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Elsevier eBooks

Everettian Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

Nadia Blackshaw, Alexander Franklin

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/b978-0-443-40622-5.00035-9

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Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson

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In Bradley ([2011b]), I offered an analysis of Sleeping Beauty and the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics (EQM). I argued that one can avoid a kind of easy confirmation of EQM by paying attention to observation selection effects, that halfers are right about Sleeping Beauty, and that thirders cannot avoid easy confirmation for the truth of EQM. Wilson ([forthcoming]) agrees with my analysis of observation selection effects in EQM, but goes on to, first, defend Elga’s ([2000]) thirder argument on Sleeping Beauty and, second, argue that the analogy I draw between Sleeping Beauty and EQM fails. I will argue that neither point succeeds. 1 Introduction2 Background3 Wilson’s Argument for ⅓ in Sleeping Beauty4 Reply: Explaining Away the Crazy5 Wilson's Argument for the Breakdown of the Analogy6 Reply: The Irrelevance of Chance7 Conclusion

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Introduction

Alyssa Ney

The aim of this volume is to develop and evaluate the suggestion that if one adopts the interpretation of quantum mechanics initially proposed by Hugh Everett, today frequently referred to as the “many-worlds interpretation,” then one can avoid the kind of nonlocality that is often thought to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches, and thus permit the compatibility of these two pillars of modern physics: quantum mechanics and special relativity. Although this is an idea that seems to have been recognized by Everett and is sometimes touted as a reason to prefer his approach to interpreting quantum mechanics over others, the precise way in which Everett’s interpretation achieves this locality, indeed whether it even does achieve locality, has been debated, including among the interpretation’s proponents. The aim of this introductory chapter is to provide readers with a background of this debate concerning the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics. We begin with a brief historical introduction to Everett’s proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics and its later development into the many-worlds interpretation. The following section discusses how the by now well-established phenomenon of quantum entanglement seems to imply what Albert Einstein, in a 1947 letter to Max Born, called “spooky action at a distance,” and a tension with special relativity. We then discuss why one might think that the many-worlds interpretation allows one to avoid nonlocality in this sense. The next sections bring the reader up to date with how the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics has been debated both by critics and proponents of the interpretation. As we will see, the desire to understand Everettian quantum mechanics as an interpretation that avoids nonlocality has opened up some interesting debates concerning both what it means to say an interpretation of quantum mechanics is local and over the metaphysical and mathematical interpretation of Everettian quantum mechanics itself. This introductory chapter concludes with a summary of the contributions to the present volume in the context of this ongoing debate.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Aug 26, 2026•0 citations

The irreducibility of chemistry to Everettian quantum mechanics

Ryan Michael Miller

Abstract The question of whether chemical structure is reducible to Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM) should be of interest to philosophers of chemistry and philosophers of physics alike. Among the three realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, EQM resolves the measurement problem by claiming that measurements (now interpreted as instances of decoherence) have indeterminate outcomes absolutely speaking, but determinate outcomes relative to emergent worlds—Maudlin (Topoi, 14:7-15, 1995). Philosophers who wish to be sensitive to the practice of quantum chemistry e.g. Scerri (The changing views of a philosopher of chemistry on the question of reduction, 2016) should be interested in EQM because Franklin and Seifert (J. Philos. Sci, 2020) claim that resolving the measurement problem also resolves the reducibility of chemical structure, and EQM is the interpretation which involves no mathematical structure beyond that used by practicing scientists. Philosophers interested in the quantum interpretation debate should be interested in the reducibility of chemistry because chemical structure is precisely the kind of determinate three-dimensional fact which EQM should be able to ground if it is to be empirically coherent—see Allori (Quantum Rep, 5:80-101, 2023). The prospects for reduction of chemical structure are poor if it cannot succeed in EQM; the prospects for EQM as a guide to ontology are poor if it cannot reduce chemical structure. Unfortunately for proponents of chemical reduction and EQM, there are three serious barriers to the reduction of chemistry to EQM. The first concern is that quantum treatments of chemical structure rely on the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, which holds nuclear locations fixed while minimizing the energy of the electronic configuration—Hendry (Philosophical Perspectives in Quantum Chemistry, 147-172, 2022), but this approximation is not licensed by EQM. The Born-Oppenheimer approximation relies on nuclei and molecular orbitals being simultaneously present, but in the three-dimensional ontology following from the Everett interpretation these only emerge at different energy scales and are not simultaneously present—Miller (Found. Chem, 25:405-417, 2023). The second concern is that the emergent worlds of EQM are supposed to be decoherent at the macro-scale—Wilson (The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism 2020), but the recent development of superchemistry suggests that chemical reactions can occur in coherent states—Zhang et al. (Nat. Phys, 1-5, 2023). The third concern is that emergent worlds are only pragmatic pseudo-processes—Wallace (The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum Theory According to the Everett Interpretation, 2012b), but this means EQM trades realist physics for mere instrumentalism about chemistry. Absent a commitment to chemical realism, reduction is an empty promise. The prospects for reduction of chemical structure to EQM are therefore poor.

