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Elsevier eBooks

Quantum cybersecurity in IIoT-based power grids

Mahmoud Ahmad Al-Khasawneh, R. Gopal, Feslin Anish Mon, Deepa Mallika Muthiah

Published Jan 1, 2026• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/b978-0-443-38349-6.00010-5

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