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Probability and branching in Everettian Quantum Physics

Nadia Blackshaw

Published Oct 1, 2023• 0 citations
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Objective Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics

Alastair Wilson

David Wallace has given a decision-theoretic argument for the Born Rule in the context of Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM). This approach promises to resolve some long-standing problems with probability in EQM, but it has faced plenty of resistance. One kind of objection (the ‘incoherence problem’) charges that the requisite notion of decision-theoretic uncertainty is unavailable in the Everettian picture, so that the argument cannot gain any traction; another kind of objection grants the proof’s applicability and targets the premises. In this article I propose some novel principles connecting the physics of EQM with the metaphysics of modality, and argue that in the resulting framework the incoherence problem does not arise. These principles also help to justify one of the most controversial premises of Wallace’s argument, ‘branching indifference’. Absent any a priori reason to align the metaphysics with the physics in some other way, the proposed principles can be adopted on grounds of theoretical utility. The upshot is that Everettians can, after all, make clear sense of objective probability. 1 Introduction 2 Setup 3 Individualism versus Collectivism 4 The Ingredients of Indexicalism 5 Indexicalism and Incoherence 5.1 The trivialization problem 5.2 The uncertainty problem 6 Indexicalism and Branching Indifference 6.1 Introducing branching indifference 6.2 The pragmatic defence of branching indifference 6.3 The non-existence defence of branching indifference 6.4 The indexicalist defence of branching indifference 7 Conclusion

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Oct 7, 2012•52 citations

The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists

Foad Dizadji-Bahmani

Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities and recover the Born rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the theorem, ‘branching indifference’ (BI). I argue that Wallace is not successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational and which violates BI. This is ‘branch counting’ (BC). Wallace is aware of BC and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the probability problem in EQM persists. 1 Introduction 2 Branching Indifference 2.1 The positive argument for branching indifference 2.2 The negative argument for branching indifference 2.3 Branching indifference section summary 3 Branch Counting 3.1 Branch counting is rational under the subjective-uncertainty viewpoint 3.2 Branch counting is rational under the objective-determinism viewpoint 3.3 Branch counting section summary 4 Number of Branches 4.1 Veracity of the framework 4.2 No such thing as the number of branches 4.2.1 The number of branches is indeterminate 4.2.2 The number of branches is indeterminable 4.3 Rationality and weight 5 Conclusion

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Oct 3, 2013•20 citations
David Wallace has given a decision-theoretic argument for the Born Rule in the context of Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM). This approach promises to resolve some long-standing problems with probability in EQM, but it has faced plenty of resistance. One kind of objection (the ‘incoherence problem’) charges that the requisite notion of decision-theoretic uncertainty is unavailable in the Everettian picture, so that the argument cannot gain any traction; another kind of objection grants the proof’s applicability and targets the premises. In this article I propose some novel principles connecting the physics of EQM with the metaphysics of modality, and argue that in the resulting framework the incoherence problem does not arise. These principles also help to justify one of the most controversial premises of Wallace’s argument, ‘branching indifference’. Absent any a priori reason to align the metaphysics with the physics in some other way, the proposed principles can be adopted on grounds of theoretical utility. The upshot is that Everettians can, after all, make clear sense of objective probability. 1 Introduction 2 Setup 3 Individualism versus Collectivism 4 The Ingredients of Indexicalism 5 Indexicalism and Incoherence 5.1 The trivialization problem 5.2 The uncertainty problem 6 Indexicalism and Branching Indifference 6.1 Introducing branching indifference 6.2 The pragmatic defence of branching indifference 6.3 The non-existence defence of branching indifference 6.4 The indexicalist defence of branching indifference 7 Conclusion
Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities and recover the Born rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the theorem, ‘branching indifference’ (BI). I argue that Wallace is not successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational and which violates BI. This is ‘branch counting’ (BC). Wallace is aware of BC and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the probability problem in EQM persists. 1 Introduction 2 Branching Indifference 2.1 The positive argument for branching indifference 2.2 The negative argument for branching indifference 2.3 Branching indifference section summary 3 Branch Counting 3.1 Branch counting is rational under the subjective-uncertainty viewpoint 3.2 Branch counting is rational under the objective-determinism viewpoint 3.3 Branch counting section summary 4 Number of Branches 4.1 Veracity of the framework 4.2 No such thing as the number of branches 4.2.1 The number of branches is indeterminate 4.2.2 The number of branches is indeterminable 4.3 Rationality and weight 5 Conclusion