Foundations of Chemistry•Jan 29, 2025•1 citation
In Bradley ([2011b]), I offered an analysis of Sleeping Beauty and the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics (EQM). I argued that one can avoid a kind of easy confirmation of EQM by paying attention to observation selection effects, that halfers are right about Sleeping Beauty, and that thirders cannot avoid easy confirmation for the truth of EQM. Wilson ([forthcoming]) agrees with my analysis of observation selection effects in EQM, but goes on to, first, defend Elga’s ([2000]) thirder argument on Sleeping Beauty and, second, argue that the analogy I draw between Sleeping Beauty and EQM fails. I will argue that neither point succeeds. 1 Introduction2 Background3 Wilson’s Argument for ⅓ in Sleeping Beauty4 Reply: Explaining Away the Crazy5 Wilson's Argument for the Breakdown of the Analogy6 Reply: The Irrelevance of Chance7 Conclusion
The aim of this volume is to develop and evaluate the suggestion that if one adopts the interpretation of quantum mechanics initially proposed by Hugh Everett, today frequently referred to as the “many-worlds interpretation,” then one can avoid the kind of nonlocality that is often thought to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches, and thus permit the compatibility of these two pillars of modern physics: quantum mechanics and special relativity. Although this is an idea that seems to have been recognized by Everett and is sometimes touted as a reason to prefer his approach to interpreting quantum mechanics over others, the precise way in which Everett’s interpretation achieves this locality, indeed whether it even does achieve locality, has been debated, including among the interpretation’s proponents. The aim of this introductory chapter is to provide readers with a background of this debate concerning the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics. We begin with a brief historical introduction to Everett’s proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics and its later development into the many-worlds interpretation. The following section discusses how the by now well-established phenomenon of quantum entanglement seems to imply what Albert Einstein, in a 1947 letter to Max Born, called “spooky action at a distance,” and a tension with special relativity. We then discuss why one might think that the many-worlds interpretation allows one to avoid nonlocality in this sense. The next sections bring the reader up to date with how the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics has been debated both by critics and proponents of the interpretation. As we will see, the desire to understand Everettian quantum mechanics as an interpretation that avoids nonlocality has opened up some interesting debates concerning both what it means to say an interpretation of quantum mechanics is local and over the metaphysical and mathematical interpretation of Everettian quantum mechanics itself. This introductory chapter concludes with a summary of the contributions to the present volume in the context of this ongoing debate.
Abstract The question of whether chemical structure is reducible to Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM) should be of interest to philosophers of chemistry and philosophers of physics alike. Among the three realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, EQM resolves the measurement problem by claiming that measurements (now interpreted as instances of decoherence) have indeterminate outcomes absolutely speaking, but determinate outcomes relative to emergent worlds—Maudlin (Topoi, 14:7-15, 1995). Philosophers who wish to be sensitive to the practice of quantum chemistry e.g. Scerri (The changing views of a philosopher of chemistry on the question of reduction, 2016) should be interested in EQM because Franklin and Seifert (J. Philos. Sci, 2020) claim that resolving the measurement problem also resolves the reducibility of chemical structure, and EQM is the interpretation which involves no mathematical structure beyond that used by practicing scientists. Philosophers interested in the quantum interpretation debate should be interested in the reducibility of chemistry because chemical structure is precisely the kind of determinate three-dimensional fact which EQM should be able to ground if it is to be empirically coherent—see Allori (Quantum Rep, 5:80-101, 2023). The prospects for reduction of chemical structure are poor if it cannot succeed in EQM; the prospects for EQM as a guide to ontology are poor if it cannot reduce chemical structure. Unfortunately for proponents of chemical reduction and EQM, there are three serious barriers to the reduction of chemistry to EQM. The first concern is that quantum treatments of chemical structure rely on the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, which holds nuclear locations fixed while minimizing the energy of the electronic configuration—Hendry (Philosophical Perspectives in Quantum Chemistry, 147-172, 2022), but this approximation is not licensed by EQM. The Born-Oppenheimer approximation relies on nuclei and molecular orbitals being simultaneously present, but in the three-dimensional ontology following from the Everett interpretation these only emerge at different energy scales and are not simultaneously present—Miller (Found. Chem, 25:405-417, 2023). The second concern is that the emergent worlds of EQM are supposed to be decoherent at the macro-scale—Wilson (The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism 2020), but the recent development of superchemistry suggests that chemical reactions can occur in coherent states—Zhang et al. (Nat. Phys, 1-5, 2023). The third concern is that emergent worlds are only pragmatic pseudo-processes—Wallace (The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum Theory According to the Everett Interpretation, 2012b), but this means EQM trades realist physics for mere instrumentalism about chemistry. Absent a commitment to chemical realism, reduction is an empty promise. The prospects for reduction of chemical structure to EQM are therefore poor.