many classical cryptographic primitives, necessitating a transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper explores the critical notion of the secrecy-randomness equivalence within the context of post-quantum protocols. We delve into how the definitions and relationships between perfect secrecy, computational secrecy, true randomness, and pseudorandomness are impacted by quantum adversaries and quantum information theory. Specifically, we investigate whether the classical equivalence – where sufficient randomness can guarantee secrecy and robust secrecy often relies on high-quality randomness – holds or requires re-evaluation in a post-quantum landscape. We analyze the implications for the design and security proofs of various PQC families, including lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes, considering the role of quantum random number generators (QRNGs) and the potential for quantum-enhanced attacks on randomness. Our findings suggest that while the core principles remain, the practical realization and theoretical guarantees of this equivalence become more nuanced, demanding careful consideration of quantum-resistant randomness sources and revised security models to ensure the long-term integrity of post-quantum cryptographic systems.