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Communications in Physics

Composable Security of Decoy-State BB84 with Semiconductor Laser Phase Noise: A Unified Source–Channel Model and Parameter-Dependent Key-Rate Bounds

Wadhah Al-Zofi

Published Mar 20, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Decoy-state BB84 security proofs often assume fully phase-randomized coherent pulses, yet gain-switched semiconductor lasers exhibit parameter-dependent phase diffusion that leaves inter-pulse correlations. We present a unified source–channel model that maps measurable linewidth, pulse spacing, and intensity modulation to effective photon-number statistics and state overlaps, and integrate it into a finite-size, composable security analysis against general attacks. The resulting key-rate bounds depend explicitly on phase-noise parameters, revealing how residual phase memory tightens decoy estimates and increases privacy amplification. Simulations with 0.2 dB/km fiber loss, InGaAs APDs (10% efficiency, 6×10^−7 dark counts/gate), misalignment 5×10^−3, and 10^8–10^12 pulses show reach reductions of tens of km, while MHz linewidths enable secure 100–130 km operation at total security ≈10^−15.

DOI
10.15625/0868-3166/24012

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This paper develops a theoretical model for source-side implementation security in practical decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD). The research object is a weak-coherent-pulse transmitter in which the emitted mean photon number is affected not only by the selected decoy setting, but also by semiconductor-laser dynamics, electrical drive response, intensity-modulator memory, residual optical effects, and slow drift. The transmitter is described at two modelling levels. The first layer is a nonlinear continuous-time carrier-photon-phase model used to explain physical mechanisms. The second layer is a pulse-indexed validation surrogate obtained by sampling the emitted pulse train under a declared operating regime and stroboscopic extraction rule. This distinction avoids treating a local discrete model as a globally valid replacement for nonlinear gain-switched laser dynamics. The model maps the selected intensity sequence to the actual pulse mean photon number, defines an operational memory length, and introduces vacuum-safe deviation metrics, residual-correlation diagnostics, conditional intensity laws, and photon-number probability intervals. These quantities are explicitly distinguished from composable security parameters. The security interpretation is an assumption audit: if the emitted intensity or phase statistics are history dependent, the standard decoy-state reduction to setting-independent photon-number yields and error rates is no longer automatic. The proposed framework therefore does not claim a new complete QKD security proof; it identifies measurable source quantities that must be exported to an appropriate finite-key or imperfect-source proof. The result is a mathematically traceable bridge between transmitter dynamics, source validation, and implementation-security requirements for practical decoy-state QKD systems. The objective of this paper is to develop a mathematically traceable dynamic source-deviation model for practical decoy-state QKD transmitters and to show how transmitter memory affects the assumptions used in decoy-state security analysis.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises provably secure communications. In order to improve the secret key rate, combining a biased basis choice with the decoy-state method is proposed. Concomitantly, there is a basis-independent detection efficiency condition, which usually cannot be satisfied in a practical system, such as the time-phase encoding. Fortunately, this flaw has been recently removed theoretically and experimentally in the four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol using the fact that the expected yields of single-photon states prepared in two bases stay the same for a given measurement basis. However, the security proofs do not fully consider the finite-key effects for general attacks. In this work, we provide the rigorous finite-key security bounds in the universally composable framework for the four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol. We build a time-phase encoding system with 200 MHz clock to implement this protocol, in which the real-time secret key rate is more than 60 kbps over 50 km single-mode fiber.
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) modulators inevitably introduce correlations, causing the state emitted in a given round to depend on the setting choices made in previous rounds. These correlations break the round-by-round independence structure on which many widely used security proof techniques rely, leaving a significant gap between available theoretical guarantees and the reality of practical implementations. In this work, we develop a fully analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state BB84 against general coherent attacks that rigorously incorporates correlations introduced by Alice's bit-and-basis encoder, while requiring only partial characterization of such correlations. Crucially, it does so without requiring the round partitioning of the data used for phase-error estimation introduced in previous works, showing that this technique is not indispensable for dealing with correlated encoders, and resulting in improved finite-key performance. Moreover, we also analyze the case of ideal single-photon sources, and our results reveal a counterintuitive effect: in the presence of strong encoding correlations, decoy-state BB84 can outperform single-photon implementations.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is immune to detector side channel attacks, which is a notorious security loophole problem in QKD. Importantly, both finite-key effects and intensity fluctuations of the practical photon sources are nonnegligible in a full key rate analysis of practical QKD. In this paper, for the case with finite-key effects and without intensity fluctuations, we present a way to estimate the phase error rate for MDI-QKD and compare performances of the parameter estimation based on Hoeffding’s inequality and the Chernoff bound. By using Azuma’s inequality, we also present the finite-key analysis with composable security against general attacks for a biased decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol with intensity fluctuations. Our simulation results show that the effect of our phase error rate estimation is almost the same as the results in Phys. Rev. A91, 022313 (2015)PLRAAN1050-294710.1103/PhysRevA.91.022313, and the parameter estimation using the Chernoff bound is tighter than that using Hoeffding’s inequality. In addition, the influence of intensity fluctuations is more obvious when the data size of total transmitting signals is small. Our results highlight that it is important to keep the stability of the intensity modulator and estimate accurately the emitted pulse’s intensity for practical implementations.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables the sharing of cryptographic keys secured by quantum mechanics. The BB84 protocol assumes single-photon sources, but practical systems rely on weak coherent pulses vulnerable to Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) attacks. The Gottesman-Lo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) framework addresses these imperfections, deriving secure key rate bounds under limited PNS scenarios. The decoy-state protocol further improves performance by refining single-photon yield estimates, but still considers multi-photon states as insecure, thereby limiting intensities and constraining key rate and distance. More recently, finite-key security bounds for decoy-state QKD have been extended to address general attacks, ensuring security against adversaries capable of exploiting arbitrary strategies. In this work, we focus on a specific class of attacks, the generalized PNS attack, and demonstrate that higher pulse intensities can be securely used by employing Bayesian inference to estimate key parameters directly from observed data. By raising the pulse intensity to 10 photons, we achieve a 50-fold increase in key rate and a 62.2% increase in operational range (about 200 km) compared to the decoy-state protocol. Furthermore, we accurately model after-pulsing using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and reveal inaccuracies in decoy-state calculations that may produce erroneous key-rate estimates. While this methodology does not address all possible attacks, it provides a new approach to security proofs in QKD by shifting from worst-case assumption analysis to observation-dependent inference, advancing the reach and efficiency of discrete-variable QKD protocols.
The decoy-state method serves as a cornerstone for practical quantum key distribution (QKD) with inherent immunity to photon-number-splitting attacks. Leveraging optical injection locking, we propose a directly modulated light source with a scheme that simultaneously generates intensity- and phase-modulated signals without external modulators. Removing external modulators eliminates modulator-related side-channel vulnerabilities, fundamentally enhancing QKD security. Integrated into a high-speed phase-encoding BB84 system with optimized one-decoy protocol and finite-size analysis, our system achieves positive key rates up to 20 dB channel loss (100 km fiber) with commercial InGaAs single-photon detectors, reducing transmitter complexity while ensuring security for practical QKD applications.